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This thesis examines the Commonwealth electoral laws, policies and processes of Australia, and in 
doing so, highlights where substantial inequality barriers exist that limit the political participation of 
Aboriginal Australians. The thesis acknowledges that Indigenous Australians comprise two distinct 
cultural identities (Aboriginal People and Torres Strait Islanders) who share different experiences 
with disenfranchisement in Australia, despite shared similar colonised pasts. This research primarily 
focuses on the disenfranchisement experiences of Aboriginal Australians. It is argued that the low 
political participation rates prevalent amongst Australia’s Aboriginal population point to inadequate 
adherence by Australian governments to principles of representative democracy and proportionality. 
In particular, formalised voting rights and candidacy rights within the Australian Constitution, case 
law and Commonwealth electoral legislation do not adequately address current barriers to 
Aboriginal political participation. Contextual understandings of Aboriginal experiences are 
discussed that surround the disenfranchisement of prisoners and the disproportionately high rates of 
Aboriginal incarceration. Aboriginal prisoners are particularly vulnerable to falling into the 
‘unsound mind’ electoral disqualification. The culmination of each of these legislative and policy 
barriers limits their ability not only to qualify as electors, but also to run for political office. 
Potential solutions to overcoming those issues are sought from the comparator countries of Canada 
and New Zealand. Canada, for instance, is supportive and inclusive of prisoners exercising their 
democratic rights to vote as citizens, even whilst incarcerated for a lengthy term of imprisonment. 
The case law supportive of such an approach is considered, alongside electoral laws and policies of 
Canada that protect First Nations self-determination rights expressed and exercised through voting.  
New Zealand is also more aligned with proportionate representative democratic practices as 
evidenced with its Mixed Member Proportionate system. This thesis particularly examines its 
establishment of the Maori Electoral Roll Option and Maori designated seats in Parliament as policy 
and institutional solutions that support Maori self-determination and political participation. 
Lastly, the Uluru Statement from the Heart proposals that call for the establishment of a First 
Nation Voice to Parliament, Makarrata Commission and Truth-Telling Commission are other means 
this thesis deems integral for Aboriginal self-determination and political participation. Similar 
Indigenous representative bodies established in New Zealand and Canada that have evidenced 
meaningful impact and protection of their Indigenous Peoples’ cultural identity are considered in 
terms of their design and structures. 
 
iv 
Ultimately, this thesis suggests that Australia should reform its current electoral laws, policies and 
processes that limit Aboriginal political participation and self-determination, in ways that are more 
reflective of models and outcomes established in Canada and New Zealand which are beneficial to 
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My name is Dani Larkin and I am a Bundjalung woman from Grafton, New South Wales. I grew up 
on Bundjalung land and was raised with a strong connection to my Aboriginal culture. My 
Aboriginal identity and experiences of culture, identity politics and overt racial discrimination have 
guided me to undertake a Doctor of Philosophy on Indigenous cultural identity and political 
participation rights. My aim in doing so is to make progressive contributions to necessary law and 
policy reform in Australia for a better future for my people and my culture. 
Despite sovereignty never being ceded and my Aboriginal cultural identity having its own laws and 
political frameworks, I choose to write this thesis within already well-established and recognised 
Westernised Anglo-Australian legal frameworks. In doing so, my aim is to show how principles of 
equality and political participation can be rehabilitated and used as a progressive means of law and 
policy reform that enhance and protect Indigenous rights and cultural identity. This thought-process 
of adhering to moral and ethical considerations of equality within law and policy reform shows how 
existing Westernised frameworks can create pathways to meaningful change and reconciliation for 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
We refuse to be pushed into the background. We have decided to make ourselves heard. 
White men pretend that the Australian Aboriginal is a low type, who cannot be bettered. 
Our reply to that is, ‘Give us the chance!’ We do not wish to be left behind in 
Australia’s march to progress. We ask for full citizen rights including old-age pensions, 
maternity bonus, relief work when unemployed, and the right to a full Australian 
education for our children. We do not wish to be herded like cattle and treated as a 
special class.1 
 
This thesis argues that in Australia there are significant barriers that contribute to the low political 
participation rates of Indigenous Australians (both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people).2 
For example, studies from the Australian Electoral Commission show that only half of the less than 
3 per cent of the Australian population that is Indigenous registers to vote.3 
Further, out of those enrolled to vote, only half again of that Indigenous population turns up to vote 
at polling stations on the day of voting or fills in their ballot paper correctly.4 Thus, despite having a 
formalised right to vote in federal elections since 1962,5 there are substantial barriers for Indigenous 
Australians gaining access to that right and exercising it, including those arising from the 
incarceration exclusion if sentenced to three years or more imprisonment6 and being classified as a 
person of ‘unsound mind’.7 
Disenfranchisement from voting at federal elections can also deem a person ineligible to run as a 
political candidate in federal parliament under the Australian Constitution8 which expressly 
disqualifies a person from becoming a member of federal parliament if they are ineligible to enrol to 
vote as an elector. 
Another means of political participation Indigenous Australians have sought to rely upon at a 
federal level has been through exercise (albeit limited) of their right to self-governance through 
                                                             
1 Jack Patten: Do White Australians Realise That There Is Actual Slavery in This Fair, Progressive Commonwealth? 
Opening Address to Day of Mourning Protest – 1938 (Speakola, 2009) <https://speakola.com/ideas/jack-patton-day-of-
mourning-1938>. 
2 The use of the term ‘Indigenous’ is explained further in Part III of this chapter. 
3 Additional Performance Information – AEC Annual Report 2015 
16 <http://annualreport.aec.gov.au/2016/performance/additional.html>; 2016 Federal Election Key Facts and Figures 
<https://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Federal_Elections/2016/key-facts.htm>. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1962, Act No. 31 of 1962 (Repealed by 1901 Amending Act). 
6 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s 93 (8AA). 
7 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s 93 (8) (a). 
8 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 44. 
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their own Indigenous body representation. However, this has also been scarce and inadequate for 
Indigenous people in terms of being involved in federal decision-making processes on laws and 
policies about Indigenous cultural affairs. To date, Indigenous body representation has been limited 
to its establishment through Commonwealth legislation.9 This has left those bodies susceptible to 
repeal under general federal parliament law-making powers according to the government policy of 
the day which can extinguish a legislated Indigenous representative body and detrimentally impact 
upon Indigenous political representation. A prime example of this occurring is the establishment 
and demise of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC).10 
This thesis explores direct and indirect barriers Indigenous Australians face that limit their exercise 
of political participation and representation rights as components intrinsic to self-determination – 
itself a feature of expression of cultural identity. In doing so, this thesis also examines beneficial 
measures implemented in other similar jurisdictions (Canada and New Zealand) to support political 
participation of their Indigenous people.  
This thesis adds to the existing body of knowledge through providing a contemporary analysis and 
recommendation of how legal pluralism can exist that politically empowers and protects the cultural 
identity of Indigenous colonised peoples. The analysis differs from other Australian scholars like 
Irene Watson who challenge the need for Aboriginal participation within the colonial paradigm.11 
Instead, this thesis suggests ways in which theoretical governing frameworks of Australia’s 
                                                             
9 For example, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission was established from the passing of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
Amendment Act (No. 1) 1999 (Cth); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Amendment Act 2005 (Cth); 
the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples was formed as an incorporated company independent from the 
Australian Government limited by guarantee in April 2010. Like all other Indigenous representative bodies that have 
been formed in Australia, the Congress is not legislatively or constitutionally entrenched and therefore formally 
protected, which has posed issues with the amount of government funding those bodies receive to reach their objectives 
and service deliverables to make meaningful impact to Indigenous lives across Australia that are in need. See Lorena 
Allam, ‘Dodson, Burney Call For Government To Fund National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples’ (The Guardian, 
12 June 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jun/12/national-congress-of-australias-first-peoples-
fights-for-financial-survival>; Building a Sustainable National Indigenous Representative Body – Issues for 
Consideration (An Issues Paper prepared by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, in 
accordance with s 46C (1) (b) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), 2008). 
10 Gary Foley, ATSIC: Flaws in the Machine (The Koori History Website, 15 November 1999) 
<http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/essay_4.html>; J. Robbins, ‘Life After ATSIC: Indigenous Citizenship in an 
Era of Mutual Obligation’ (Paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Annual Conference, University of 
Otago, 28 September 2005); Larissa Behrendt, ‘The Abolition of ATSIC – Implications for Democracy’ (Democratic 
Audit of Australia, 2005); M. Phillips, ‘Howard Abolishes ATSIC’, The Courier-Mail (16 April 2004); S. Morris, S. 
Lewis and B. Hickman, ‘Labor to Scrap ATSIC’, The Australian (31 March 2004); Scott Bennett and Angela 
Pratt, ‘The End of ATSIC and the Future Administration of Indigenous Affairs: Current Issues Brief No. 4, 2004–
05’ (Department of Parliamentary Services, 2004). 
11 Irene Watson, Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law: Raw Law (Routlege, 2015); Irene Watson, 
‘Re-Centring First Nations Knowledge and Places in a Terra Nullius Space’ (2014) 10(5) AlterNative 508-520; Irene 
Watson, ‘First Nations and the Colonial Project’ (2016) 1(1) Inter Gentes 30. 
 
3 
democratic regime might be reformed through domestic electoral laws, processes and policies that 
best acknowledge Indigenous self-determination rights and protect Indigenous cultural identity 
through access to political participation. 
Whilst this thesis draws upon the work of the relevant scholars who engage with recent issues that 
surround calls for Indigenous Constitutional recognition that provide a substantive means of 
political equality and cultural autonomy, it is but one component of the analysis this thesis engages 
with in terms of assessing Indigenous political participation.12 
For instance, most of the current contributions that surround the need for Indigenous constitutional 
reform focus on the need to create institutions of differentiated Indigenous representation.13 This 
particular recommendation forms only one component of what this thesis terms to be necessary for 
law reform in Australia that would seek to enhance Indigenous political participation.  
This thesis examines other elements of political participation like voting and candidacy alongside 
constitutional reform proposals that call for an increased establishment of entrenched national 
Indigenous body representation. The voting and candidacy elements defined within what this thesis 
terms to be political participation provide, in addition to its constitutional law analysis, an 
additional examination into broader electoral laws and policies. This places the work that underpins 
the Uluru Statement from the Heart and the preceding Final Report of the Referendum Council in a 
different context that considers other democratic rights and law and policy barriers that limit access 
to those rights of Indigenous Australians. It shows that there are several law and policy reform steps 
that need to be taken to fully enhance the political participation of Indigenous Australians and 
adherence of the Australian Government to principles of representative democracy. 
                                                             
12 Final Report of the Referendum Council (Commonwealth of Australia, 2018); G. Williams, and D. Hume, People 
Power: The History and Future of the Referendum in Australia (UNSW Press, 2010); George Williams, Human Rights 
under the Australian Constitution (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1999); George Williams, ‘Recognising 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in the Constitution’ (2015) 34 University of Tasmania Law Review 114; 
Gabrielle Appleby and Megan Davis, ‘The Uluru Statement and the Promises of Truth’ (2018) 49(4) Australian 
Historical Studies 501 - 509; Gabrielle Appleby and Gemma McKinnon, ‘Indigenous recognition: The Uluru statement’ 
(2017) 37 Law Society of NSW Journal 36 – 39; Megan Davis, ‘Constitutional reform and Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people: why do we want it now?’ (2011) 7(25) Indigenous Law Bulletin 8; Megan Davis, ‘The Long Road to 
Uluru Walking Together: Truth before Justice’ (2018) 60 Griffith Review 13, 41 – 45; Megan Davis and Marcia 
Langton, It’s Our Country (Melbourne University Press, 2016); Dylan Lino, Constitutional Recognition: First Peoples 
and the Australian Settler State (Federation Press, 2018). 
13 Dani Larkin and Kate Galloway, ‘Uluru Statement from the Heart: Australian Public Law Pluralism’ (2018) 30(2) 
Bond Law Review <https://blr.scholasticahq.com/article/6796-uluru-statement-from-the-heart-australian-public-law-
pluralism>; Final Report of the Referendum Council (Commonwealth of Australia, 2018); Referendum Council, 
‘Discussion Paper on Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ (Law Council of 
Australia, 19 May 2017). 
 
4 
There are a number of ways in which this thesis highlights that Indigenous Australians are still 
limited from the Australian franchise. The primary focus of this thesis examines the pathway to 
disenfranchisement Indigenous Australians experience. In doing so, this thesis shows how their 
high and disproportionate representation in the out-of-home care system leads to a greater 
likelihood of their imprisonment which, if incarcerated for a lengthy term of three years or more in 
prison, contributes to their electoral disqualification to enrol and to vote.14  
From there, a broader and more comprehensive understanding can be formulated, that shows how 
other co-existing and necessary areas of Australian electoral law and policy reform would 
complement proposals outlined in the Uluru Statement from the Heart and enhance Indigenous self-
determination and political participation. 
The Canadian comparator analysed in this thesis involves the framework of voting participation. 
Canada formally disqualifies citizens from voting if they are serving a term of incarceration of two 
years or more. Like Australia, Canada also has high levels of incarceration and persons deemed of 
‘unsound mind’ who happen to be of First Nation descent. However, despite Canada’s disqualifying 
provision, it has been ineffective since the handing down of the decision in Sauvé.15 Canada also 
has a clearer process for determining whether a person is deemed of ‘unsound mind’ and supporting 
some of those persons to still engage in voting. Thus, it works as a useful example of how an 
overarching framework in the Australian context might support its Indigenous citizens currently 
limited from voting because of those disqualifications. 
The New Zealand comparator deployed in this thesis involves candidacy representation. Unlike 
Australia, New Zealand safeguards designated seats in parliament for Maori candidates.16 Further, 
to determine whether those designated seats are increased or remain the same (currently there are 
four seats) the New Zealand electoral system encourages Maori voters to enrol to vote on the Maori 
Electoral Roll Option.17 This separate enrolment option provides direct Maori political data to the 
New Zealand Government that is used to determine together with Maori census data whether 
                                                             
14 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162; Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
(National Report Volumes 1-4, 15 April 1991). 
15 Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) [2002] 3 SCR 519. 
16 Maori Representation Act 1867 (NZ); Rozalind Dibley, Maori Representation in Parliament: The Four Maori Seats 
(MA Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1993); Augie Fleras, ‘From Social Control towards Political Self-
Determination? Maori Seats and the Politics of Separate Maori Representation in New Zealand’ (1985) 18(3) Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 551; Andrew Geddis, ‘A Dual Track Democracy? The Symbolic Role of the Maori Seats in 
New Zealand’s Electoral System’ (2006) 5(4) Election Law Journal 347. 
17 Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), s 76. 
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electoral boundaries need to be adjusted and whether an increase of designated seats in parliament 
needs to occur. In turn, it provides an incentive for Maori to vote and run as political candidates. 
In addition to these two case studies, this thesis also identifies that both Canada and New Zealand 
have more national Indigenous representative bodies compared to Australian First Nations. The 
representative bodies established in Canada and New Zealand are unprotected by their 
Constitutions; however, they have a respected and meaningful presence in their countries’ national 
decision-making on laws and policies that affect their Indigenous peoples.  
The success of their representative measures is likely because of the treaties both countries have in 
place that recognise their Indigenous peoples’ pre-existing rights over the land, and their 
citizenship.18 In turn, those bodies are not reliant on being constitutionally protected because of the 
meaningful inclusion of and respect for First Nations peoples that they have established, and the 
mechanism for relationships with their respective governments. 
Most recently in Australia, the constitutional entrenchment of a Voice to Parliament and a 
Makarrata (or treaty) Commission are being considered as constitutional reform proposals.19 The 
Voice to Parliament, if successful at a referendum, would operate as a representative body that 
would provide guidance and oversight on federal laws and policies that directly and indirectly 
impact upon First Nation affairs. The Makarrata Commission would operate as a treaty supervisory 
body that would oversee treaty negotiations between First Nations and the governments (federal, 
state and territories).20 These mechanisms are therefore part of the analysis in this thesis of the 
potential for institutional frameworks to support Indigenous Australian political participation. 
I. RESEARCH AIMS AND METHOD 
 
The contemporary discourse around the Uluru Statement from the Heart and the proposal for a 
Voice to Parliament21 highlights Indigenous Australians’ exclusion from political participation – 
                                                             
18 For Maori in New Zealand there is the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 (NZ); For First Nations of Canada, since ‘The Royal 
Proclamation’ (7 October 1763), the Canadian Government recognizes 70 historic treaties in Canada signed between 
1701 and 1923 that form the basis of the relationship between the Crown and 364 First Nations. Those treaties include: 
Treaties of Peace and Neutrality (1701–1760), Peace and Friendship Treaties (1725–1779), Upper Canada Land 
Surrenders and the Williams Treaties (1764 –1862/1923), Robinson Treaties and Douglas Treaties (1850 –1854) and 
The Numbered Treaties (1871–1921). 
19 Larkin and Galloway (n 13). 
20 Final Report of the Referendum Council (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017) 2. 
21 Amanda LeCouteur, Mark Rapley and Martha Augoustinos, ‘This Very Difficult Debate about Wik: Stake, Voice and 
the Management of Category Memberships in Race Politics’ (2001) 40 British Journal of Social Psychology 35, 35 –57; 
Rudi Maxwell, ‘Fury as Government Rejects Voice to Parliament’ (Guardian, Sydney, No. 1803, 15 Nov 2017) 3; 
Keith Windschuttle, ‘Aborigines Want More than a Voice in Parliament’ (2017) 61(9) Quadrant 50, 50 –55; Gregory 
Uhr and John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament (Cambridge University 
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both voting and candidacy – in Australia and their ongoing desire to develop an institutional 
response. This thesis posits that the exclusion from political participation is both historical and 
ongoing – that it stems from the very processes establishing Australia’s framework of governance 
and is maintained directly through the institutions and processes of political participation, and 
indirectly through various legislated limitations that fail to apprehend the experiences of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Australians as colonised peoples. The absence of processes equipped to 
take account of these experiences reinforce the indirect limitations resulting in an entrenched 
disenfranchisement of Indigenous Australians. 
This thesis, therefore, seeks first to identify how the structures of Australia’s governance fail at the 
Commonwealth level, both directly and indirectly, to assure Indigenous political participation. In 
particular, it provides an account of the effect of the interrelationship between different components 
of the institutions of representative democracy on Indigenous participation in that system of 
governance. It concludes this account with a case study of select barriers to effective political 
participation: namely the effect of high rates of Indigenous incarceration and the absence of an 
institutional response to the political expression of Indigenous peoples’ needs. It explains how these 
factors function, both directly and indirectly, to inhibit First Nations peoples’ political participation 
and therefore their rights of self-determination. 
Secondly, this thesis aims to identify feasible institutional reform in Australia that would 
structurally address Indigenous political participation within the confines of the colonial legal order. 
This analysis aims to marry Indigenous Australians’ aspirations for communal rights of self-
determination with the institutional norms of Western liberal democracy in the Westminster mould. 
It does so in two steps. 
First, with reference to the select barriers to political participation identified initially, this thesis 
analyses the overarching legal framework within two comparable jurisdictions, Canada and New 
Zealand, to identify a range of institutional responses to the question of Indigenous political 
participation. It identifies institutional frameworks in both jurisdictions that marry various legal 
                                                             
Press, 1998); Sarah Maddison, ‘White Parliament, Black Politics: The Dilemmas of Indigenous Parliamentary 
Representation’ (2010) 45(4) Australian Journal of Political Science 663, 663 – 680; Andrea Felicetti, John Gastil, 
Janette Hartz-Karp and Lyn Carson, ‘Collective Identity and Voice at the Australian Citizens' Parliament’ (2012) 8(1) 
Journal of Public Deliberation Article 5; Lino (n 12); Megan Davis, ‘The Long Road to Uluru Walking Together: Truth 
before Justice’ (2018) 60 Griffith Review 41, 41 – 45; M. Davis, ‘Indigenous rights and the constitution: making the 
case for constitutional reform’ (2008) 7 Indigenous Law Bulletin 6 – 8; Megan Davis, ‘Indigenous Constitutional 
Recognition from the Point of View of Self-Determination and Its Exercise through Democratic Participation’ (2015) 
8(9) Indigenous Law Bulletin 10; G. Williams and D. Hume, People Power: The History and Future of the Referendum 
in Australia (UNSW Press, 2010); George, Williams, ‘Race and the Australian Constitution: From Federation to 
Reconciliation’ (2000) 38(4) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 643; Williams (n 12)114. 
 
7 
strategies – including treaty, constitutional provisions, charter or bill of rights, and electoral laws – 
that together enact principles of self-determination for Indigenous peoples through political 
participation. This analysis involves identifying the role of these institutional arrangements in 
mitigating the adverse effects of the case studies identified initially.  
The second aspect of this institutional inquiry involves an analysis of Indigenous representative 
bodies in Canada and New Zealand, the comparator jurisdictions. These bodies are created under 
domestic legislation22 rather than through constitutional entrenchment, providing a baseline of 
analysis encompassing a broader range of possibilities than constitutional entrenchment per se. To 
answer the question of feasible institutional responses in Australia, this thesis then compares these 
institutions to those that have existed previously in Australia, and those proposed by the Uluru 
Statement from the Heart.23  
Ultimately, this thesis provides an account of barriers to Indigenous political participation in 
Australia and identifies possible institutional reform that might feasibly mitigate those barriers, in 
the framework of a commitment to self-determination as a marker of a robust and healthy 
democracy.24 
This thesis adopts a doctrinal methodology in answering the research question. As a component of 
that methodology, it engages in a comparative legal methodology as described below. 
A. Doctrinal Methodology 
 
The primary methodology of this thesis is a doctrinal methodology. A doctrinal methodology has 
been described as the ‘core legal research method’25 that provides a thorough analysis and ‘research 
into the law and legal concepts’.26 For this research, which focuses on three Commonwealth 
                                                             
22 For example, the Waitangi Tribunal is established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ) and the New Zealand 
Maori Council is established under the Maori Welfare Act 1962 (NZ). Similarly, the Assembly of First Nations replaced 
the National Indian Brotherhood in 1982 following the Declaration of First Nations (signed in December, 1980). The 
Assembly fulfils its role and functions in accordance with the Indian Act 1876, and the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples 
is a political organisation founded in 1971 to represent First Nations interests in Canada.  
23 Uluru Statement from the Heart 2017; P. L. Dodson, Final Report: Joint Select Committee on Constitutional 
Recognition Relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
2018); Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Local Government, Final Report (December 2011). 
24 Anika Gauja, ‘The State of Democracy and Representation in Australia’ (2015) 51(1) Representation 1, 23–24; 
Arend Lijphart, ‘Australian Democracy: Modifying Majoritarianism?’ (1999) 34(3) Australian Journal of Political 
Science 313; Gregory Uhr and John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
25 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17(1) 
Deakin Law Review 83, 85. 
26 Ibid, 101; Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock, Advanced Research Methods in 
the Built Environment (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 29. 
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jurisdictions (Australia, Canada and New Zealand), the doctrinal methodology employed will 
provide an analysis of their legal rules that surround political participation rights of citizens, 
evidenced through voting rights and candidacy. It will undertake a synthesis and understanding of 
each jurisdiction’s electoral laws, policies and national political structures to determine whether 
they fully align with the jurisprudence that so governs them and on which they are based.27  
Thus, a doctrinal systematic exposition of relevant electoral laws and political-legal concepts will 
aim to explain reasons that contribute to lacking Indigenous political participation figures, within 
the Australian political landscape, that further signify why they lack political representation in 
Australian federal politics. The synthesis of Australia’s adherence to its international obligations 
will inform a greater understanding as to why current electoral laws might be considered to inhibit 
the full citizenship rights of Aboriginal people in Australia. 
Electoral laws alone are not sufficient to answer this question. It is also imperative that 
constitutional concepts and values are examined. The legal concepts examined in this thesis that are 
fundamental to empowering and enhancing Indigenous political participation include self-
determination, representative democracy and political equality. Those concepts, together, best 
promote a democratically representative and politically ‘just society’ within a Commonwealth 
democratic regime that has a colonialist past.28 From there, an understanding of how electoral rules 
ought to be within a democratic colonialist background political system can be determined. 
Within this context, the doctrinal analysis of those legal concepts requires consideration of 
international standards surrounding Indigenous political participation rights that define and scope 
what citizen political participation rights might include in terms of voting participation, candidacy 
representation, and national body representation.29 
                                                             
27 Chynoweth, ibid. 
28 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason’ (1995) 92(3) Journal of Philosophy 109. 
29 See, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed 16 December 1966) (entry into 
force 23 March 1976) art 25; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UN GA Dec (Paris: 10 December 1948) art 
21; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res 2200A (XXI) (signed 16 December 
1966) (entry into force 3 January 1976) art 8; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (signed 21 December 1965) (entered into force 4 January 1969) art 5 (c); the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (signed 18 December 1979) (entered into force 3 
September 1981) arts 7 and 8; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (signed 30 March 2007) (3 
May 2008) arts 4 (3), 29, 33 (3); the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities GA Res 47/135 (signed 18 December 1992) art 2 (2); United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 107th plen mtg, Supp No. 49, UN Doc 
A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007) arts 5 and 18; the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action UN GA Res 
61/149 (passed in 2006) art 22; the Declaration on the Rights to Development GA Res 41/128 of 4 December 1986, arts 
1.1, 2 and 8.2; the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to 
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From there, to assess Indigenous political participation rights within Australian domestic laws and 
evaluate whether they are effective or not, this thesis considers Australia’s lack of constitutional 
recognition and arrangements in place between the Australian Government and Indigenous citizens. 
It then analyses those findings against two comparators: Canada and New Zealand. Each 
jurisdiction’s electoral laws, policies and processes that affect their Indigenous peoples’ political 
participation and representation will be analysed alongside other relevant, publicly available 
statistical data, reports and case law.30  Each of those pieces of data will provide context as to the 
political status of each jurisdiction’s Indigenous peoples with regard to their voting participation, 
candidacy representation and national body representation: the three components of political 
participation.  
The doctrinal methodology will identify in each jurisdiction key barriers that limit Indigenous 
political participation at a national level and, for the comparative jurisdictions, highlight beneficial 
measures from which Australia might learn. This includes consideration of issues surrounding 
Indigenous disenfranchisement through blanket-ban applied legislative elector and candidate 
qualifications and disqualifications, and consideration of Australia’s lack of constitutional 
arrangements compared to Canada and New Zealand. Lastly, it will consider the types of 
Indigenous national body representation in each jurisdiction and determine whether, based on the 
data, those bodies are effective in terms of having a meaningful impact and power to self-govern.31 
To achieve an analysis of doctrine per se requires consideration of historical facts. Historical and 
social contexts of each jurisdiction provide a greater understanding as to why and how electoral 
rules, policies and processes in each jurisdiction have come to be, within the dominant post-colonial 
paradigm.32 To be precise, this analysis will be inclusive of examination into constitutions, statutes, 
case law, reports, journal articles and other relevant publicly available statistical data surrounding 
the electoral engagement of Indigenous people. That data will be used to determine what electoral 
                                                             
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms GA Res 53/144 of 9 
December 1998, art 8. 
30 Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock, Advanced Research Methods in the Built Environment (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 
29; Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 
17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, 84; Ashish Kumar Singhal and Ikramuddin Malik, ‘Doctrinal and Socio-legal Methods of 
Research: Merits and Demerits’ (2012) 2(7) Educational Research Journal 253. 
31 This represents a comparative method as described in Hutchinson and Duncan, Ibid. 
32 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ [2015] Law and Method 1; Pauline C. 
Westerman, ‘Open or Autonomous: The Debate on Legal Methodology as a Reflection of the Debate on Law’ [2009] in 
Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011) 87–110. 
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laws and policies should be reformed in order to ensure Indigenous citizens are given full and equal 
access to their exercise of political participation rights. 
The historical context of doctrine will highlight the circumstances that have generated the key 
differences between the three jurisdictions’ approach to engaging their First Nations peoples in the 
political process to provide useful pointers for achieving contemporary standards of human rights 
and meaningful protection of Indigenous Australians’ cultural identity through full access and 
enhancement of their political participation rights.33 These key differences will be teased out 
through a comparative methodology. 
B. Comparative Legal Methodology 
 
Within its doctrinal methodology, this thesis uses a comparative legal method to identify 
institutional benchmarks within a country’s domestic legislation that achieve the goals of political 
equality of First Nations peoples with all other citizens.34 
In identifying ways in which Australian electoral laws, policies and systems are currently 
inadequate in terms of supporting and enhancing Indigenous political participation in Australia, it 
contrasts the approach of equivalent Commonwealth jurisdictions, Canada and New Zealand. Both 
Canada and New Zealand support and enhance their Indigenous peoples’ political participation 
through a combination of different legal mechanisms relevant to the Australian context.  
For instance, whilst Canada was colonised by French and English settlers who based their actions of 
dispossession on a false assumption of terra nullius, First Nations have a longstanding and hard 
fought history of their ascertainment of legal recognition and political standing through treaties and 
constitutional recognition.35 From there, the colonial policy objectives originally established in 
Canada, which were significantly influenced by French and English settlers, has shifted over time to 
a more inclusive cultural policy agenda that recognises the rights and sovereignty of First Nations.36 
                                                             
33 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Legal Research as Qualitative Research’ in Mike McConville, Research Methods 
for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2017) 18; Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law 
(Routledge, 2017) ch 2; Mathias M. Siems and Daithí Mac Síthigh, ‘Mapping Legal Research’ (2012) 71(3) The 
Cambridge Law Journal 655. 
34 Hoecke (n 32).  
35 Jonathan Paquette, Devin Beauregard and Christopher Gunter, ‘Settler Colonialism and Cultural Policy: The Colonial 
Foundations and Refoundations of Canadian Cultural Policy’ (2017) 23 (3) International Journal of Cultural Policy 
271. 
36 Ibid, 274. 
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Another example is seen with the similar way in which New Zealand was colonised by English 
settlers. Like First Nations of Canada, Maori were dispossessed from their lands and have 
experienced a longstanding struggle with continuous debates over, the recognition of their 
sovereignty as a people working in partnership with the British Crown. Whilst much of those 
debates that surround recognition and protection of Maori sovereignty stem from interpretative 
issues and conflict of terms between the English and Maori versions of the Treaty of Waitangi 1840, 
the treaty has been a useful legal tool to assert such rights from Maori.37 In doing so, the treaty itself 
opens a continuous dialogue for Maori and the New Zealand government to engage with on matters 
surrounding Maori cultural identity and political participation.38 
Inherent in this comparison is the recognition in Canada and New Zealand of their Indigenous 
peoples’ cultural identity in ways that are more meaningful and respectful than the approach to 
cultural identity in Australia. Consequently, there is a greater sense of political pluralism within 
Canada and New Zealand – of Western traditions intersected with Indigenous cultures and inclusion 
politically.39  
The aim of this thesis coincides with the objectives that underpin comparative legal research40 
which is to learn information elsewhere as an instrument of evolutionary and taxonomic science to 
improve one’s own legal system.41 Further, choosing only two Commonwealth jurisdictions to 
compare with Australia allows this research to provide a deeper understanding of historical 
developments in each country, to better explain their current situations and relevancy to federal 
electoral reform options that should be considered within Australia.42 Although there are other 
colonised nations with common law legal systems that might provide useful comparison, Canada 
and New Zealand offer a close alignment to the Australian experience in terms of political systems 
and broad Western cultural norms. These similarities are more likely to lead to meaningful 
comparison than some other jurisdictions with a more markedly different cultural and political 
landscape. 
                                                             
37 Te Kani Kingi, ‘The Treaty of Waitangi: A Framework for Maori Health Development’ (2007) 54 (1) New Zealand 
Journal of Occupational Therapy 4-10. 
38 Mark Barrett and Kim Connolly-Stone, ‘The Treaty of Waitangi and Social Policy’ (1998) Social Policy Journal of 
New Zealand 1 – 2; Neil Lunt, Paul Spoonley and Peter Mataira, ‘Past and Present: Reflections on Citizenship 
Within New Zealand’ (2002) 36 (4) Social Policy and Administration 346 – 362. 
39 Elisa Morgera, ‘Global Environmental Law and Comparative Legal Methods’ (2015) 24(3) Review of European, 
Comparative & International Environmental Law 262. 
40 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘The Aims of Comparative Law’ in J. M. Smits, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2006) 57–65; Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ [2015] Law and Method 2. 
41 Hoecke (n 32) 2. 
42 Ibid, 5. 
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To undertake comparative research between these three countries requires an in-depth 
understanding of the overall differences and similarities between all three legal systems. To that 
end, this thesis addresses the relevant contexts explaining how and why those systems exist with an 
emphasis on political participation rights and electoral developments.43 
1. Similarities 
 
There are clear cultural and historical similarities between Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
Drawing upon those commonalities and exploring them in greater depth is an important aspect of 
undertaking a comparative legal research methodology.44 
In terms of the historical factors, all three Commonwealth jurisdictions have been colonised by the 
British45 and are all common law legal systems.46 Given the way in which all three jurisdictions 
were colonised by the British (through unnecessary extreme violence and force towards Indigenous 
peoples47), each jurisdiction shares similar issues surrounding Indigenous political oppression48 
maintained, in each case, in the face of otherwise ostensibly liberal democratic traditions.49 Each 
country’s political system and structures have been founded on racial discrimination and political 
inequality.50 This, in turn, has significantly impacted upon Indigenous peoples’ political 
representation in those systems including the extent of involvement in decision-making processes 
that involve laws and policies on Indigenous rights. 
During the early post-colonial era at a time of the vital drafting phases of each country’s 
Constitution, all three countries’ Indigenous peoples’ interests went politically unrepresented. 
Consequently, a governance system was created that established institutions, law-making processes 
                                                             
43 Ibid, 7. 
44 Ibid, 3. 
45 Oliver Brand, ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies’ (2007) 
32(2) Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 410; Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law 
(Clarendon Press, 3rd ed, 1998) 44. 
46 Mark Van Hoecke, Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004) 209. 
47 Chris Cunneen, ‘State Crime, the Colonial Question and Indigenous Peoples’ [2011] UNSWLRS 2, 159–80; Asafa 
Jalata, ‘The Impacts of English Colonial Terrorism and Genocide on Indigenous/Black Australians’ (2013) 3(3) SAGE 
Open 3; A. Dirk Moses, ‘An Antipodean Genocide? The Origins of the Genocidal Moment in the Colonization of 
Australia’ (2000) 2(1) Journal of Genocide Research 90. 
48 Reza Banakar, ‘Power, Culture and Method in Comparative Law’ (2007) International Journal of Law in Context 6. 
49 Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut, The Method and Culture of Comparative Law: Essays in Honour of Mark Van 
Hoecke (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014) 133. 
50 Catherine Iorns, ‘International Human Rights and Their Impact on Domestic Law on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand’ in P. Havemann, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999) 235–276; Andrew Armitage, Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal 
Assimilation (UBC Press, 1995) 21–23; Marianne O. Nielsen and Linda Robyn, ‘Colonialism and Criminal Justice for 
Indigenous Peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America’ (2003) 4(1) Indigenous 
Nations Studies Journal 30. 
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and political processes within it to govern and regulate citizens within its territorial borders. The 
limited access of Indigenous colonised peoples to free exercise of their political participation rights 
shows how each country’s government has ignored pre-existing rights to land as sovereign people51 
and, through that devaluation and lack of acknowledgement, has created systems and institutions 
that fail to uphold the civil and human rights of Indigenous peoples equally with other citizens. The 
resulting laws and policies have maintained the political oppression of each country’s colonised 
Indigenous peoples and have either segregated them from or assimilated them into Westernised 
traditions. Those actions have not only compromised the collective human rights of those 
Indigenous colonised peoples but also left their cultural identity unprotected.  
Each jurisdiction has therefore experienced longstanding issues with ensuring their Indigenous 
peoples’ cultural identities and pre-existing rights to land, cultural traditions and governance 
structures do not continue to go unprotected. Accordingly, each country shares broadly similar 
historic post-colonial experiences and issues surrounding racial discrimination, political, social, 
financial and legal inequality of Indigenous people and, in turn, protection of Indigenous cultural 
identity from that. 
2. Differences 
 
Comparative legal research also requires consideration of each country’s differences.52 The 
different institutional contexts of each country and the way in which they recognise their Indigenous 
peoples inform a broader understanding of electoral law and policy reform generally. Discovery of 
law and policy reform is fundamental for answering the central research questions of this thesis.53 
Quite often, there is a misconception of what comparative legal research does. A primary and quite 
narrowly defined misconception is that comparative legal research orients itself in presumptive 
cultural and historical similarities. That understanding inaccurately disregards the identification and 
analysis of differences that exist between jurisdictions and subject matters.54 To avoid the resulting 
risks associated with ignoring differences, this thesis examines both commonalities and differences 
between jurisdictions and subject matters to justify why each jurisdiction is being comparatively 
                                                             
51 Paul Callister, ‘Skin Colour: Does it Matter in New Zealand?’ (2008) 4(1) Policy Quarterly 19; P. Ongley and D. 
Pearson, ‘Post-1945 International Migration: New Zealand, Australia and Canada Compared’ (1995) 29(3) 
International Migration Review 756, 765–793; A. B. Watson, ‘The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on 
Native Land Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand’ (2011) 34(2) Seattle University Law Review 510. 
52 Hoecke (n 32) 7; C. B. Picker, ‘Comparative Legal Cultural Analyses of International Economic Law: A New 
Methodological Approach’ (2013) 1(1) The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 9. 
53 Hoecke (n 32) 17. 
54 Ibid, 180. 
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analysed. Even its differences inevitably provide insight as to what Australia can learn and adopt 
from other systems that have better outcomes for Indigenous political participation. 
A key difference between each country is the extent to which each has developed its political 
system and processes in ways that culturally reconcile with its Indigenous people and show they 
have learnt from past mistakes post-colonisation. Australia has made relatively little progress with 
reforming its laws and policies to ensure political inclusivity of Aboriginal citizens when compared 
to outcomes achieved in Canada and New Zealand. For instance, Australia’s Constitution still has 
entrenched racially discriminatory provisions55 contained within it that have been significantly 
criticised as being outdated56 and in conflict with principles of equality.57 Unlike Canada and New 
Zealand, Australia does not have a treaty established with its Indigenous people,58 although there 
are currently treaty negotiations underway in Victoria,59 and negotiations proposed in Queensland 
and the Northern Territory.60 South Australia had proposed commencement of treaty negotiations 
but abandoned this policy following the last state election.61 
                                                             
55 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, ss 25, 51 (xxvi). 
56 Marcia Langton, ‘Indigenous Exceptionalism and the Constitutional “Race Power”’ (2013) Space, Place & Culture 
19; M. Davis, ‘Indigenous Rights and the Constitution: Making the Case for Constitutional Reform’ (2008) 7 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 8. 
57 Langton, ibid, 10; Michael Saward, ‘Fragments of Equality in Representative Politics’ (2016) 19(3) Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy 245, 245–262; Geoffrey Stokes, ‘The ‘Australian Settlement’ and 
Australian Political Thought’ (2004) 39(1) Australian Journal of Political Science 5.  
58 Marcia Langton, Settling with Indigenous People: Modern Treaty and Agreement-making (Federation Press, 2006) 
207; Harry Hobbs and George Williams, ‘The Noongar Settlement: Australia’s First Treaty’ (2018) 40(1) Sydney Law 
Review 30; Aboriginal Treaty Working Group (Victorian Government, 2018) 
<https://www.vic.gov.au/aboriginalvictoria/treaty/treaty-bodies/aboriginal-treaty-workinggroup.html>; Aboriginal 
Treaty Interim Working Group, Aboriginal Community Consultations on the Design of a Representative Body – Phase 2 
(June 2017); Aboriginal Victoria, Victorian Treaty Advancement Commission 
<https://www.vic.gov.au/aboriginalvictoria/treaty/victorian-treaty-advancement-commission.html>; ‘Indigenous Treaty 
Remains on NT Government’s Agenda’ (NT News, 4 May 2017) <http://www.ntnews.com.au/news/northern-
territory/indigenous-treaty-remains-on-ntgovernments-agenda/news-story/299369abf4b496a06aa92ee8e5d0300d>; 
Caroline Winter, ‘Treaty: South Australian Government Enters Historic Discussions with Aboriginal Nations’ (ABC 
News, 15 December 2016) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-14/southaustralia-enters-historic-treaty-
discussions/8120162>; Harry Hobbs and George Williams, ‘Treaty Making in the Australian Federation’ (2019) 43(1) 
Mebourne University Law Review 206. 
59 Hobbs and Williams, ibid; Aboriginal Victoria, Victorian Treaty Advancement Commission 
<https://www.vic.gov.au/aboriginalvictoria/treaty/victorian-treaty-advancement-commission.html>; Advancing the 
Treaty Process with Aboriginal Victorians Act 2018 (Vic). 
60 ‘Indigenous Treaty Remains on NT Government’s Agenda’ (NT News, 4 May 2017) 
<http://www.ntnews.com.au/news/northern-territory/indigenous-treaty-remains-on-ntgovernments-agenda/news-
story/299369abf4b496a06aa92ee8e5d0300d>; Queensland Labor, ‘Queensland State Policy Platform 2016’ (State 
Conference of the Queensland Branch of the Australian Labor Party, 29–30 October 2016) 93 [8.190]; Annastacia 
Palaszczuk, Jackie Trad and Leeanne Enoch, ‘Historic Signing of “Tracks to Treaty” Commitment’ (Media Release, 14 
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Negotiating a Treaty with the First Nations of the Northern Territory of Australia  between the Northern  Land Council, 
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Canada does have a number of treaty agreements with differing First Nation tribes across the 
country and an entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms forms the first part of the Canadian 
Constitution Act 1982. The Charter recognises First Nation treaty rights and protects their 
democratic rights to political inclusion in federal decision-making processes as culturally 
autonomous people.62  
In addition, and although the system is not perfect,63 the Charter affords First Nations of Canada 
political representation by providing a mechanism through which to advise the Canadian 
Government on laws and policies that impact upon their cultural affairs, including their access to 
full self-determination and political participation rights.64 The system provides a comparative 
practical example of how First Nations can have a unique and special relationship with the Crown 
whilst maintaining their sovereignty and cultural integrity through treaties based on peaceful 
coexistence, mutual respect, recognition and the equitable sharing of lands and resources.65  
New Zealand, on the other hand, has the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 entered into between the British 
Crown and Maori. It is treated as one of several important constitutional documents in New 
Zealand.  The significance of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand is that it recognises and 
upholds Maori sovereignty and their partnership relationship with the Crown. In addition, New 
Zealand also has the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 which, although not constitutionally 
entrenched like Canada’s Charter, is still significantly valued in New Zealand and forms part of the 
New Zealand Government’s obligation to respect and protect Maori political rights and cultural 
identity.66  
Through the different legislative, constitutional, and treaty frameworks of Canada and New 
Zealand, even in only broad terms, First Nations of Canada and Maori of New Zealand have 
domestically sourced legislative tools to assert their rights and hold their governments accountable.  
Examining the different approaches and extents to which similar colonialist jurisdictions have 
                                                             
62 Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, ss 3, 25; Constitution Act 1982, s 35; Brian Slattery, ‘The Constitutional 
Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights’ (Fall 1982/Spring 1983) 8(1–2) Queen's Law Journal 232, 232–273. 
63 Ray Schmidt, ‘Canadian Political Economy: A Critique’ (1981) 6(1) Studies in Political Economy 65, 65–92; Iyko 
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(Winter 2002) 29(1–2) Resources for Feminist Research 27. 
64 Jeff Corntassel, ‘Re-envisioning Resurgence: Indigenous Pathways to Decolonization and Sustainable Self-
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managed to progress and reconcile Indigenous peoples provides practical examples of how 
Australian institutions might adapt. 
3. Additional Considerations 
 
The third component of this comparative methodology focuses on the historical and socio-economic 
contexts relevant to understanding the differing processes of evolution of legal institutions in each 
country.67 Examining the legal historiography and taxonomy of all three jurisdictions has been 
described by comparative legal scholars as unavoidable in comparative legal research.68 To properly 
understand current electoral laws and policies requires examination of how and why those laws 
have come to be what they are today. 
Those historical and socio-economic contexts work as ‘legal formants’69 that show what has 
influenced electoral laws and policies over time as they evolve into their current form. For 
Indigenous peoples from colonial states such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, this includes 
consideration of the way in which they were colonised and excluded from important law-making 
processes that created their governance systems. The exclusion of Indigenous peoples from those 
processes provides ‘implied patterns’ of the way in which law, policies and institutions are created 
and maintained at a federal level.70 
From the outset, this will depend on how each country has recognised Indigenous self-
determination rights and the extent to which they have sought to protect those rights through 
domestic laws and policies.71 Those contextual matters for consideration are what Pierre Legrand 
refers to as a ‘deconstructive hermeneutical’ approach.72 Legrand states that cultural considerations 
are integral to undertaking comparative legal research so that legal rules become signifiers of a 
more profound understanding of deep mental structures within a State’s political system.73  
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The interrogation of electoral laws, policies, federal-decision making processes and the way in 
which they limit the rights directly and indirectly of Indigenous peoples become signifiers within 
the cultural paradigm of each state to be considered and compared.74 Accordingly, this component 
of the comparative methodology will highlight the socio-political marginalisation of Indigenous 
peoples of Australia, Canada and New Zealand and in doing so the legal history and taxonomy of 
each colonial country will show how ‘law is central both to the historical narratives of loss and to 
the contemporary processes of rehabilitations and “reconciliation”’.75  
Similarly, Paul McHugh identifies that ‘the common lawyer’s use of the past must be seen through 
the lenses of the present’ and suggests that it is only when that occurs that questions and issues for 
resolution will become abundantly clear, which are derived from the past as the primary resource.76 
Therefore, this method involves not just considering past laws but also how they ought to be in the 
present in learning from past mistakes.77 
II. SCOPE 
 
This thesis explores the electoral legislative, policy, and political representative institutional 
measures that should be reformed or adopted in Australia, that seek to protect the cultural identity 
and political participation rights of Indigenous Australians. This part outlines concepts that are 
central to the analysis in this thesis and which together explain the boundaries of the inquiry. 
A. Cultural Identities 
 
This thesis recognises that the term ‘Indigenous’ in the Australian context refers to both Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are two separate 
and distinct cultural identities despite sharing similar colonialist experiences of Australian 
colonisation and Indigenous oppression.78 Although there is a variation in terminology adopted to 
describe Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians, this thesis, with respect, refers to and 
                                                             
74 P. Legrand, Extra Culturam Nihil Datur: Le Droit Compare (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2009) 84; 
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Droits, Eésolument (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2009) 216–17. 
75 Anthony Musson and Chantal Stebbings, Making Legal History (Cambridge University Press, 1st ed, 2012) 149. 
76 Paul McHugh, ‘The Politics of Historiography and the Taxonomies of the Colonial Past’ [2012] Making Legal 
History, 167; Anthony Musson and Chantal Stebbings, Making Legal History (Cambridge University Press, 1st ed, 
2012) 151. 
77 Musson, ibid 151. 
78 Aileen Moreton-Robinson, The White Possessive: Property, Power, and Indigenous Sovereignty (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2015); Pat Dudgeon, Michael Wright, Yin Paradies, Darren Garvey and Iain Walker, The Social, 
Cultural and Historical Context of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2010) 25–26. 
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uses the terms ‘Indigenous’, ‘Aboriginal’ and Torres Strait Islander’ people as appropriate, as well 
as the term ‘First Nations’. Its principal analysis will, however, focus on Aboriginal experiences, 
recognising that while they share much, they also differ from Torres Strait Islander experiences in 
material respects. For instance, Torres Strait Islander people have suffered region neglect differently 
compared to Aboriginal experiences in terms of the islands’ annexation to Australia in 1879.79 
Neglect of Torres Strait Islanders’ sovereignty has generated culturally autonomous needs as a 
people and their exercise of self-determination including through political participation and, 
uniquely to Torres Strait Islanders, calls for regional autonomy.80 To the extent that there is a 
difference between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander experiences, this thesis will focus on those 
of Aboriginal people. Those that do not identify as Indigenous Australians are referred to as non-
Indigenous Australians. 
 
In terms of considering the analysis of the Canadian experience, this thesis recognises that, like 
Australia, Canada’s Indigenous people are not culturally homogenous. There are 634 First Nation 
communities (or reserves) in Canada with their own First Nation governments that are unique 
culturally and linguistically.81 First Nations of Canada are one of three distinct groups recognised as 
‘Aboriginal’ in the Canadian Constitution82 with two other distinct groups: the Métis and the Inuit.83 
This thesis focuses its analysis of Canada’s Indigenous people on First Nations as a broad category, 
without seeking to distinguish between particular nations. Although this thesis focuses on First 
Nation experiences in terms of assessing political participation rights overall, references will still be 
made to ‘Aboriginal’, ‘Inuit’ and ‘Metis’ people where relevant and appropriate. Those that do not 
identify as Indigenous or Aboriginal are referred to as non-Indigenous Canadian people. 
 
Lastly, this thesis will focus on Maori of New Zealand as a relatively homogenous cultural identity 
in that despite its diverse community differences and values amongst Maori citizens, alongside 
dialectical differences, Maori do share the same language and cultural identity title as being 
identified as iwi Maori.84 Accordingly, this thesis will refer to the Indigenous people of New 
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Zealand as Maori and treat Maori views as being relatively homogenous in terms of them being for 
the most part, in consensus with national issues. 
B. Political Participation 
 
A key element of this thesis is the consideration of the political participation rights of Indigenous 
peoples in colonial Commonwealth countries. To do so, this thesis draws upon international legal 
instruments and standards to qualify its scoping of political participation, and to include three key 
elements.85 Those elements have been narrowed down to comprise voting participation, candidacy 
representation and state body representation. 
 
Each key element of political participation is also a key component of self-determination rights that 
seek the cultural empowerment and political autonomy of Indigenous colonised people.86 
C. Level of Governance and Rights  
 
This thesis only considers the national level of governance and political participation rights of each 
jurisdiction’s Indigenous peoples. Accordingly, only Australian Commonwealth laws and policies 
relevant to considering the political participation rights of Aboriginal people will be explored. 
Given the entry of Australian states, such as Victoria, into treaty-making activities,87 there is 
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87 Aboriginal Treaty Working Group (Victorian Government, 2018) 
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currently a debate in Australia about the roles of the states and even local government88 in 
regularising political participation of Indigenous Australians through institutional mechanisms. 
 
Whilst there lies an interconnectedness of voting mechanisms between states and the 
Commonwealth89  in that both levels of government have their own electoral legislation that applies 
to their elections only the federal level will be examined. Both levels of government in Australian 
have similar electoral rules but the issues that arise within those differing rules and political 
jurisdictions are dealt within differently and so this thesis will only focus on the national level of 
political participation which also affords a unified perspective that may then be applied more 
specifically to state circumstances. 
 
The same applies to the comparative approach to Canada. The political participation analysis of 
Canada will also only include Canadian federal electoral law and policies that limit First Nation 
political participation. Canada, like Australia, has a federal level and provincial level of 
government. Whilst both levels have similar electoral legislation applicable to citizens that wish to 
politically participate in elections for provincial elections or general elections, they do still have 
minor differences in terms of what their electoral rules contain and how First Nation electoral issues 
are dealt with. Thus, for the purposes of scoping this thesis, it will only examine federal political 
participation rights of First Nations.  
 
For New Zealand, given it is a unitary parliamentary democracy unlike Canadian and Australian 
systems, it will only consider its national-based issues that affect the political participation and 
representation of Maori citizens. 
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This thesis is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the thesis topic and outlines the structure of each chapter. It scopes the 
cultural identity analysis of Indigenous Australians to consider Aboriginal Australians with a slight 
expansion in terms of referencing ‘First Nations’ in Chapter 4. Further, this chapter scopes what 
rights underpin broader democratic political participation rights to include voting, candidacy and 
federal body representation. 
This chapter also shows the way in which this thesis engages in a comparative analysis of 
Indigenous federal disenfranchisement between Australia, Canada and New Zealand. It shows how 
this thesis applies doctrinal, comparative and legal taxonomy methodologies to answer the research 
questions. It also provides a comprehensive literature review to afford historical contexts justifying 
the selection of Canada and New Zealand as comparators. 
Chapter 2: Indigenous Political Participation and Representation in Australia 
Chapter 2 examines the extent to which the Australian political system fails to adhere to the 
principles of representative democracy and proportionality. To do so, this chapter considers 
formalised voting rights within the Australian Constitution,90 Australian case law and 
Commonwealth electoral legislation, highlighting current legislative and policy measures that limit 
federal Indigenous suffrage.  
Secondly, this chapter examines citizen candidacy representation and its formalisation of rights 
through the Australian Constitution, Australian case law and Commonwealth electoral legislation. 
In doing so, this thesis further highlights current legislative and policy measures that limit 
Indigenous political representation at a federal level.  In turn, this chapter explores measures 
implemented in Australian electoral legislation that limit the political rights of persons incarcerated 
who, as a result, are unable to qualify as electors and also limited to run as candidates. 
Chapter 3: Indigenous Political Participation within Canada and New Zealand 
This chapter addresses two forms of political participation: voting qualification and political 
candidacy. It uses case studies of each, from Canada and New Zealand respectively. 
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First, it analyses the differences between Australia and Canada’s prisoner electoral disqualifying 
legislation and how both jurisdictions’ electoral legislation has impacted upon its Indigenous 
peoples. This is important given both jurisdictions’ Indigenous peoples experience a greater 
likelihood of falling victim to a discriminatory streamlined pathway into incarceration compared to 
non-Indigenous people.  
Secondly, this chapter considers beneficial measures established in New Zealand that give incentive 
to Maori to vote and also to run as a political candidate in parliament. New Zealand has a Mixed 
Member Proportionate electoral system which recognises all citizens’ rights to vote and run as a 
candidate in politics, including Maori, as recognised within the Treaty of Waitangi 1840, the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Maori Electoral Option.   
The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 identify the importance 
of Maori political representation during decision-making processes that impact upon Maori affairs 
through its designated seats in parliament. 
The focus of this chapter lies on identifying policy and institutional solutions to the challenge of 
supporting voting by and the candidacy of Indigenous people. 
Chapter 4: Federal Indigenous Representative Bodies within Australia 
This chapter analyses the role of a national Indigenous representative body within Australia in terms 
of enhancing Indigenous political participation through its potential to represent Aboriginal cultural 
identity and heritage rights. It analyses the effect of the lack of a permanent or effectively integrated 
representative body in the Australian political system on Aboriginal Australian cultural identity and 
heritage rights and the consequences for self-determination. 
This chapter highlights the importance of self-determination as a foundation right of Aboriginal 
Australians. It articulates the capacity of enacting such a right to go some way to remedy the failure 
of ostensibly representative democratic regimes with colonial backgrounds to realise the cultural 
rights and heritage of Indigenous people. 
Ultimately this chapter explores the deficiencies of the Australian approach to self-determination – 
namely a limited interpretation that is constrained further through the fragility of federal Aboriginal 
representative bodies established so far. It canvasses previously formed Aboriginal representative 
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bodies in Australia91 and examines how those bodies have been subjected to repeal under successive 
governments that disregard their purpose in terms of self-determination, with consequences for 
Indigenous political participation. The few bodies that remain lack meaningful inclusion and 
funding by the Australian Government to adequately represent the interests of Aboriginal affairs 
across the country.92 
This chapter acknowledges contemporary proposed solutions for overcoming the lack of Aboriginal 
representation through federal representative bodies. The Uluru Statement from the Heart called for 
the Australian Government to recognise Indigenous self-determination rights and ‘recognition’ of 
Indigenous Australians to include a meaningful change that provides a sense of substantive political 
equality.93  
Of the several constitutional reform proposals the Statement from the Heart calls for, this chapter 
focuses on the proposed Voice to Parliament, Makarrata Commission and Truth-Telling 
Commission.94 In doing so it highlights the basis on which these bodies might provide a vehicle for 
Aboriginal self-determination rights to be exercised and the consequences of this for Indigenous 
political participation.  
Chapter 5: Indigenous Representative Bodies within Canada and New Zealand 
Despite Australia’s limited interpretation and recognition of self-determination, its counterparts 
throughout the Commonwealth have taken a different approach to recognise those rights of their 
Indigenous peoples.  
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This chapter identifies the distinct ways in which other Commonwealth jurisdictions whose 
Indigenous peoples have had oppressive experiences similar to those of First Nations peoples in 
Australia, have interpreted and applied Indigenous rights to self-determination. New Zealand and 
Canada have both established treaties between their Indigenous peoples and the Crown and in turn, 
have also been able to produce better outcomes that culturally empower their Indigenous people 
within their respective governance structures. 
This chapter firstly recognises that in the case of New Zealand, at first grounding, Maori–Crown 
relations (or Indigenous–State relations) recognised Maori as Aotearoa (or sovereign).95 That 
recognition paved the way for Maori to exercise self-determination rights to self-govern their own 
territories.96   
Treaty has been fundamental to Maori establishing a more practical means of self-determination 
through representative bodies that act as primary consultative mechanisms for Maori with the New 
Zealand Government. What has followed since the recognition of such rights and establishment of 
such institutions has seen a continued Maori political presence on laws and policies that impact 
upon Maori affairs. This chapter, therefore, examines the types of national Maori representative 
institutions that have been established in New Zealand. Most specifically, this chapter considers the 
weight the Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand Maori Council have had in advising the New 
Zealand federal parliament on laws that impact upon Maori affairs. 
Second, this chapter considers the experiences of First Nations in Canada and the ways in which 
First Nations have been able to assert and exercise their rights to self-determination including 
through self-governance. Like New Zealand, First Nations of Canada have treaties with the Crown 
that recognise those rights.  
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Accordingly, this chapter examines the role, structure and outcomes achieved by the Assembly of 
First Nations and the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples. Both provide examples of the means by 
which representative bodies can embody effective political participation for Indigenous peoples. 
This chapter uses the comparative studies of New Zealand and Canada as a benchmark for assessing 
constitutional reform proposals surrounding a First Nations Voice to Parliament and a Makarrata 
Commission. 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This chapter synthesises conclusions from Chapters 2–5 to highlight areas for reform of Australian 
electoral law and policy as well as institutional structures. In doing so, this chapter draws upon the 
comparative analysis of Canada and New Zealand to determine how each element of ‘political 
participation’ might be reformed through incorporating core features from those countries to 
promote Indigenous political participation within Australia. 
Finally, this chapter designs reform options for each element of ‘political participation’. It 
concludes that significant areas of the political disadvantage of Aboriginal Australians together 
contribute to substantial limitations to their rights as citizens, and, as Indigenous colonised people, 
their rights to self-determination. If protection of cultural identity as Aboriginal people lies at the 
heart of self-determination, then to achieve this through political participation requires substantive 




The essential theoretical commitment of this thesis that underpins its purpose, method, and scope, is 
that of self-determination. Political participation, as it is considered in this thesis, is itself an 
offshoot of self-determination. This part introduces the concept of self-determination as a 
foundation for the analysis that follows in subsequent chapters. It canvasses the broad meaning of 
self-determination before turning to its relationship with international law, and within the Australian 






A. Self-determination within International Law 
 
Self-determination is the corollary of Indigenous peoplehood and terminology used within the 
international community of law that identifies the collective human rights of Indigenous colonised 
peoples. Internationally, self-determination is identified in several international legal instruments and 
is widely recognised as a collective human right that specifically targets the wants, needs and 
aspirations of colonised Indigenous peoples’.97 
Both self-determination and Indigenous peoplehood have become prominent collective Indigenous 
human rights that have been relied upon since the beginning of the decolonisation movement, 
particularly prevalent from the 1970s onwards.98 Self-determination and Indigenous peoplehood have 
been relied upon globally from Indigenous rights advocates, to frame Indigenous political struggles 
within settler-State political systems.99 
The United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
1960 (‘DGICCP’) was the first international legal instrument to specifically and formally 
acknowledge self-determination rights.100 Accordingly, it has been central to the decolonisation of 
Indigenous people in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories through upholding fundamental 
human rights and freedoms recognised within the Charter of the United Nations.101 The Charter of 
the United Nations provides universal recognition of self-determination rights as being fundamental 
to Indigenous colonised people and the maintenance of friendly relations and peace among States.102  
The DGICCP sought to end colonialism in all of its manifestations including practices of 
segregation and discrimination. However, of the 89 States that voted for this resolution, there were 
nine abstentions – one of which was Australia, which is important to identify given the limitations it 
has continued to place on Indigenous Australians having access to those rights. 
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The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘ICERD’) 
forms another important international legal instrument that forms part of the collection of 
instruments that recognise Indigenous rights. ICERD calls for an end to colonisation globally and 
obliges signatory States to uphold principles of dignity and equality for all individuals despite their 
cultural differences.103 
Explicit reference and thus acknowledgement of self-determination is found within the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).104 The ICCPR is considered a 
prominent legal instrument within the international community that obliges Australia and other 
signatory colonialist States to uphold self-determination rights within their domestic laws, policies, 
processes and institutions. In turn, this obligation requires those States to act without limitation and 
ensure its Indigenous people have access to freely determine their groups’ political, economic, 
social and cultural development.105  The ICCPR also reaffirms self-determination provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations.  
Lastly, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) again 
acknowledges self-determination rights and how those rights must not be limited by a State.106 
Accordingly, Indigenous rights to cultural autonomy over internal and local affairs are integral to 
protecting their cultural identity and rights.107  
Those initiatives and their objectives must be financially supported by the government to ensure 
that they are appropriately carried out.108 The importance of ongoing funding was noted in 
Australia, for example, in the 1991 report Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody as 
a critical issue and key feature for the proper exercise of self-determination rights for Aboriginal 
Australians.109  
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The General Assembly’s adoption of the UNDRIP expounded not only on the right to self-
determination and participation in decision-making processes affecting them but also the right to 
‘control the outcome of such processes’.110 The Declaration contains more than 20 general 
provisions pertaining to Indigenous peoples and decision-making. This is because ‘[t]he right to full 
and effective participation in external decision-making is of fundamental importance to Indigenous 
peoples’ enjoyment of other human rights’.111 
Research conducted by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (a mechanism 
of the United Nations Human Rights Council) shows that ‘Indigenous peoples are among the most 
excluded, marginalized and disadvantaged sectors of society’. Accordingly, the Expert Mechanism 
highlighted how imperative it is for Indigenous peoples to be politically engaged and included when 
it comes to their decision-making in political regimes on matters that will enable them to protect 
their cultural identity ‘including their languages and their lands, territories and resources’.112 
A good indication a State has actively included its Indigenous people politically and adhered to 
internationally accepted standards is the extent to which a State has involved its Indigenous peoples 
in the design process of its government institutions and their agreement to it. Accordingly, States 
that haven’t met those standards are ones that implement State-centred top-down interventions that 
have little regard to Indigenous rights which, in turn, can result in land dispossession, conflict, 
human rights violations, displacement and the loss of sustainable livelihoods.113 
The duty to consult with Indigenous peoples must occur each time a State engages in matters that 
will directly or indirectly impact upon Indigenous affairs.114 Having a lack of Indigenous 
representation in decision-making processes that impact upon Indigenous affairs also decreases the 
political interest and advocacy Indigenous people need that would fight for the maintenance of vital 
service delivery bodies and outputs relied on by Indigenous Australia. This is particularly important 
in sectors like health and education which provide Indigenous people with basic fundamental 
support they should be always receiving as citizens and first peoples of Australia.115  
This circumstances of Australia are a far cry from other countries across the globe that have 
implemented domestic policies to include concrete measures intended to advance the right to self-
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determination.116 Australia remains one of the very few signatories to UNDRIP that is yet to 
achieve such measures of cultural progression and reconciliation.117 This is reflective, perhaps, of 
the general experience of self-determination in Australia.118 
B. Self-determination and Domestic Law 
 
To protect and provide full access to political participation rights of Indigenous peoples, those 
rights must be considered in accordance with self-determination rights. Self-determination is a 
collective human right that seeks to empower Indigenous colonised peoples through 
acknowledgment and protection of their cultural identity through the implementation of domestic 
laws, policies and processes.119 However, self-determination must, by definition, be self-
determined, interpreted and applied by Indigenous colonised peoples themselves. To give full 
expression to self-determination, a State should not limit the exercise of Indigenous self-
determination rights or treat all Indigenous peoples as automatically sharing the same set of values 
and beliefs.120  
Indigenous Australian cultural identities comprise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Both 
are differing cultural identities and within them there are internal differing cultural identities which 
for Aboriginal people in Australia are referred to as ‘nations’, ‘clans’ or ‘mobs’.121 This thesis will 
refer to internal Aboriginal groups as ‘nations’. Differing Aboriginal nations have differing laws, 
societal values, names, languages, political views, governance structures, Dreamtime stories and land 
boundaries.122 Each nation is complex and multi-faceted in its own respective way and should, in 
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turn, be referred to, recognised and treated as its own sovereign nation. This is precisely what self-
determination identifies, protects and requires in terms of protecting Indigenous colonised 
identities.123 
Issues arise when States wrongfully assume the right of self-determination necessitates an exercise 
of Indigenous sovereignty that requires complete secession from a State – a move which is generally 
seen to threaten a State’s territorial integrity.124 Whilst this exercise of self-determination and its 
interpretation has been advocated for and against in some jurisdictions,125 it is not the only means of 
achieving self-determination.126 Self-determination is a broad right of Indigenous self-empowerment 
that can take shape in many different forms according to differing Indigenous group’s laws, customs 
and shared values. This is because not all Indigenous groups share the same wants and needs when 
interpreting and exercising such rights. Such rights are self-determined and expressed by differing 
Indigenous groups in ways in which they see fit. 
Therefore, States should become better informed as to the plural objectives of self-determination 
rights prior to limiting access to those rights through domestic laws, policies and political 
processes.127 A better understanding of self-determination rights is one that requires States that are 
party to international legislative instruments to recognise the right and to uphold their treaty 
obligations through the implementation of domestic laws, policies and processes.128 In doing so their 
actions evidence the State’s commitment to recognising and protecting such rights of its Indigenous 
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citizens. An understanding of self-determination rights should focus on protecting the cultural 
integrity of Indigenous colonised peoples through prior sought-after consent, consultation and 
inclusivity in national decision-making processes on Indigenous cultural affairs.129  
In this context, self-determination rights can guide the reform of Westernised political systems and 
processes to better include plural cultures through political and legal intersection within a State’s 
overall governance structure.130 This point precisely has been examined by international treaty 
monitoring bodies in terms of what a State’s governance structure and the political system might 
look like in practice where they correctly and fully acknowledge Indigenous self-determination 
rights.131 That examination has since highlighted several key objectives of what a State’s system 
and political processes must achieve.132  
At first instance, a State may have a system where its Indigenous group/s have interpreted self-
determination so as to form its own new State through secession from the colonial State. In 
addition, and in an alternative interpretation, Indigenous groups may also seek to agree to autonomy 
or association in a federal State, or integration or assimilation within a single unitary State.133 The 
main requirement that underpins such changes to a State’s governance structure and the political 
process is that there must be prior consent and consultation sought by a State from its Indigenous 
people when drafting laws and policies to implement those changes.134  
Furthermore, that type of cultural partnership and collaboration must be guided by principles of 
mutual respect and continuity to ensure the element of collaboration within that relationship is 
maintained but also occurs at all levels of governance. The prior consent and consultation sought-
after of Indigenous people must not merely be limited to lower levels of governance in regional 
organisations.135  
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There must be consultation and consent sought by a State government of Indigenous people at all 
levels on matters that concern their cultural affairs which most importantly includes top-tier federal 
decision-making processes. The consultation that occurs between Indigenous people and a State 
must also be meaningful, substantively effective and respectful.136 As international treaty 
monitoring bodies have identified, self-determination in practice within democratic decision-
making processes requires not only ethical consent but meaningful collaboration within shared 
political forums that counter majority dominance.137 
Accordingly, a State should promote programs that protect cultural identity, and cultural autonomy 
through recognising rights to traditional lands, natural resources and economic activities.138 Such 
programs implemented by a State comply with not only its international obligations but also refocus 
a State’s actions on achieving cultural reconciliation – a move away from assimilation towards 
more culturally empowering measures for Indigenous people.139 
Alongside those efforts, a State should also create multiple access points to political empowerment 
and decision-making for Indigenous people.140 This may occur through Indigenous representation 
within their own autonomous self-governing institutions as well as their enhanced and protected 
political representation within local, regional and national institutions.141  
A State should also support its Indigenous people in the development of their native language 
through domestic laws and policies. Further, those laws and policies that recognise such rights 
should allow for the practise and development of Indigenous language and culture into the future. In 
addition, a State should also encourage Indigenous people to communicate with government 
authorities in their native tongue – a measure to which this thesis will consider in its comparative 
New Zealand analysis with Maori political representatives speaking in their native tongue in the 
New Zealand Parliament.142 
Overall, a State must ensure in its law and policymaking processes that Indigenous voices are 
included and protected. It is imperative that Indigenous views are incorporated into non-Indigenous 
forms of governance frameworks, if reconciliation is to truly be progressed with in Australia. This 
effort must also be continuous and there must be a partnership type relationship struck, between 
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Indigenous and non-Indigenous participants in those forums that share the decision-making space 
based on mutual respect for one another. It is only when these domestic contexts of self-
determination are created, that a fuller expression of the right by Indigenous people of Australia (as 
understood at an international level) can be achieved. 143 
C. Self-determination and the Australian Experience 
 
To make suggestions on law and policy reform in Australia that seek to right past wrongs arising 
from incorrect acknowledgement and interpretation of self-determination rights, it is important to 
first understand where and when those issues have arisen throughout Australian history. This is 
important for determining what can be learned from past mistakes in order to reform and create 
better pathways towards reconciliation into the future. 
The Australian experience with understanding self-determination rights has been a historically 
contentious topic.144 This is evidenced by the Australian Government’s limited provision of self-
determination rights for Aboriginal citizens.145 This experience, however, is contrary to other 
colonial States with similar backgrounds and cultural struggles to Australia. As Megan Davis 
argues, ‘The right to self-determination is taken seriously in most states of the world that have 
Indigenous communities because self-determination in its true form is intended to enhance 
democracy and enhance political participation and therefore improve health and well-being’.146  
It is thus imperative that the right of self-determination be only applied and determined by 
Aboriginal Australians themselves as distinct autonomous people and not by the Australian 
Government.147 The resurgence and movement of Indigenous people through self-determination 
rights centres around ‘distinct groups, communities, tribes or nations engaging in the practical tasks 
of governing’.148 
                                                             
143 Murphy (n 124) 202. 
144 Terrill and Boutilier (n 135) 34.  
145 Mansell (102) 166; Corntassel and Holder (n 120) 11; Will Sanders, ‘Journey Without End: Reconciliation Between 
Australia’s Indigenous and Settler Peoples’ (Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, No. 237/2002) 2. 
146 Megan Davis, ‘A Right that is Fundamental to our Aspirations’, Koori Mail (28 November 2012) 24; Will Sanders, 
‘Journey Without End: Reconciliation Between Australia’s Indigenous and Settler Peoples’ (Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research, No. 237/2002) 5; Geoffrey Stokes, ‘Australian Democracy and Indigenous Self-
Determination, 1901–2001’ in Geoffrey Brennan and Francis G. Castles, Australia Reshaped: 200 Years of Institutional 
Transformation (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 193. 
147 Sharon H. Venne, ‘The Road to the United Nations and Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2011) 20 Griffith Law 
Review 558; Geoffrey Stokes, ‘Citizenship and Aboriginality: Two Conceptions of Identity in Aboriginal Political 
Thought’ in Geoffrey Stokes (ed), The Politics of Identity in Australia (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 193. 




The term and characterisation of ‘people’ have been also widely recognised as referring to a group 
of colonised Indigenous people that share common colonialist experiences with political and civil 
oppression.149 Those ‘people’ are the authors of their future and must, in accordance with correct 
interpretation and application of self-determination rights, be given a rightful opportunity in 
acknowledgment of that. 
However, Australia has not seen this type of cooperative and respectful governance over Indigenous 
affairs to date. Rather, self-determination has been interpreted and applied in a significantly limited 
way in Australia since 1788 which has left many Aboriginal people, after nearly 230 years, still 
unable to feel at home in their own country.150  
In turn, self-determination rights originate in the continuous calls for recognition of sovereignty 
from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people across the country. Those calls seek 
acknowledgement of their pre-existing, self-governing political entities that have been established 
prior to colonisation.151 
Australian governance over Indigenous affairs through its domestic laws and policies has been 
relentlessly paternalistic and justified as a response to the so-called ‘Aboriginal problem’.152 The 
Australian Government continuously presumes that resolution of the ‘Aboriginal problem’ can only 
occur through the exercise of settler-colonial authority.153 That mindset has warranted the 
implementation of liberal norms and institutions onto Indigenous polities that have been 
disempowering and deeply problematic to their lives and their cultural identity.154 Accordingly, 
Indigenous policy has barely improved the quality of most Aboriginal Australians’ lives.  
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner June Oscar has identified that 
typically Australian Government policies are consistent with churn and reinvention and resist taking 
proactive measures that provide Aboriginal people with an ability to control and manage their own 
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lives.155 Australia’s political systems and institutions have shown to be inadequate at providing 
Aboriginal Australians with appropriate representation in the matters that affect them.156 
The Australian Government has also generally favoured a ‘top-down’ approach instead of dealing 
with Aboriginal people on a nation-to-nation basis like self-determination rights require in terms of 
requiring a State to seek free, prior and informed consent from Indigenous people on matters that 
affect their cultural affairs.157 
Calls for self-determination by Aboriginal Australians really took off as early as the 1920s.158 Such 
advocacy and calls for cultural respect and autonomy came largely as a reaction to specific 
legislation passed in Australia (known as the ‘Aborigines Acts’)159 from the 1860s onwards that 
regulated Aboriginal people’s lives during the decades of violence and massacres that occurred 
from 1830 to 1910.160 
By the 1930s the attention shifted from apparent segregation inequalities that existed between 
Aboriginal Australians and non-Indigenous Australians to the importance of racial equality 
following the first Commonwealth–State Native Welfare Conference held in 1937.161 However, the 
conference viewed the road to racial equality in Australia as an issue the Commonwealth would 
‘take care of’ through total absorption policies that targeted Aboriginal people of mixed descent.162 
The presumption was one that viewed Westernised culture as being superior to Aboriginal culture 
and, in turn, Aboriginal people must learn and adopt white European societal standards. The result 
of the wrongful understanding and application of measures necessary to achieve racial equality by 
the Commonwealth Government, has left Aboriginal people subject to laws, that expose them to 
continued, overt racial discrimination and denial of their basic and fundamental rights.163 The 
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assimilationist policy era predominantly targeted ‘half-caste’ Aboriginal children by forcefully 
removing them from their parents’ care and placing them into State care under various federal and 
state and territory laws. This is known as Australia’s ‘Stolen Generations’ era.164 
The assimilationist era reignited advocacy yet again for Aboriginal Australians and again called for 
respect of their cultural identity and acknowledgement of their legitimacy as peoples in Australia.165 
Aboriginal identity politics shifted by the 1960s into calls for equality through citizenship rights 
and, after over a decade of advocacy from Aboriginal activist groups comprising Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous advocates, a referendum was held to formalise those calls for racial equality.166  
The 1967 constitutional referendum was successful and removed racially discriminatory provisions 
from the Australian Constitution that explicitly targeted and referred to Aboriginal people.167 From 
there, the ‘Black Power’ movement began which shifted Indigenous identity politics from seeking 
recognition as citizens to recognition as people with pre-existing rights to land and cultural 
autonomy.168 
The elected Whitlam Labor Government from 1972 until 1975 was significant for Indigenous 
identity politics as it formally acknowledged self-determination within its national policy 
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framework. This came as a result of Australia’s signature to the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination169 in 1965.  
The Whitlam government based its formalisation of self-determination in an Aboriginal land rights 
scheme in the Northern Territory,170 which led to the establishment of an Indigenous sector 
responsible for representing Aboriginal people and delivering services to them.171 Thus, self-
determination was restrictive in that it purely focused on government-created institutions to deliver 
services for Aboriginal people and regulations implemented surrounding their land rights.172 
Initially, the introduction of a formal policy of self-determination was perceived by Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Australians alike as a necessary means and progressive step towards reconciliation. 
In theory, the objectives behind Australia’s self-determination policy fell alongside the underlining 
principles and advocacy that underpinned the ‘Black Power’ movement which called for Indigenous 
Australians to ‘make choices’ about ‘the terms and the pace of their adaption to the settler-colonial 
society that encapsulated them’.173 This line of advocacy for self-determination was also later 
affirmed in the 1991 report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody within the 
19 recommendations tabled that specifically relate and refer to self-determination rights and 
Indigenous lives being returned to Indigenous hands.174  
In practice, however, the Commonwealth’s version of self-determination was not as transformative 
and progressive as what Indigenous Australians had hoped for.175 The issue was that the policy was 
very State-centred as opposed to focusing on an Indigenous-led interpretation and application of 
self-determination to empower Indigenous Australians to manage their own internal cultural 
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affairs.176 For the most part, Indigenous advocacy for cultural empowerment during this era sought 
Indigenous peoplehood through land rights.177 
The Commonwealth Government implemented legislation to give effect to its national self-
determination policy including the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) 
(‘ALRA’), the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth) and the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth).178 From the establishment of those laws, the period of 
1979 to 1983 saw a shift with Indigenous politics towards calls for self-determination rights through 
treaty formation.179 Bodies like the National Aboriginal Conference and Aboriginal Treaty 
Committee were created to work on issues surrounding a potential treaty/s to be established 
between Indigenous Australians and the Commonwealth and state governments.180 
Of all Indigenous representative bodies to be formed during this period, the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) was by far the most prominent, established in 1989 by 
Commonwealth legislation.181 ATSIC, however, was designed by the Australian Government to 
include both administrative and elected arms in functions to provide a representation of, and 
services to, Indigenous people across Australia.182 
In practice, ATSIC significantly lacked meaningful control and input over Indigenous policy and 
government funds to achieve its outcomes.183 This was because, as critiqued by Irene Watson, 
ATSIC’s design by the Australian Government was under-resourced to the extent that it left 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with very little means to care for and represent 
Aboriginal Australia. Accordingly, to many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people across 
Australia, ATSIC felt like it was doomed to fail from the very beginning.184 
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The failure of ATSIC to meet its goals and achieve its objectives, caused by a lack of financial 
support, was held up by the Howard government as a failure of self-determination policy in 
Australia. Consequently, the then Prime Minister, John Howard, used that ‘failure’ as a racially 
discriminatory justification to replace Australian self-determination policy with a new policy 
regime that focused more on assimilation and control by the Australian Government over 
Aboriginal affairs.185 By 2005, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 
(Cth) was repealed, abolishing ATSIC and leaving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
without a representative voice.186  
Other failures of the Australian Government’s limited purported policy and understanding of self-
determination have included its lack of acknowledgment of the diversity of Indigenous nations in 
terms of understanding their cultural identity. This is fundamental to understanding the varying 
exposure and impacts Indigenous nations have had with colonisation. Those experiences influence 
the way in which communities interpret and apply self-determination according to their 
community’s wants and needs. The national policy also limited traditional structures of governance 
and control established with elders in Indigenous communities with newly inserted settler structures 
(such as community elected councils).187 The newly imposed regimes, when withdrawn from 
Indigenous communities and missions, also left social voids and destabilised some communities 
across Australia.188 
By 2006, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Report criticised the Australian 
Government’s treatment of Indigenous Australians and labelled the rollout of its national self-
determination policy as ‘a passive system of policy development and service delivery’. 
Furthermore, the report also highlighted the absurdity of the Australian Government’s criticism of 
Indigenous Australians ‘for being passive recipients of government services’.189  
In turn, it was clear that the Australian Government’s limited version of self-determination left 
many Indigenous Australians disempowered by not having the financial means and support to 
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provide culturally appropriate services to their communities.190 The withdrawal of Australia’s self-
determination policy left Indigenous Australians culturally suppressed within the dominant cultural 
and political framework, and, to that extent, disempowered yet again.  
By 2014, the then Prime Minister Tony Abbott introduced the Indigenous Advancement Strategy 
(IAS). The IAS significantly cut funding to Aboriginal community organisations and programs and 
in doing so left Indigenous communities across Australia with minimal control over their own 
community programs and services.191 Those actions have since been criticised at all levels of 
governance for lacking effective policy logic and not seeking free, prior and informed consent and 
consultation with Indigenous communities prior to the implementation of the IAS.192  
Ultimately, it is clear that self-determination is fundamental to the rights and aspirations of 
Aboriginal communities and, as such, should be viewed as the only acceptable framework for 
negotiating their governance within the Westernised political regime.193 Although Australia has had 
and continues to undergo critique as to its ‘impoverished’, ‘one-dimensional’ and ‘state-centric’ 
form of self-determination,194 there is still hope and an opportunity for Australia to totally recode its 
understanding of self-determination from an issue of ‘policy self-management’ to Indigenous 
‘political autonomy’.195 
Outdated draconian-type controls must be eliminated from Australia’s political system and the 
mentality of its government elites to make room for Indigenous political autonomy and 
empowerment.196 Australia must align itself with an understanding and implementation of self-
determination in its truest form intended to enhance democracy and Indigenous political 
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participation.197 Once this occurs only then can Australia pride itself on adhering to what’s 
understood as a ‘gold standard’ of democracy for virtually all countries with Indigenous populations 
with liberal democratic governance frameworks.198 In this version, a long-awaited united journey 
towards reconciliation can begin that deals with ‘the unfinished business of post-colonial struggle’ 
through an adjustment to the balance of power and relationships between Indigenous Australians 
and the Australian State – including political participation and citizenship.199 
D. Indigenous Political Participation and Citizenship 
 
Self-determination rights are quite broad and seek to protect all aspects of Indigenous cultural 
identity, mostly through political autonomy and inclusion in political decision-making processes on 
Indigenous affairs. Thus, political participation is integral for protecting the full citizenship rights of 
Indigenous people through their exercising of self-determination rights that recognise their 
marginalisation and dispossession post-colonisation.200  
Although the term ‘political participation’ does not have a specific legislative definition, the 
international community has described it as ‘citizen’s activities affecting politics’.201 As such, it is 
widely recognised internationally as a right that is vital to a person’s citizenship within a liberal 
democratic political regime.202 The most prominent legal instrument that recognises the right of 
political participation is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).203 
Article 25 of the ICCPR obliges States signatory to the covenant to uphold the integrity of polit ical 
equality and inclusion of all peoples it so governs.204   
In theory, citizenship should enhance and empower the status of individuals as members of their 
respective States, and as a universal entitlement citizens should have full and equal access to all 
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civil rights that underpin their citizenship to their State.205 However, in practice, full access to 
citizenship rights and entitlements in colonial States with Indigenous people often fail to provide 
them with access to such rights equally compared to other citizens. There exist in those states 
substantial inequality barriers when it comes to minority groups like Indigenous people accessing 
rights that underpin their citizenship.206  
Indigenous people have, unlike their non-Indigenous counterparts, experience with political 
exclusion and marginalisation treatment in their State. Furthermore, they have distinct, differing 
internal cultural identities that governments often fail to understand, respect and recognise, and 
instead require within their democratic framework individuals to transcend their differences to 
assume an impartial, general point of view as part of their citizenship obligations.207  
However, this can be problematic when assessing reform to political processes of a State to provide 
equal access to fundamental citizenship rights through the recognition of Indigenous people’s rights 
to self-determination. Self-determination and identity politics recognise the distinct identities of 
Indigenous people and reject frameworks that deny Indigenous people their right to cultural identity 
recognition and protection. Instead, self-determination applied through political rights and 
autonomy relies on the principle of democratic equality to do the exact opposite in that the task is to 
nurture and sustain these group differences through specialised rights, policies and/or State-funded 
institutions.208  
Those sorts of special measures are necessary for a State to adequately show its acknowledgement 
and understanding of the injustices its Indigenous people have faced as a product of colonisation 
that fall outside of surface value formalised rights afforded to everyone. They provide equitable 
outcomes to marginalised people faced with structural barriers that limit their full participation in 
society and political processes.209  
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Citizenship and structural assurances sit synonymously with one another and the task for a State is 
to ensure necessary legislative and policy respect to differentiated members of society whilst also 
treating those members as equals. This is imperative in circumstances when a State’s members are 
marginalised and dissent from the majority normative cultural standards imposed upon them by the 
State.210  
Thus, it is important for contemporary liberal democracies (like Australia) to temper 
majoritarianism within their electoral systems by reforming their formal procedural political rights, 
like, for instance, voting at elections.211 Such reforms should seek to encourage more of its minority 
Indigenous groups to politically participate through reform of exclusionary decision-making 
processes and electoral laws and policies.212 Protection of such rights should also be upheld through 
the entrenchment of a bill of rights or charters, recognition within a State’s Constitution, 
establishing treaties and safeguarding reserved seats for Indigenous people within a State’s 
parliament.213  
Those types of substantive changes that would positively impact the citizenship status of Aboriginal 
people in Australia are still yet to occur.214 This is because Australia has repeatedly since 
colonisation resisted such structural reforms to its institutions to properly accommodate its 
Indigenous peoples.215  
In turn, Australia’s current electoral system including its laws and policies that surround political 
participation of its citizens fail to acknowledge and protect important self-determination rights.216 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The primary issue of law this thesis considers is: how can Australia reform its electoral laws, 
policies and political processes by learning from similar Commonwealth jurisdictions that have a 
colonial background but have politically empowered their Indigenous peoples better than what 
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Australia has achieved. Ultimately, this is an issue surrounding Australia’s understanding and 
implementation of full citizenship rights for all people through its domestic acknowledgement of 
international standards and obligations it must adhere to relating to self-determination and political 
participation rights. 
There is clear statistical data that shows how Indigenous Australians and, in particular, Aboriginal 
Australians are restricted in their right to vote.217 However, there is also clear comparison data from 
other jurisdictions, such as Canada, that is informative when considering how to overcome indirect 
electoral legislative exclusions specifically. For instance, Canada does not in practice disqualify 
prisoners from voting at federal elections. Given the similar statistical data both countries share 
with disproportionate figures of Indigenous incarceration, Canada’s approach to overcoming this in 
and of itself as a key disenfranchising electoral obstacle, is important and useful for this thesis 
research to consider.  
This is just one of several issues upon which this thesis makes law and policy recommendations, in 
terms of addressing the limitations on Aboriginal voting rights in Australia. Additional issues will 
be examined that highlight how racially discriminatory provisions within the Australian 
Constitution can limit Aboriginal voters from voting, alongside the lack of measures the Australian 
Electoral Commission has in place to better support Aboriginal voters.  
In addition to the Canadian treatment of incarcerated voters, this thesis considers measures 
implemented in New Zealand that underpin Maori self-determination and sovereignty and thus their 
political representation. Australia has been slow to progress and enhance its political candidacy 
representation of Aboriginal members of parliament federally.218 Importantly, however, there are 
also a variety of reasons stemming from the unreconciled relationship Aboriginal Australians have 
with the Australian Government and voter restrictions that influence their lack of incentive to run as 
a political candidate at Australian federal elections.219 
There are additional beneficial practical examples established in New Zealand that will be 
considered. For example, this thesis examines the Maori Electoral Option and the viability of a 
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similar option for Aboriginal Australians as a means of providing a sense of political and cultural 
autonomy for Aboriginal people enrolling to vote at federal elections. Such measures can be used to 
determine where and when electoral boundaries need to be adjusted to ensure proportionality of 
Aboriginal voting and, secondly, it can determine whether designated seats might be feasible for 
Aboriginal candidates. These types of measures form the foundation for analysis in this thesis with 
a goal of assessing the extent to which they might provide a sense of political inclusivity and 
empowerment for Aboriginal Australians and, in turn, support increased numbers of their 
representation in federal parliament and politics. 
Lastly, this thesis examines, in light of the contemporary political debates in Australia calling for 
the constitutional entrenchment of a Makarrata Treaty Commission and Voice to Parliament bodies, 
whether the design of such bodies could benefit from consideration of similar bodies already 
established in Canada and New Zealand.   
Ultimately, this thesis provides additional contextual and electoral contributions to Aboriginal calls 
for and debates surrounding pathways towards Aboriginal constitutional recognition and political 





                                                             


























CHAPTER 2  
INDIGENOUS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION WITHIN 
AUSTRALIA 
 
Since the 1967 referendum, Australia has been living a lie. It has patted itself on the back as a fair 
country, one that treats its citizens equally and, especially, protects the vulnerable. 
Don’t get me wrong. I am proud to have helped to secure the ‘Yes’ vote that recognised us as 
citizens and more than mere flora and fauna. It was important. But it also pains me to know that the 
constitution still contains a potentially discriminatory power, which can be used by the 




Research conducted from the Australian Electoral Commission in 2016 suggests that approximately 
58 per cent of Indigenous Australians (both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people) were 
enrolled to vote. However, this was viewed as a generous estimate of Indigenous voter engagement 
with a more realistic enrolment figure perceived to be at 50 per cent.  Further, a private assessment 
conducted by Indigenous leaders, non-government and government agencies found that 
approximately 25 – 30 per cent of Indigenous Australians who are enrolled, actually cast a formal 
vote.2 These figures are indicative of the broader systemic challenges facing Indigenous political 
participation in Australia.  
In addition to a lack of Indigenous voter enrolment and voter participation in elections, there has 
also been only eight Indigenous Australians that have been successfully elected into the national 
parliament since its establishment. This chapter recognises that a citizen’s political participation 
exercised through voting and political candidacy are fundamental to self-determination. Australia, 
therefore, has a responsibility to formally recognise and respect those rights.3 
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This chapter identifies that despite Australia’s representative democratic system of governance, it 
often lacks consideration in its electoral laws, policies and processes of Indigenous citizens’ 
experience of limitations on their civil rights as a result of colonisation.4 The absence of 
consideration of these experiences inhibits the full expression of self-determination through 
political participation. 
The next part of this chapter defines the right and concept of universal suffrage according to voting 
rights acknowledged within international standards and how they are fundamental to representative 
democracy in general terms. Australia’s representative democracy initially limited universal 
suffrage understood at an international level, to only providing access to voting rights for political 
elections to wealthy males. Thus, suffrage was used as a means of limiting the representative 
element of Australia’s democratic regime to only wealthy males to maintain their political power, 
control and wealth within society. This chapter shows how representative democracy was extended 
to include poorer males, Indigenous Australians and women in the right of suffrage and its exercise 
through voting at political elections.5  
Part III highlights key historical contexts of Australian political participation through consideration 
of the Westminster system introduced in Australia. Further, this part considers Australia’s 
independence at federation from Britain, and how that has impacted the Australian franchise. 
This chapter then considers the role of Australia’s representative government within the 
constitutional framework that regulates its political system. This analysis is designed to test the 
adherence of the Australian system to principles of proportionality and responsible government that 
are central to its institutions of governance.  
From there this chapter examines the historical development of the Commonwealth franchise and 
qualification standards of voting participation and candidacy representation under the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. It draws on the experience of Aboriginal Australians to 
demonstrate a limited version of accessibility to the franchise compared to non-Indigenous citizens.  
This chapter shows how Aboriginal Australians are more vulnerable than non-Indigenous 
Australians to be subject to the Commonwealth disqualification of prisoners, the ‘unsound mind’ 
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disqualification, and further limitations on candidacy eligibility. Ultimately, this chapter 
contextualises how all electoral legislative barriers are, when applied to Aboriginal citizens, 
inconsiderate of their continued oppression since colonisation that contributes to their 
overrepresentation of financial poverty, mental health issues and incarceration. The resulting 
inequality forms substantive barriers to Indigenous Australians’ political participation in the 
Australian electoral system.  
Although this chapter recognises the array of measures that have been established over time by the 
Australian Electoral Commission which seek to enhance Indigenous political engagement, it also 
acknowledges the inadequate impact and outcomes those programs have.  
II. UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND THE AUSTRALIAN FRANCHISE 
 
The term ‘adult suffrage’ appears within s 128 of the Australian Constitution whereby electors 
qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives are also qualified to 
decide upon constitutional alteration.6 However, this reference was only intended to acknowledge 
that both men and women had the vote.7 As a result, the extent of suffrage was still able to be 
adjusted and limited by electoral legislation to exclude certain citizens and not others from the right 
to vote in political elections.8 This calls into question the meaning of ‘universal suffrage’ in the 
Australian context. 
Prior to the establishment of the Australian Constitution, Australian colonies were guided by the 
electoral legislative pattern of the Australian Constitutions Act 1842 (Imp). The Act restricted the 
franchise to persons who satisfied the elector property qualification and who were not attained or 
convicted of ‘any treason, felony, or infamous offence within any part of Her Majesty’s 
dominions’.9 The only exception was for those who had received a free pardon, or one conditional 
upon not leaving the colony, or who had undergone the sentence or punishment, and were excluded 
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from those electoral disqualifications.10 The franchise standards then were based on standards of the 
United Kingdom which favoured white adult males.11  
At Federation, the elector property qualification to vote was altered or abandoned by states12 but 
adult suffrage remained limited and it differed from state to state. Adult suffrage in South Australia 
and Western Australia, for example, remained relatively unfettered.13 However, in other states, it 
was limited to only males.14 New South Wales and Victoria both substantially maintained the 
elector disqualification for ‘treason, felony or infamous offence’ that had been contained within the 
Australian Constitutions Act 1842.15 More recently, at a federal level, some prisoners are 
disenfranchised where they are serving lengthy terms of imprisonment without distinction as to 
their history or the nature and characteristics of their crime, as seen in Roach v Electoral 
Commissioner.16 
Suffrage is an informative indicator of the proportion of the adult population who have the right to 
vote in their countries’ political elections.17 In that context, suffrage is important for not only 
providing a minimal standard of representative democracy within political regimes that hold 
political elections, but can also be used as a means of predicting voter turnout statistics for political 
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elections.18 That data is particularly useful for informing electoral law reform, particularly when 
there are portions of certain citizens who remain excluded from the franchise.19  
In general terms, universal suffrage should only be limited if there are substantial reasons to justify 
the limitation of the franchise of adult citizens. Thus, all adult citizens should have access to 
exercising their right to vote at political elections if there are no substantial reasons present to 
justify a restriction of their access to that right. 
At an international level, the heart of the problem of access to the franchise lies with the 
applicability of each country’s domestic electoral disqualifications. Often this is found within a 
country’s disqualification of the right to vote at political elections of citizens sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment.20 Such disqualifications will generally also limit their eligibility to run as a political 
candidate.21  
The United Nation standards to which Australia is a party oblige Australia to broadly seek to 
encourage its citizens to politically engage with domestic democratic processes. For instance, article 
25 of the ICCPR22 provides that every citizen shall have the right and opportunity to politically 
participate, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 (such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion etc.).23 Further, the political rights of citizens should not be limited by 
unreasonable restrictions and should allow all citizens to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives.24 Article 25 also provides that citizens have the 
right without distinction to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
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universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
the will of the electors.25 
It is widely recognised that the foundation of representative democracy includes the right to 
political participation and that this right will only be limited under reasonable and objective 
circumstances.26 Some democratic states (for example, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Finland and New Zealand to name just a few) tend to disenfranchise citizens from the right to vote 
where sentences are lengthy and crimes committed are serious in nature.27  
The argument or justification for disenfranchising prisoners from voting at elections is that in order 
to enhance civil responsibility and respect for the rule of law, citizens who have breached basic 
rules of society forfeit their right to have a say in the way those rules are made whilst they are 
serving their term of imprisonment.28 
However, countries as diverse as Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Israel, Japan, Kenya, 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Zimbabw however, do not 
disenfranchise prisoners from voting at elections.29  
Whilst some democratic states include such limitations within electoral laws and policies, they can 
be contradictory to the objectives of article 10 of the ICCPR. Under art 10 (3), ‘the penitentiary 
system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation 
and social rehabilitation’.30 Punitive measures placed upon a prisoner in addition to their sentence, 
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such as their political disenfranchisement whilst incarcerated, limit their pathway to social 
rehabilitation through engaging with the electoral system.31 Prisoners are already physically 
excluded from society whilst they are incarcerated.  
III. AUSTRALIAN HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Despite ostensible claims to universal suffrage, political participation rights are not afforded to 
Australian citizens equally. A primary issue stems from the way in which electoral processes were 
drafted into the Australian Constitution at federation. Despite its underlying objectives to adhere to 
principles of representative democracy, proportionality and equality,32 the Australian Constitution 
was created in a way that contradicted those principles, excluding a portion of the nation’s 
stakeholders. It is well known that only some interests were represented during the Federal 
Convention debates and not others. For instance, women and Aboriginal Australians were excluded 
from providing input during the drafting of the Constitution. In fact, the only people who were 
included during that process were non-Indigenous male delegates from each colony except 
Queensland.33 It might be said that the drafting of the Constitution was itself a process of exclusion 
from political participation. 
At the 1897 Convention in Adelaide, the draft proposal of s 3034 and its wording ‘until the 
Parliament otherwise provides’35 attracted no serious debate as to whether that legislative power of 
enfranchisement should rest with the Commonwealth Parliament rather than state parliaments.36 
Instead, the debate at the Adelaide Convention focused on women’s suffrage. Ultimately, this was 
left for the new federal parliament to decide.37 The issue of women’s suffrage was subsequently 
resolved by s 3 of the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902:38 ‘[s]ubject to the disqualifications 
hereafter set out, all persons not under twenty-one years of age whether male or female married or 
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unmarried’ who met criteria of residence, being a subject of the King, and being enrolled, were 
entitled to vote.39  
The franchise still at that point was not universal given s 4 of the Commonwealth Franchise Act 
1902 which disqualified some citizens and not others in terms of voting as electors at political 
elections. Section 4 disqualified persons of unsound mind, attainted of treason, or who had been 
convicted of an offence punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for one year or longer. In 
addition, it also disqualified Aboriginal natives of Australia, Asia, Africa or the Islands of the 
Pacific except for New Zealand. The only exception to that disqualification is if the ‘native person’ 
in question was entitled to have their name on an Electoral Roll and to vote prior to the 
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 and in accordance with s 41 of the Constitution.40 
The justification used for excluding Aboriginal people from the franchise was based on a racially 
discriminatory premise that wrongfully assumed Aboriginal people lacked the capacity to 
understand any political question, or to vote with intelligence. The Australian government’s 
administrative construct of Aboriginal identity through Commonwealth electoral legislation was 
based on Aboriginal blood strains that singled Aboriginal people out for discriminatory legislative 
treatment to their detriment – that is, to politically disenfranchise them from the right to vote.41 
In addition, the majority Anglo-Celtic population at the time was significantly guided and 
influenced by internationally recognised racist philosophies which maintained white privilege and 
devalued those that differed from ‘white’ Caucasian appearance.42 The exclusion of Aboriginal 
Australians both from the drafting process and from the text of the Constitution itself was a 
deliberate act by constitutional drafters and political elites to maintain their privilege and standing 
economically, politically and culturally. Aboriginal Australians were excluded from being consulted 
during the drafting phases of Australia’s Constitution because they were considered a ‘dying race’43 
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and therefore it was pointless to involve them. They were depicted as uncivilised barbaric beings 
unworthy of being counted as people or having rights worth protecting formally.44  
The absence of Indigenous Australians from constitutional processes affected Aboriginal peoples’ 
political standing, their inclusion within the Australian polity, and the respect given to them 
culturally by the Australian Government. Aboriginal rights were only mentioned in the Australian 
Constitution to their detriment – not to their benefit or protection.45  
Following the Convention debates, in the 1899 referendum,46 both non-Indigenous women and 
Aboriginal Australians were prevented under colony electoral laws from voting.47  
Thus, it is clear that even in the lead up to Australia becoming a federation, Aboriginal Australians 
experienced significant limitations to their civil rights.48 The exclusion of Aboriginal Australians 
from the colonies’ own establishment of a national government set the foundation for the Australian 
electoral system.49 Consequently, post-federation Aboriginal Australians experienced political 
underrepresentation and exclusion at the federal level50 culminating, in 1902, with the introduction 
of the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 that excluded ‘native people’ of Australia and other 
countries from voting in Australian federal elections.51  
The Barton government in power at the time justified the passage of such racially discriminatory, 
disenfranchising legislation as part of its rollout of the ‘White Australia’ policy.52 The ‘White 
Australia’ policy movement informed laws and policies that racially discriminated against people of 
colour, including Aboriginal people in Australia and, in doing so, it consolidated a national racial 
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identity designed to exclude Aboriginal Australians through political, social, economic and cultural 
mechanisms.53  
The movement was a means employed by the Australian Government to legitimise racial 
discrimination against people of colour and as a result placed the interests of Anglo-Celtic non-
Indigenous Australians above the interests of Aboriginal Australians.54 Despite Aboriginal 
Australians being classified as British subjects under the Crown post-colonisation, they held few 
civil rights and limited citizenship – including political participation rights – compared to Anglo-
Celtic Australians.55  
For many years during the ‘White Australia’ policy era, Australian states and territories were able to 
exclude Aboriginal children from the mainstream education system and place limits on their level of 
education received. Those actions have significantly contributed to the imbalance of Aboriginal 
educational levels compared to non-Indigenous Australians.56 
Further, the unequal political standing of Aboriginal Australians, born out of colonisation and post-
federation White Australia policy exclusions, have made it exceptionally difficult for Aboriginal 
Australians to overcome such obstacles by politically participating as a people.57 Maintaining the 
circumstances of Aboriginal people’s lives have stemmed at least in part from the entrenched 
electoral process and political institutions within Australia’s constitutional framework. To change 
the system, one must have the ability within it to exercise the franchise and elect members to 
represent their interests in both the upper and lower houses of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
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Despite being citizens of Australia, the result of Aboriginal Australians’ limited membership of the 
federal body politic has limited their capacity as a people to change the system.58  
Barriers inhibiting Aboriginal people’s full access to political rights, such as voting and candidacy 
representation, were maintained in the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902. By 1918 the Act was 
repealed by s 3 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 which reformed elector qualifications and 
disqualifications59 but without reforming disenfranchisement of Aboriginal Australians because of 
their race. Instead, s 39 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 replaced its predecessor, s 4 of the 
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902.60  
The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 was reformed in 1949 to the extent that it recognised 
Aboriginal voting rights at federal elections if they satisfied s 41 of the Australian Constitution.61 
However, that was only a tentative step towards reform and recognition of Aboriginal voting rights 
for Commonwealth elections. Full Aboriginal voting rights for Commonwealth elections did not 
occur until s 39 was wholly removed in 1962 with further reform to the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act 1918.62   
Despite the voting exclusion being removed, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were still 
excluded from the compulsory voting obligation for Commonwealth elections until 1984.63 
Legislators at the time justified the exclusion of the compulsory obligation to vote for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people to avoid exposing those who chose to register but not exercise 
their right to vote, to penalties for not doing so. However, at the same time, the Act until 1983 also 
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IV. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Australia’s electoral regime is based on Great Britain’s Westminster model of governance65 given 
the Australian Constitution refers to the Queen as the head of State with a federal indissoluble 
Commonwealth Parliament, Executive and Judicature.66  
Executive power is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General on the advice of 
the Federal Executive.67 Ultimately, this structure aims to adhere to principles of responsible 
government through keeping, in theory, the Executive, Legislature and Judicature separate from one 
another under the separation of powers doctrine.68 Thus, to achieve responsible government, the 
Executive is accountable and responsible to the Legislature and through the Legislature, to the 
electorate.69  
The Westminster system’s promotion of representative democracy sought to theoretically ensure all 
citizens are politically heard through exercising their rights to political participation. However, as 
discussed in the previous part, despite the Australian electoral system affording itself the title of 
representative democracy, it has not in practice included all citizens equally. While the previous 
part examined the extent of suffrage afforded by the interaction between the Constitution and 
electoral provisions, this part focuses on the relationship between suffrage and representative 
democracy through constitutional provisions themselves. 
The Australian Constitution formally recognises the principle of responsible government and 
maintains that parliamentary representatives be ‘directly chosen by the people’.70 Further, it 
provides that those representatives must be accountable to their electors in exercising their powers 
as members and representing their constituents’ rights and interests.71 In light of the capacity of 
                                                             
65 Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 1; The Preamble 
is part of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK), which in s 9 sets out the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, itself consisting of 128 sections. 
66 Megan A. Winder, ‘Disproportionate Disenfranchisement of Aboriginal Prisoners: A Conflict of Law that Australia 
Should Address’ (2010) 19 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 394; John Kincaid and Alan Tarr, Constitutional 
Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries (McGill-Queen's Press, 2005) 30; Brian Galligan, ‘Federalism and 
the Constitution’ in Ian McAllister, Steve Dowrick and Riaz Hassan, The Cambridge Handbook of Social Sciences in 
Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 235–236. 
67 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, ss 61, 62. 
68 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd and Others v Commonwealth of Australia (No. 2) (1992) 177 CLR 106, 631; 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
69 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd and Others v Commonwealth of Australia (No. 2) (1992) 177 CLR 106, 631; 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129. 
70 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, ch 1; Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, [112] 
(Gummow, Kirby, Crennan JJ). 
71 J. A. G. Griffith, Michael Ryle and M. A. J. Wheeler-Booth, Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedures (Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1989) 6; Nadia Urbinati, ‘Representative Democracy and Its Critics’ [2010] The Future of Representative 
 
59 
electoral law to disenfranchise sections of the community, the question is how the State can meet 
the obligations inherent in responsible and representative government. 
Gummow and Hayne JJ observed in the case of Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission72 
that the words ‘until the Parliament otherwise provides’ implies that representative government is 
not a static institution.73 Instead, as Stephen J held in Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v 
Commonwealth (‘McKinlay’),74 representative democracy is descriptive of a whole spectrum of 
political institutions. Those institutions differ from each other in countless respects yet still seek to 
adhere to representative democracy in ensuring numerical equality of electors is present within the 
electorates.75 In addition, the High Court noted in McKinlay that representative democracy in its 
purest form requires adult suffrage free from discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, property or 
educational qualification.76  
Representative democracy is in theory an electoral system that ought to connect all citizens equally 
to accessing political rights and, in turn, contributing to decision-making through voting. Voting is 
important because constituents must elect candidates from their electorate to become their member 
representatives in parliament. A representative democratic regime should also ensure member 
representative proportionality is present and reflective of the system’s differing citizen interests.77  
A. Voting and Candidature 
 
Stephen J held in McKinlay78 that the parliament ought to legislate so that electoral proportionality 
amongst members of the several Commonwealth states and territories is present.79 An elected 
Senator must obtain a number of votes equal to or in excess of, the required quota necessary which 
is based on the latest Commonwealth population statistics. Excess quota votes for successful 
candidates are then distributed to their electors ranking preferences until all vacancies are filled by 
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candidates obtaining quotas of the total votes. The Commonwealth Parliament decides when and 
where those elections are to occur.80 
This system has been held to be the appropriate calculation to achieve political proportionality 
within the Australian Senate to ensure Senators are elected by a proportionate system of voting 
reflective of the votes of the electors as opposed to the majority vote system used for the House of 
Representative.81 By doing so, smaller parties and independants have a greater opportunity to be 
elected and form part of the composition of the Senate and, be part of the review and check of the 
government of the day. 
To be eligible to run as a candidate for membership of the Commonwealth Parliament of Australia, 
persons must firstly meet Constitutional eligibility standards for the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives.82  
For persons to qualify as members for the Commonwealth House of Representatives, according to 
the Australian Constitution, they must have attained the age of 21 years and must be already 
eligible to or already entitled to enrol to vote at federal elections.83 In terms of citizenship, those 
persons must have also been residents of Australia for three years up to the time at which they are 
chosen.84  
In the alternative, those persons must be a subject of the Queen including ‘natural-born’ persons or 
persons that have been naturalised under a law of the United Kingdom, of a colony that has become 
a state, or of the Commonwealth for at least five years.85 
The objective behind the framers of the Constitution when creating the role and powers of the 
Senate was to ensure it served to protect the interests of the less populous states in the federal 
parliament.86 The Constitution does so on a generalised scale by providing equal representation of 
those states.87 This is turn requires there be six senators for each original state unless the parliament 
legislates and provides otherwise for each state.88  
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The Senate’s role and powers are contained within Part II of the Constitution, which provides that 
the Senate be comprised of senators for each state, directly chosen by the people unless parliament 
provides otherwise.89 The Senate is also counted as one electorate.90 The House of Representatives’ 
role and powers within Part III of the Australian Constitution provides that (as practicably as 
possible) the number of members comprising the House of Representatives be twice the number of 
members comprising the Senate.91 Members of the House of Representatives are also directly 
chosen by the people.92  
Section 41 of the Australian Constitution deals with issues relating to both Houses of the 
Parliament. It seeks to ensure adults who have the right to vote in the Lower House of their state 
parliament are also enfranchised to exercise their right to vote at Commonwealth elections.93 This 
means that a person who has the right to vote at state elections or was entitled to enrol to vote at 
state elections prior to 1901 are also entitled to enrol and to vote at Commonwealth elections.  
However, if a person did not acquire the right to enrol and to vote at their state election prior to 
1901, they were not then also entitled to enrol and to vote at Commonwealth elections. The passing 
of the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 changed that disqualification of persons from enrolling 
and voting at Commonwealth elections if they had not acquired the right to vote at state elections.94 
This was, of course, subject to electoral qualifiers and disqualifiers within the Australian 
Constitution (where a person must be an adult and a citizen/permanent resident of Australia)95 and 
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (where a person must be of capacity and not sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of a year or more).96 
Section 41 does not, however, provide an express right to vote, nor does it provide a guarantee of 
adult suffrage.97 However, it was noted by Murphy J in R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka (1983)98 that 
the right to vote is so precious it should not be read out of the Constitution by implication.99 
                                                             
89 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, Pt II. 
90 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 7. 
91 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 24. 
92 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, Part III. 
93 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 41 (i); Zappala, Gianni and Stephen Castles, Citizenship and 
Immigration in Australia (University of Wollongong, 1998) 298; Jonathan Crowe and Peta Stephenson, ‘An Express 
Constitutional Right to Vote? The Case for Reviving Section 41’ (2014) 36 (2) Sydney Law Review 207; T. H. Marshall, 
Class, Citizenship, and Social Development (Doubleday, 1964) 30. 
94 Crowe and Stephenson, ibid, 210; R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka (1983) 152 CLR 254 [264] (Gibbs CJ, Mason and 
Wilson JJ); 279 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
95 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, s 41 (i). 
96 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1902, s 4. 
97 R v Pearson; ex parte Sipka (1983) 152 CLR 254, 12–21. 
98 152 CLR 268. 
99 R v Pearson; Ex parte Sipka (1983) 152 CLR 254, 12; Crowe and Stephenson (n 93) 213. 
 
62 
Therefore, every reasonable presumption and interpretation should be adopted that favours the right 
of people to participate in the elections of those who represent them.100 In practice, this position has 
only been applied without restrictions to non-Indigenous Australians (with the exception of non-
Indigenous women until the passing of the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902).101 
For Aboriginal Australians, proportionality within its constitutional sense is limited because it does 
not extend provisional consideration or articulation of their cultural constituency if they are to run 
as a political candidate to become a member of the Senate or House of Representatives.  The 
assumption of proportionality is that society is homogenous; indeed this was the basis for excluding 
certain people and not others from the discussions of the Constitutional Conventions and their 
debates. Thus, Australian society has been built on the image of the white landed men who made it, 
which as a result limits the inclusivity of those left outside of the discussions during that process 
like Aboriginal people (and other minorities). Consequently, the system on the face of it looks like 
proportionality, but not everyone within it experiences the system that way. 
This is an important factor of consideration given Aboriginal policy interests and objectives are 
likely to differ from the status quo of their electorate or their political party if they are not running 
as an independent. Jurisdictional proportionality in a post-colonial, politically disproportionate 
Australia for Aboriginal Australians, is not enough to adequately represent those cultural interests. 
There needs to be cultural proportionality given Australia’s continued post-colonial issues with 
disenfranchisement of an Aboriginal population comprising less than 3 per cent, compared to the 
non-Indigenous majority.  
The practical and lived day-to-day experiences of Aboriginal Australians as a distinct cultural 
identity are contrastingly different from the so-called ‘mainstream’ identity of non-Indigenous 
Australian citizens. As such, there must be some sort of legislative consideration that delivers 
support for and understanding of that.  
Furthermore, Australia’s current political climate has strayed considerably away from democratic 
norms based on democratic equality and fairness.102 That shift affects the likelihood of Aboriginal 
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candidates elected into federal parliament,103 which in turn affects Australia’s ability to achieve 
proportionate political representation of its citizens. Despite the currently elected five Aboriginal 
federal candidates sitting within Australian federal parliament, the overall political representation of 
Aboriginal Australians is still lacking. The current representation of Aboriginal Australians should 
be increased so that there is more diversity of representation that reflects all differing Aboriginal 
wants and interests politically.  
Aboriginal candidates must still be ‘chosen by the people’ of their electorate like their non-
Indigenous counterparts.104 Citizen interests within electorates are led by its majority because the 
entire Australian electoral system is based on a majority vote creation of leadership. Minority 
candidates must, therefore, appeal to the majority interests to be selected and then elected. 
B.  ‘Directly chosen by the people’ 
 
Evidently, voting in elections for the parliament lies at the heart of Australia’s representative 
democratic regime under the Australian Constitution.105 As foreshadowed earlier, a key aspect of 
representation is how the electoral system deals with placing limitations upon ‘universal 
suffrage’.106 While this is largely the province of electoral law, these laws must adhere to the 
constitutional requirement that candidates are ‘directly chosen by the people’. The right to vote is an 
implied right contained within ss 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution, based on the requirement 
for members of parliament to be ‘directly chosen by the people’.107  
Constitutionally speaking, section 7 provides that the senators for each state within the 
Commonwealth Parliament are to be ‘directly chosen by the people’ of the state, voting, until the 
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parliament otherwise provides, as one electorate.108 Section 24, on the other hand, considers 
electoral proportionality. Section 24 provides that when s 25 adjustments are made to a state’s 
representation within Commonwealth Parliament (the provision that deals with races disqualified 
from voting), those adjustments are proportionate to the number of seats that state has in the 
Commonwealth House of Representatives.109 The total number of House of Representative 
members must be twice the number of Senators.110 
Section 24, however, does not guarantee universal adult suffrage because adults can be excluded 
from voting if the parliament legislates to exclude them for ‘substantial reasons’111 The 
internationally recognised standard for the allowance of limitations being placed on universal 
suffrage within democratic regimes.112 Accordingly, the words ‘directly chosen by the people’ 
according to Australian case law, are words of generality and must not be confused with words of 
universality.113  
The nature and extent of exceptions that limit adult suffrage are important. Within the Australian 
context, the Constitution leaves it to parliament to define.114 However, parliament’s legislative 
power to do so, Australian common law standards have confirmed that this must be balanced with 
principles of representative democracy.115  
Representative democracy and enfranchisement of citizens lie at the heart of political participation 
rights recognised within Australia’s political regime. Thus, for parliament to disenfranchise a group 
of adult citizens from voting and politically participating within Australia’s democratic regime, the 
case of McGinty confirmed it must do so for substantial reasons.116 Substantial reasons must be 
weighed in with consistency of ‘choice by the people’ according to the High Court’s finding in 
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Roach. In doing so, take into consideration all factors relevant to those citizens’ circumstances 
before limiting their right to political participation.117  
Australian case law has confirmed that Australian citizens can be excluded from voting if they are 
infants, minors, persons of unsound mind and felons serving lengthy prison sentences:118 this is 
what Australia’s current parliament considers qualifying as ‘substantial reasons’.119 The wording of 
s 24 should be interpreted so that reference to ‘the people’ includes, as the case of McKinlay held, 
those who hold the capacity to understand the voting process.120 Any other arbitrary reason for 
disenfranchising persons from voting that are discriminatory in nature according to international 
law standards, (based on race, colour, sex, language, religion etc.) do not satisfy this standard.121 
However, while this may represent formal equality, without further consideration of a person’s 
individual circumstances prior to their exclusion from voting, Australian case law has confirmed 
disqualification is likely to disproportionately affect some sections of the community resulting in 
substantive inequality.122 This has the potential to affect Australia’s ability to conform to the norms 
of representative government.  
The phrase ‘directly chosen by the people’ contained within ss 7 and 24 provides electors with a 
constitutional implied right to vote.123 The way in which members are chosen is by way of a popular 
vote where parties compete for votes and seats on the national as well as the sub-national level.124 
The effect of the requirement to be ‘directly chosen by the people’ is that sovereign power will 
reside in the people and will be exercised on their behalf by their representatives through legislative 
and executive powers.125 Those representatives are accountable to the people and are responsible for 
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representing and protecting their interests within politics and legislation drafting.126 Further, at a 
federal level, those parliamentary representatives are responsible for regulating the way in which 
elections take place in Australia according to the Australian Constitution.127  
C. The Race Disqualification  
 
A prominent Constitutional provision that deals with race and voting rights is found in s 25 of the 
Australian Constitution. Section 25 provides “if by the law of any State all persons of any race are 
disqualified from voting at elections for the more numerous House of the Parliament of the State, 
then, in reckoning the number of the people of the State or of the Commonwealth, persons of that 
race resident in that State shall not be counted.”128  
The intention behind s 25 was to create an entrenched penalty provision that would work to restrict 
a state’s representation within the Commonwealth Parliament if it disqualifies citizens from voting 
at state elections because of their race. This section is an altered version of subs 2 of the 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution129 which, for Australia’s version, aimed to limit the 
extent to which racial inequality and political inequality were present during the time of federation.  
Section 25 outdatedly refers to the term ‘race’ which has been deemed to offend principles of 
equality and representative democracy. This is because disqualification from voting because of a 
citizen’s ‘race’ does not fit within the common law meaning of ‘substantial reasons’ which qualifies 
the government to legislate and disenfranchise people from voting.130 
Further, contemporary political debates131 that oppose references to race within Australia’s 
constitutional framework deem it irrelevant and outdated if Australia is to truly align itself with 
principles of equality and representative democracy.132 This is because all citizens should not be 
subject to disenfranchising laws that limit their right to vote at elections (be it at a state/territory 
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level or Commonwealth) for unjustified discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, a nation with a 
democratic regime’s primary political purpose in that context is to encourage and allow for all 
citizens to vote equally in public elections so that their interests are proportionately represented in 
federal parliament.133  
Section 25 of Australia’s Constitution evidences a clear formalised acknowledgement of politically 
unconstrained state and territory electoral law-making powers that can go against those principles of 
equality, democracy and universal suffrage based on race. The slow progression of Australian states 
and territories extending the franchise to Aboriginal people (including Aboriginal women) is 
indicative of Australia’s limited adherence to those principles.134  
D. Parliament’s Power to Make Electoral Laws 
 
At the core of the challenge to generate truly universal suffrage is the implied right to vote as 
expressed through ss 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution. Those sections are vague and so the 
parliament is left with the power to define who is disenfranchised and who is not.135 As a result, 
parliament has been able to preserve the scope to which ‘directly chosen by the people’ applies.136  
The Australian Constitution, in providing a framework and structure under which the electoral 
system operates, vests legislative power in the federal parliament.137 That legislative power qualifies 
electors’ eligibility to enrol and to vote at federal elections.138 This system of governance, as noted 
in Lange139 and by Isaacs J in the Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro,140 ‘provides for the 
fundamental features of representative government’.141   
However, parliamentary electoral legislative power does have its limitations. For instance, under 
both ss 8 and 30 of the Australian Constitution there can be no plural voting.142 Plural voting in 
Australia occurred prior to the establishment of the Australian Constitution where colonies gave 
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property owners (for those who had freehold or leasehold interests) an additional vote in elections. 
This was eventually abolished at a state and territory level as it had been significantly critiqued as 
undemocratic and anachronistic.143  
Further, those provisions must be read in consideration of the context and structure of the 
Australian Constitution in its entirety, which in turn requires those sections to be read with 
reference to, and in consideration of s 128. Section 128 requires electors qualified to vote at 
elections for the numerous House of Representatives to be eligible to also vote at elections for 
proposed laws for an alteration of the Constitution.144 
Thus, ss 7, 8, 24 and 30 are to be read in consideration of and reference to each other and the 
entirety of the Australian Constitution.145 Chapter 1 of the Constitution also makes clear that by 
providing the formula “[u]ntil the Parliament otherwise provides’ the parliament has vested 
legislative power to regulate elections for and membership of both Houses of Parliament.146 This is 
evidenced within the wording contained in s 7 (with its provisions about the division of Queensland 
into divisions, and its provision for the numbers of Senators to be elected in each state);147 s 9 (in 
reference to the method of electing Senators);148 s 10 (in the application of certain state laws to the 
election of Senators);149 s 14 (for further provision for the rotation of vacancies in the Senate);150 
and s 22 (which refers to the quorum at a meeting of the Senate).151  
The Australian Constitution also makes reference to Commonwealth Parliament’s legislative power 
to regulate how representatives within it are to be elected.152 In that context, it is clear that the 
Australian franchise is thus a matter for the Commonwealth Parliament to determine with only one 
generalised limitation and requirement that each House must be ‘directly chosen by the people’.153  
This can prompt larger political issues in terms of indirectly excluding members of minority groups 
like Aboriginal Australians who become ineligible for a variety of reasons under Commonwealth 
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electoral legislation. Laws controlling eligibility should observe the broader significant 
circumstances that contribute systemically to ineligibility to participate politically. In this regard, it 
is necessary to appreciate the distortion of Australia’s electoral system through laws that indirectly 
disqualify Aboriginal Australians – in particular, the disqualification of prisoners.154   
Substantive inequality within the Australian electoral system is maintained because legislative 
reform has failed to genuinely seek to increase the political participation of minority groups like 
Aboriginal Australians.155 This is evident in Australia’s prioritisation of issues that continue to 
favour the non-Indigenous majority whilst at best masking, and possibly suppressing, the 
expression of Indigenous issues and the representation of those issues within institutions of 
Australian governance.156 
The Australian Constitution provides the framework for Australia’s governance structure and 
electoral processes. Further, it established a constitutional framework for representative democracy 
in terms of federal electoral processes,157 constituting the houses of parliament through citizens’ 
vote. These processes are further regulated by federal parliament through Commonwealth electoral 
legislation. 
V. THE COMMONWEALTH ELECTORAL SYSTEM  
 
Australia’s overall governance structure is, as defined and set out in the Constitution, one that is 
labelled as being reflective of a liberal representative and democratic regime. It is impliedly defined 
within the Australian Constitution in ss 7 and 24 as a system that provides its citizens with a right to 
vote candidates into parliament who are ‘to be chosen directly by the people’ to best represent their 
interests if they win a seat as an elected member.158   
To do so, citizens who are eligible to enrol to vote at federal elections (which are held every three 
years) are subject to a compulsory voting obligation once enrolled.159 Further, those persons must 
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attend a polling booth on Election Day, have their name marked off the certified list of electoral 
division electors, mark their ballot paper in a polling booth and place it in the ballot box.160 
Originally, the method of voting in Australia’s democratic regime was exercised through what was 
referred to as a ‘simple majority voting’ system (or ‘first-past-the-post’ system).  However, this 
voting system changed in 1919 when the Commonwealth Parliament passed legislation to introduce 
the preferential voting system (or the ‘alternative vote’ system).161 The preferential voting system 
has been upheld by the High Court of Australia for elections for the House of Representatives.162  
The preferential voting system is a unique system of voting for the House of Representatives of 
parliament that requires electors to number the candidates in order of preference and the ‘winner’ to 
have 51 per cent support.163 Electors cast one vote to elect a candidate from their electoral division 
to represent their interests as members of parliament in the House of Representatives.164 
In this system, once electors attend a polling booth on Election Day, they must fill in the ballot 
paper to choose their preferred candidate. Electors must write the number one in the box beside the 
candidate’s name they choose to elect as their most preferred choice and the numbers two and three 
for other candidates that fall in the hierarchical order of the voter’s preference.165  
For Senate elections, a proportional representation voting system is used for electors to choose 
candidates in multi-member electorates. This system requires winners to meet a set quota of 
votes.166 Ballot papers for Senate elections can be numbered in order of preference ‘above the line’ 
when choosing parties or groups of their choice (there must be at least six boxes marked). In the 
alternative, electors can vote ‘below the line’ and number their ballot paper boxes alongside their 
preferred individual candidates from candidates they prefer to least prefer (there must be at least 
12).167  
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Previously, in the old system, voters had the option of simply putting a ‘1’ in one box above the line 
or filling out all the numbers below the line. Accordingly, if they voted above the line in this 
system, their preferences would be determined by the chosen party or group.168 However, this 
allowed for so-called micro-parties to swap preferences with each other which meant high numbers 
of candidates being elected on very low first-preference votes. In 2013, the prevalence of micro-
parties in the Senate prompted parliament to change the rules.169 Nonetheless, it is essential for 
voters to understand how the new system works for their vote to be counted.170 
The current qualifications for voting at Commonwealth elections are found in s 93 of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. Section 93 provides that persons are eligible to vote when they 
have obtained the age of 18 years,171 where they are Australian citizens.172 Section 93 also provides 
an exception for persons to vote in federal elections who are not directly classified as an Australian 
citizens if their name would be on the electoral roll for an electoral division if the relevant 
citizenship laws had remained in force and they are British subjects.173  
Another crucial part of voting in Australia is enrolling to vote. Australian electoral legislation 
requires persons to evidence their eligibility to enrol to vote as electors by identifying themselves as 
an Australian citizen or eligible British subject. They must also be able to prove through identifying 
themselves that they meet the age requirement – for enrolment, this is at age 16, although the right 
to vote will only apply once the person reaches 18 – and that they have lived at their address for at 
least one month.174 
Identification to meet eligibility requirements is done by way of producing a driver’s licence, an 
Australian passport number, or by having a person already enrolled to vote confirm their identity. 
An 18+ or a Proof of Age card are not accepted.175 Documentary proof of meeting the age 
requirements all depend upon having a birth certificate. Birth registration and certification of 
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individuals in Australia rests with state and territory governments.176 This is done through a 
Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages with oversight by a Registrar whose responsibility is to 
seek to maximise birth registration and certification.177  
The registration and certification of births affect the electoral system in two ways. First, birth 
registration provides data to the Australian Bureau of Statistics which informs each state and 
territory’s population statistics that are used to determine how many seats are apportioned to 
electorates in the Commonwealth House of Representatives.178 Secondly, registration and 
certification of births are necessary for the issue of identifying documentation including primary 
photographic identifying documents required to identify individuals seeking to enrol and vote at 
elections.  
Evidently, the franchise is still limited for certain citizens in Australia, which disqualifies persons 
from voting who are under the legal age, are non-citizens, are of ‘unsound mind’, persons serving a 
lengthy term of imprisonment or are unable to identify themselves to register to vote at polling 
booths on election day.179 Disqualifications based on ‘unsound mind’, imprisonment, and voter 
registration have a disproportionate impact on Indigenous Australians. 
A. The Prisoner Disqualification 
 
The provisions that limit a person’s ability to enrol and to vote at Commonwealth elections are 
found in s 93 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.180 The two primary disqualifications that 
affect Aboriginal voting participation for Commonwealth elections include persons deemed of 
‘unsound mind’ who are incapable of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment and 
voting,181 and those serving a term of imprisonment of three years or more.182 
For persons incarcerated for a lengthy term of imprisonment, the first formal limitation in Australia 
was s 6 of the Australian Constitutions Act 1842 (Imp) for the New South Wales legislature:183  
no person shall be entitled to vote at any such Election who shall have been attainted or convicted of 
any Treason, Felony, or infamous Offence within any Part of Her Majesty's Dominions unless he 
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shall have received a free Pardon, or one conditional on not leaving the Colony, for such Offence, or 
shall have undergone the sentence or Punishment to which he shall have been adjudged for such 
Offence.184  
This was the beginning of disenfranchisement of prisoners from politically participating in 
Australasian colonies.185 The section refers to an ‘infamous offence’. An ‘infamous offence’ in that 
period included circumstances where ‘a man is convicted of an offence which is inconsistent with 
the common principles of honesty and humanity [and] the law considers his oath to be of no weight 
and excludes his testimony as of too doubtful and suspicious a nature to be admitted in a court of 
justice to affect the property or liberty of others’.186 It focused on the infamy of the punishment as 
opposed to the nature of the crime itself. Therefore, the legislation rendered the offender as 
politically unworthy of exercising their civil responsibility to politically participate. 
Those who were disenfranchised who fell into those circumstances were only exempted if they had 
received a free pardon or had already served their sentence imposed upon them for the crime they 
had committed.187 Disqualification from being an elected member in the lower house of the 
legislature arose from attainment of treason, by a conviction of a felony or any infamous offence or 
crime.188  
This disqualification of elected members was later put forth as a Bill at the Sydney Convention in 
1891 leading up to the establishment of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. It 
provided in Chapter I clause 46 (3) that persons ineligible to be chosen and sit in either legislative 
chamber included those who were ‘attainted of treason or convicted of a felony or of any infamous 
crime’. Furthermore, it also provided that the civil political disability imposed upon such persons 
might be removed upon ‘the expiration or remission of the sentence, or a pardon, or release, or 
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otherwise’.189 The disqualification was later considered at the Adelaide Convention in 1897 where it 
was presented in the form of a paper to both Houses of the Parliament of Queensland by Sir Samuel 
Griffith.190  
Disqualification of elected members fell within the then s 45 of the draft constitution which 
recommended that the word ‘felony’ be amended. This was because its use made the 
disqualification dependent upon state law.191  
The disqualification was then considered at the Sydney Convention in September 1897 within s 45 
(iii). S 45 disqualified a person ‘who is attainted of treason or has been convicted of felony or of 
any infamous crime or any offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State, by 
imprisonment for three years or longer’.192  
The three-year disqualification was later reduced to one year by 1889. This was a result of a 
recommendation provided by the Drafting Committee in the final stages of the Melbourne 
Convention.193 However, those constitutional provisions for disenfranchising persons with a 
conviction, or those that are imprisoned, only disqualify political candidates under s 44 (ii). The 
disqualification of electors sentenced to imprisonment was not included. Instead, the 
disqualification of electors was left to states and territories to legislate on within their respective 
electoral laws (until parliament provides otherwise).194 
By 1983, the disqualification of electors from voting at Commonwealth elections had changed yet 
again within the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. In particular, s 93 of the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 changed the targeted disqualification time period for those sentenced to a terms 
of imprisonment from one year or longer to a time period that disqualified those sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment of five years or longer.195  
The reform process of this particular disqualifying section continued on through the Electoral and 
Referendum Amendment Act 1995 (Cth). The prisoner disqualification section changed again to 
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disqualify persons ‘serving a sentence of 5 years or longer for an offence against the law of the 
Commonwealth or of a State or Territory’.196  
By 2004, the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Prisoner Voting and Other Measures) Act 
2004 (Cth) changed the elector imprisonment disqualification sentence time from five years or more 
to three years or more from enrolling to vote at Commonwealth elections.197 The current 
disqualifying section is now found in s 93 (8AA) of the Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).198 Whilst this has 
changed yet again in 2006 (from a term of three years or more to imprisonment in general (no 
matter what the term is))199 the Australian Parliament changed the prisoner disqualifier section back 
to three years or more which is our current disqualifying provision within the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918.  
Therefore, persons will not meet the voter eligibility criteria200 if they are serving a term of 
imprisonment of three years or more.201 Those persons will also not appear on the certified list of 
voters for elections prepared by the Australian Electoral Commission.202 In contrast, persons 
serving a term of imprisonment of less than three years are still entitled to enrol to vote in 
Commonwealth elections as per s 96A of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. 203 
While the disqualifying provision applies to all persons equally who are serving a term of 
imprisonment of three years or more, by prohibiting them from voting at federal elections, it comes 
with a variety of indirect racially discriminatory issues for Indigenous people.204 Some of those 
issues were discussed a landmark Australian case called Roach v Electoral Commissioner 
(‘Roach’).205 
Gleeson CJ in Roach considered the rationale behind excluding certain citizens from the franchise 
for ‘substantial reasons’:  
The franchise is critical to representative government and lies at the centre of our concept of 
participation in the life of the community, and of citizenship, disenfranchisement of any group of 
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adult citizens on a basis that does not constitute a substantial reason from such participation would 
not be consistent with choice by the people.206 
As such, certain citizens should only be excluded from voting for ‘substantial reasons’ which are 
neither disproportionate nor inconsistent with choice by the people.207  
The majority in Roach, however, relied on the reasoning of ‘substantial reasons’ in the case of 
McKinlay.208 McKinlay held that the wording contained within s 24 of the Australian Constitution 
did not guarantee universal suffrage and that disqualifying citizens from voting who are infants, 
minors, persons of unsound mind and felons serving lengthy prison sentences were substantial 
reasons.209  
The majority held in Roach that the disqualification of the prisoner in question (an Aboriginal 
female) was justified. Yet the reasoning behind holding the disqualification justification, only 
considered the length and serious nature of the offence committed by the prisoner. Other important 
considerations of the prisoners Aboriginal cultural identity and historical contexts that she as an 
Aboriginal woman has been subjected to in terms of her pre-imprisonment disenfranchisement, 
incarceration and intergenerational trauma from being a survivor of the Stolen Generations, were 
not taken into account.  
On those limited terms the court held that political exclusion was justified as the prisoner evidenced 
disconnection from society and an exercise of antisocial behavior which warranted limitation of full 
civic rights.210  
The disqualification and exclusion of political participation rights form an important part of a 
person’s connection to society and exercise of civil rights. International standards,211 argue that 
such limitations placed upon a person’s exercise of fundamental political rights are invalid as they 
add an additional and unnecessary layer of punishment on someone already punished and serving 
their sentence. Therefore, it is not appropriate for Commonwealth electoral legislation to further add 
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to a state’s administration of criminal justice, on a person who has committed a state-based offence, 
by disqualifying those persons from politically participating at federal elections.212 
If anything, it is important for persons to maintain their political membership of their country’s 
political community.213 This is important to ensure persons incarcerated, particularly those serving 
lengthy terms of imprisonment, form a better sense of civic responsibility and political inclusion 
that underpins citizenship rights and societal obligations.214 
The preamble to the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) declares that parliament recognises that 
Australian citizenship represents full and formal membership of the community of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, and Australian citizenship is a common bond, involving reciprocal 
rights and obligations.215  
The reference to the reciprocity of rights and obligations is important in the context of membership 
of the community and their exercise of political participation rights. However, the current 
parliamentary rationale for temporarily limiting such rights to the franchise is warranted for persons 
that engage in antisocial behaviour and serious criminal conduct.216 To be eligible to access political 
participation rights, persons must not sever their connection to their community. This requires them 
to be civically responsible and not commit a serious offence with a lengthy term of imprisonment. 
Australian electoral legislation does not also formally recognise those who qualify for non-custodial 
sentencing options. Further, it also does not acknowledge, the circumstances of those who suffer 
from poverty, homelessness, mental health problems or reside in a geographically remote location.  
These factors are key contributors that place Aboriginal Australians in a higher risk category 
compared to non-Indigenous Australians, of being incarcerated. According to the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander prisoners accounted for over a quarter, or 28 per 
cent, of the total Australian prisoner population.217 Bearing those factors in mind, it is also worth 
noting that the amount of serious offences that Indigenous people are incarcerated for are less when 
compared to non-Indigenous Australians. In 2019, Indigenous Australians comprised 34 per cent of 
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acts intended to cause injury and 14 per cent of unlawful entry with intent. Whilst these offences are 
serious in nature, other serious offences like homicide, sexual assault and illicit drug offences had a 
majority non-Indigenous population of offenders sentenced to imprisonment. Statistics of 
Indigenous imprisonment rates also found that 78 per cent of Indigenous prisoners had been 
imprisoned previously.  
Overall, based on that data alone, it is clear that the rates of imprisonment are higher for Aboriginal 
people which increased their likelihood to reoffend and re-enter incarceration for a potentially 
longer imposed subsequent sentence. Some states in Australia actually include imprisonment as a 
mandatory sentence for certain offences. This can also be an issue for Indigenous offenders who are 
reliant on the principle of ‘imprisonment as a last resort’ given their cultural and historical 
vulnerabilities as Aboriginal people who are frequently subjected to all kinds of systematic racism 
within Australia.218   
Thus, the arbitrary nature of determining which offences are serious enough to warrant 
disenfranchisement is unjust because of the culmination of factors that need careful consideration 
when further punishment is imposed one someone’s sentence that disenfranchises them. Those 
factors must consider the nature of the offence, the cultural background of the person and the 
environment and circumstances that person has grown up in and continues to live within.219  
The legislative requirement in most Australian states and territories is to treat imprisonment of an 
offender as a last resort.220 In doing so, other sentencing options such as fines, community service, 
home detention, or periodic detention are considered as initial penalty options.221  
Where these penalty options are preferred, offenders have the chance to remain connected to their 
community which includes their political enfranchisement. However, data reveals that Indigenous 
offenders are more likely than non-Indigenous offenders to attract a custodial sentence than an 
alternative penalty option.222  
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The Australian Law Reform Commission has identified that this is a persistent and increasing 
problem for Australia’s criminal justice system to deal with by recognising the economic, housing, 
employment and educational issues Aboriginal Australians experience post-colonial oppression 
with.223  Those factors, as noted by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in 
1991, go frequently overlooked when it comes to sentencing Aboriginal people which contributes to 
their greater streamlined pathway into incarceration compared to non-Indigenous Australians. 
Those high, unfair and disproportionate Indigenous incarceration rates also have a flow-on effect to 
Indigenous disenfranchisement for Australian political elections. 
B. The ‘Unsound Mind’ Disqualification 
 
The unsound mind disqualification disenfranchises persons deemed to be of unsound mind based on 
the rationale that such persons lack capacity in exercising a free and informed choice in terms of 
voting at elections.224  
There has been much critique from the Australian Human Rights Commission of the wording of 
this provision. The Australian Human Rights Commission has commented that the wording is 
vague and lacks clarity as to how persons are categorised as being of ‘unsound mind’ and who 
decides on their status.225 This critique also acknowledges international standards of protecting the 
franchise of persons with disabilities found within the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.226  
Nonetheless, this exclusion was established during the 19th century in Australia during a time when 
exclusionary social policies were dominant and guided legislation drafting and political norms.227 
This exclusion remains in the current Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.228 It is important because 
being deemed as being of ‘unsound mind’ can also statistically contribute to a person’s greater 
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likelihood of entering into the incarceration qualification through antisocial and criminalising 
behavioural traits. Both are factors that Aboriginal people are significantly vulnerable to 
experiencing and which both have a huge impact on the political participation of Aboriginal 
electors.  
Historically, Aboriginal people were automatically deemed to be of ‘unsound mind’ with the 
introduction of s 4 of the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902. That section showed that the original 
legislative electoral law presumption on Aboriginal mental capacity to exercise their rights to the 
franchisee as citizens, was exclusionary and one that considered Aboriginal people as lacking 
capacity and intelligence to understand political choice through voting at an election.229 Whilst that 
section has since been repealed, there remains indirect possibilities left open where Aboriginal 
people may experience racial discrimination with being deemed to be of ‘unsound mind’ for the 
purpose of disqualifying those persons from voting at federal elections.230  This is largely due to 
ever present racial bias existent in many of Australia’s institutions, law and policies, but in 
particular in this regard, within Australia’s health care system.231  
As such, the deeming of an elector (particularly those of Aboriginal descent) to be of ‘unsound 
mind’ which would disqualify them from voting at a federal election, provides doctors with power 
to certify those persons politically unfit to vote, from a health care systematic perspective where 
racial bias is present towards Aboriginal people.232 This aspect is yet to be fully resolved and given 
further cultural and historical consideration towards Aboriginal experiences with 
disenfranchisement through being deemed directly or indirectly, mentally incapacitated to vote at an 
election. The section needs to better understand and have a greater presence of cultural sensitivity 
to, the ways in which Aboriginal people experience political racial bias through discriminatory 
assumptions made about their mental capacity to make informed and intelligent political decisions 
that will affect their lives. 
Most Aboriginal electors suffer inter-generational trauma as a result of their dispossession 
following the Stolen Generations and that has often led to their incarceration through antisocial 
behaviour exhibited towards authorities.233 Those experiences of inter-generational trauma and 
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dispossession however, do not automatically incapacitate their ability to understand the importance 
of their right to vote and to undertake their exercise of that right. Inter-generational trauma, 
depression and an aggression towards authorities, do not limit the political capacity and intelligence 
of a person to capably vote at an election.234 If anything, one would think those types of actions for 
a person from such a culturally disenfranchised background, would empower them and have a 
positive impact to some degree, on their self-worth as an individual and as an Aboriginal person, 
which would lead to a better state to some extent, of their mental health and wellbeing. 
Whilst a support person or carer can assist in helping persons deemed of ‘unsound mind’ with 
exercising their right to vote (where appropriate), the point to be made is that there is a need for 
further development of this particular section that takes into account Aboriginal experiences with 
mental health and disenfranchisement.  
There is also the realisation that without doing so, Aboriginal people that trigger this section, may 
understandably lack incentive to progress with trying to exercise their right to vote with additional 
administrative obstacles placed upon them together with already present feelings of political 
exclusion based on past legislative electoral assumptions about their capacity as a people.  
This section must afford itself further legislative or even policy development that realises those 
contextual experiences of Aboriginal disenfranchisement and mental capacity. 
C. Indigenous Citizens’ Voting Experiences 
 
When Indigenous Australians do not see themselves or their experiences within the Australian 
Constitution and electoral legislation, they become alienated from the political process. Such forms 
of legislative exclusion can also make Indigenous Australians, alongside their pre-existing 
longstanding rights to sovereignty, question the Australian political systems legitimacy.235 In those 
circumstances, some Indigenous Australians view engaging such a system is not worthwhile and 
may limit their recognition as sovereign people of this land. 
However, for those who seek political recognition and political exercise of their sovereignty, who 
do wish to engage and be politically heard and represented, and do wish to take up their plight for 
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political justice, voting and political inclusivity is essential. This part focuses on the aspirations of 
those Indigenous Australians that seek to engage in voting and aspire for reform of the Australian 
system so that the majority rule accommodates their aspirations as an Indigenous minority. 
A contemporary example of where reform to the system might exist can be seen with results from 
the rollout of the new voting system for Commonwealth elections. Surveyed research results 
revealed that almost 50 per cent of voters do not understand how the new Senate voting system 
works. The Australian Electoral Commission (which is an independent federal agency in charge of 
organising, conducting and supervising federal elections, by-elections and referendums) has been 
criticised by the Australia Institute for providing voters with unclear instructions including aspects 
of the instructions that are incorrect.236 The result has meant that some of those voters have been 
unintentionally preferentially voting for parties on their ballot papers that they thought they were 
putting last.237    
The rate of informal Senate ballots that have been incorrectly filled out and go uncounted increased 
to 3.9 per cent in the 2019 federal election from its previous 2.9 per cent in 2013.238 This rate of 
informal votes becomes important when there are tight counts in an election. Furthermore, this is of 
particular importance in consideration of the statistics on Indigenous Australians’ voting 
participation. Prior to the rolling out of the new Senate voting system, the AEC had identified that 
only half of the less than 3 per cent Indigenous population had registered to vote and, out of those 
enrolled to vote, only half of that population actually turns up to vote at polling stations on the day 
of voting or fills in their ballot paper correctly.239 
Voting correctly is crucial to the performance of political participation and, consequently, for 
voters’ political voice to be heard and represented. AEC initiatives to provide electors with correct 
instructions to fill out their ballot paper validly, and also to assist electors to do so, are of 
fundamental democratic importance. 
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At first instance, and in consideration of one of the first steps required in the voting process which 
requires electors to identify themselves when enrolling to vote on Election Day, it is important to 
note various barriers Aboriginal electors face with this requirement. 
Despite the difficulty in calculating unregistered births across Australia, a study conducted in 
Western Australia in 2016 found that there are lower rates of birth registrations amongst Aboriginal 
Australians compared to non-Aboriginal Australians.240 According to the study, many Aboriginal 
Australians do not have registered birth certificates when they are infants. This was common 
amongst Aboriginal children from disadvantaged families who were also shown to be nine times 
less likely than non-Aboriginal people to have their births registered.241 The study also found that 
there are significant barriers in the birth registration process that can contribute to Aboriginal 
families not registering births. Generally, those barriers included situations where the mother was a 
teenager when they had their first child, who lived in a remote area without private healthcare 
insurance, and whose own birth was not registered.242   
The most likely circumstances for non-registration occurred where the parent was disadvantaged 
through having lower levels of literacy which made it difficult for them to complete the application 
form whilst trying to look after a newborn baby. Despite assistance being available through the birth 
registry, access to such staff is difficult for those residing in very remote areas.243 The financial 
disadvantage was another common factor given most Aboriginal parents living within remote 
communities had higher unemployment rates are were unable to afford the fee for a birth 
certificate.244 
Despite electoral legislation allowing persons without photo identification to enrol with the support 
of a statutory declaration signed by a person who is identified to vouch for their identity, there 
remains a barrier for Aboriginal electors. Those who reside in remote communities may lack the 
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incentive to enrol to vote in the first place because of that initial barrier, compounded by the task of 
finding someone to vouch for their identity through a statutory declaration. Inevitably, some 
Aboriginal citizens will remain off the voter rolls.  
There is another way in which low rates of birth registration intersects with high rates of 
incarceration, to compound Indigenous people’s disenfranchisement. Australia’s national 
incarceration statistics evidence a disproportionately high representation of Aboriginal Australians 
imprisoned despite comprising less than 3 per cent of Australia’s population.245 Aboriginal 
Australians occupy 27 per cent of Australia’s national prison population.246 This statistic was 
acknowledged by the Australian Law Reform Commission report Pathways to Justice – Inquiry into 
the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (‘Incarceration Report’).247  
In addition, the Incarceration Report found that the rate of Aboriginal incarceration climbs each 
year. For instance, from 2006 to 2016 Aboriginal incarceration increased by 41 per cent and further 
contributed to their higher likelihood of being incarcerated compared to non-Indigenous 
Australians.248  
Unlicensed driving offences greatly contribute to Indigenous Australians being overrepresented in 
incarceration. Those without a birth certificate are unable to get a driver’s licence. Those in remote 
areas, in particular, depend on driving to cover the vast distances between families and services. 
Without a licence, many drive regardless, which leaves those persons open to being found guilty of 
driving a vehicle without a licence. The offence is typically one that occurs in emergency and high 
need situations where an Indigenous person needs to or is the only one able to (illegally, however) 
drive a vehicle to attend a hospital for an emergency and/or lives in a remote community and needs 
to travel to get groceries etc.249  
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The Incarceration Report also revealed that Aboriginal Australians who are incarcerated, are also 
likely to be affected by mental illnesses and illiteracy issues.250 Mental illnesses and illiteracy issues 
experienced by Aboriginal Australians can potentially put them at risk for being disenfranchised 
under the ‘unsound mind’ disqualification. Being deemed of ‘unsound mind’ can limit a person’s 
voting rights and eligibility to become a federal member of parliament.251  
Aboriginal Australians are particularly vulnerable to falling within this exclusion given the post-
colonial dispossession and intergenerational trauma they still experience even to date. The 
Pathways to Justice – Inquiry into the Incarceration Report specifically identified that post-colonial 
dispossession, dislocation, deprivation and discrimination252 still suffered by Aboriginal Australians 
can negatively impact their mental and physical health and cause developmental and psychological 
problems.253 
Continued psychological and cultural disempowerment can over time lead to frustrated and 
destructive behaviour which can be displayed by an individual in a variety of different ways. 
Sometimes the behaviour can be seen through drug and alcohol abuse, other times it can appear in 
reckless or abusive behaviour towards authorities, agencies and other people from the 
community.254  That type of behaviour is a result of Aboriginal Australians being absorbed into a 
system that has placed limitations upon Aboriginal cultural and political empowerment. 
Electoral legislation and its disqualification provisions fail to account for the high risk for 
Aboriginal Australians of entering the streamlined process and early age entry into 
institutionalisation, relative to non-Indigenous Australians. The cause of this is widely understood 
to lie in the unhealed and unreconciled intergenerational traumatic experiences that remain 
unrecognised within Australia’s formalised Western system of governance.255 Its blanket ban 
applying to all prisoners that excludes them from politically participating is a prime example.256  
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Research suggests that adult Indigenous Australians are more likely to be charged with criminal 
offences, sentenced to a term of imprisonment and denied bail by courts and be held in prison on 
remand compared to non-Indigenous adults.257 In addition, research showed in 2001 that most 
persons sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment have a mental illness or an intellectual 
disability.258 Thus, this provokes the beginning of further disenfranchisement issues of political 
exclusion for Aboriginal Australians in being incarcerated and highly likely to, whilst incarcerated, 
be deemed of ‘unsound mind’ given associated mental health issues and intellectual disabilities 
associated with being incarcerated. 
Some of the Aboriginal population who are incarcerated form part of the un-sentenced national 
prison population if they are on remand and are awaiting trial. That part of the incarcerated 
population is still eligible to vote and more than one-fifth of that population vote either by postal 
voting or by the visit to prisons of mobile voting booths.259 However, for those that are serving a 
term of imprisonment and that term is for three years or longer, the electoral disqualifications 
apply.260 
The starting point for many Aboriginal children is dispossession from their culture, family and 
friends through out-of-home care.261 The Incarceration Report found there is currently a significant 
overrepresentation of Aboriginal children in child removal rates which continues to increase.262 
Usually, this occurs in situations where children are living with only one sole carer and that carer 
becomes incarcerated (be it mother or father). The Australian Human Rights Commission found in 
a 2008 Report (‘2008 AHRC Report’)263 that 30 per cent of Indigenous households were one-parent 
families (as opposed to 10 per cent of non-Indigenous families).264 The 2008 AHRC Report also 
found that typically out-of-home care begins for most Aboriginal children through the removal of 
their mother into adult incarceration. This is because 80 per cent of Indigenous imprisoned women 
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are mothers265 who are also the current fastest-growing prison population and severely 
overrepresented.266 Further, the 2008 AHRC Report found that not only were those women 
incarcerated sole carers to their own children but were also carers for other Aboriginal children 
from their community whose parents or grandparents were incapable of looking after them.267  
As a result, research has found that by 2016, Indigenous children were 9.8 times more likely than 
non-Indigenous children to be placed in out-of-home care. This equates to approximately 36 per 
cent of Indigenous children living in out-of-home care. The Incarceration Report found that this is 
usually the first encounter most Aboriginal children have with authority which is negative because 
not only were they removed from their parents, but also their friends, their family and their 
environment.268 
For instance, when children are placed into out-of-home care there is no guarantee that those 
children will remain in the same school and geographical area where they previously resided. This 
can mean that children are moved from schools and locations several times if they are placed in 
multiple out-of-home care options throughout their lifetime. The Incarceration Report found that 
their continuous displacement can lead to disruption to their educational learning and frustration 
with authority and the system.269 That type of disruption and lack of routine in a settled 
environment contributes to the high rate Aboriginal children have of lower levels in literacy and 
numeracy compared to non-Indigenous Australians.270  
Aboriginal children placed into out-of-home care range usually from ages 10–17 years old. Those 
children are 26 times more likely to be placed into a detention centre compared to non-Indigenous 
young people.271 Further, those children are also more likely to enter into institutionalisation 
through early entry into a detention centre through accumulated frustrations and loss of trust with 
the system and authorities which can also increase their likelihood to proceed into adult 
incarceration.272 
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The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Report (‘JSCEM Report’) showed because of 
unjust and unequal treatment of Aboriginal Australians post-colonisation, their literacy and 
numeracy levels and school retention rates were lower than non-Indigenous Australians.273 It also 
identified that poorer health and social conditions and remoteness of living experienced by 
Aboriginal Australians might affect their political participation.274 This is because they evidence 
substantial inequality conditions compared to non-Indigenous persons.275 Those conditions can lead 
to mental and emotional health issues that can place those persons at risk of falling into the 
‘unsound mind’ categorisation with its vague wording yet broad application.276  
Most prisoners also have an intellectual disability, and people with intellectual disability have 
shown statistically to be detained at a rate four times greater than that of the general population.277 
For Aboriginal Australians, the ‘unsound mind’ electoral disqualifying provision must not be taken 
lightly or applied in a way that automatically blanket-bans them from participating and voting. This 
is because, since colonisation, Aboriginal Australians have experienced a lack of consultation, 
consent and political inclusion which has been detrimental to the social, economic, cultural and 
educational support they’ve received (or rather lacked) from the Australian Government. This was 
highlighted in the JSCEM Report.278  
VI. ELECTORAL LAWS: CANDIDACY  
 
Suffrage depends on both active suffrage – the right to vote – addressed in the previous sections, as 
well as passive suffrage – the right to stand as a candidate. The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 
provides that to be eligible to nominate for the Senate or to stand for election to the House of 
Representatives, a person must be an Australian citizen and have attained the age of 18 years.279 
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The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 also requires a candidate to be enrolled to vote or be 
eligible to become such an elector, for Commonwealth elections.280  
The wording contained within s 163 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 almost mirrors s 34 
(1) of the Australian Constitution except for differing age requirements.281 The Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 requires a member to have attained the age of 18 years whereas the Australian 
Constitution provides that a member must be 21 years old.282 In practice, the parliament applies the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 age requirement instead of what is prescribed in Part III of the 
Constitution because section 34 itself, gives the Parliament the power to set new qualifications.283 
A. Inability to Enrol as Elector 
 
Disenfranchisement of prisoners from enrolling to vote at Commonwealth elections can also limit a 
person’s eligibility for political candidacy as a member of the Commonwealth Parliament. The 
wording contained within s 44 of the Australian Constitution makes clear that the term of 
imprisonment applicable is one year or longer.284 The disqualification also ends once that person’s 
sentence is served.285  
Section 44 provides that persons are ineligible to be elected as senators or members of the House of 
Representatives in federal elections if they have an allegiance to a foreign power or are entitled to 
citizenship of a foreign power.286 Potential federal candidates are also disqualified if they are 
attainted of treason or have been convicted of a state or Commonwealth offence subject to a term of 
imprisonment for one year or longer.287 In addition, persons are also disqualified if they are 
bankrupt or insolvent;288 hold any office of profit under the Crown or pension payable from 
revenues of the Commonwealth;289 or have a pecuniary interest in any agreement with the Public 
Service of the Commonwealth.290  
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In addition to that limitation to candidacy, a person can also be disqualified from running as a 
political candidate to become a member of the Commonwealth Parliament if they are not eligible as 
an elector.291 As such, if a person is not eligible to be an elector by virtue of s 93 (8AA) 
(disqualification of prisoners exclusion) and s 93 (8) (a) (disqualification of persons of ‘unsound 
mind’), then they are ineligible for political membership of federal parliament.292 Persons must be 
entitled to enrol and to vote at Commonwealth elections to qualify for candidacy for 
Commonwealth Parliament.293 This candidacy disqualification in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
1918 is also not an entrenched membership disqualifying provision within the Australian 
Constitution because of how s 34 parliamentary legislative powers can override it.294  
As such, persons that fall within the disqualification criterion within s 44 of the Constitution may be 
determined ineligible to run as a candidate by the High Court of Australia after an election.295 The 
AEC is also able to reject nominations of candidates based on grounds in s 172 of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 which fall outside of the disqualification within s 44 of the 
Constitution.296 
In theory, the disenfranchising prisoner disqualifications that exclude persons from voting and 
qualifying for political membership in the Commonwealth Parliament apply to all Australian 
citizens equally.297 However, this is precisely the problem. The electoral disqualifications are 
applied as a blanket ban that does not consider other factors relevant to limiting a person’s right to 
politically participate. Both provisions operate without regard to the nature of the offence 
committed, the length of the term of imprisonment imposed, or the personal circumstances of the 
offender.298   
For instance, the voter eligibility criteria set out in the Australian electoral legislation299 imposes 
tighter and more defined standards compared to what is imposed on persons within the Constitution 
to become a member of parliament.300 Again, this prompts further discussion and consideration of 
how laws surrounding the broad disqualification of persons of ‘unsound mind’ should consider 
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other extrinsic factors as those persons may just be slightly less capacitated than others, in terms of 
their literacy and numeracy levels. 
Those factors are important if Australian electoral laws are to be considerate of the Australian 
political system’s commitment to adhering to principles of representative democracy. In turn, the 
way forward in ensuring such adherence is committed to through further examination into the types 
of citizens who are affected by such disqualifying provisions.301  
 
B. Indigenous Candidacy Limitations 
 
 
What both candidacy disqualifying provisions lack is a consideration of the disproportionate 
incarceration statistics that show a significant overrepresentation of Aboriginal Australians who 
could very well also be deemed to be of ‘unsound mind’ given the vagueness of the wording within 
that disqualifying provision.302 Those statistics are relevant for consideration when making 
determinations as to whether the Australian electoral system upholds the principles of representative 
democracy embedded within its constitutional framework.303 
As a result, there are currently only five Aboriginal federal parliamentary representatives.304 Those 
representatives consist of three Senators of the 79 in the Senate and two members within the House 
of Representatives out of 150 members.305 The lack of having a more prominent Aboriginal 
presence within the Commonwealth Parliament is partially due to the broad application of 
Australian electoral legislation that disqualifies persons from becoming members of 
Commonwealth Parliament.306  
Electoral boundaries and geographical locations that have both high and low Aboriginal population 
statistics also contribute to the low figures of Aboriginal political representation. For example, 
Aboriginal citizen interests can be marginalised within a broader society of people who live in city 
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electorate locations and where they are more exposed and vulnerable to dominating ‘mainstream’ 
political agendas.307  
In the alternative, Aboriginal citizens that live in regional locations can also become politically 
marginalised by lacking a means to attend a polling booth on election day if that location does not 
have an AEC outreach service designated to it, or they comprise even a lesser population statistic 
within their region as a minority culture with an already lacking critical mass voice to make 
meaningful impact. In both circumstances, the focus on proportionality through a geographical 
location lens alone is not a sufficient adherence to the scope to which political proportionality can 
be interpreted. There are other factors that should be taken into consideration that promote cultural 
inclusivity with political representation, reflective of Aboriginal people and their cultural interests 
within Australia.308 
The Australian Constitution’s ‘blanket ban’ application of candidacy qualification provisions lacks 
consideration of a potential candidate’s background, identity and other relevant circumstantial 
information.309 For Aboriginal Australians, their post-colonial oppressive experiences and 
significant over representative figures of incarceration and mental health issues within Australia go 
ignored politically and legislatively.310  Those factors not only legislatively limit their 
representation within federal parliament through candidacy disqualifications, but also, the situation 
overall creates a sense of unbelonging and exclusivity of Aboriginal potential candidates which 
does not provide them with much incentive to run as candidates and feel culturally safe within the 
current structure of Federal Parliament. 
Ultimately, the underrepresentation of Aboriginal people within the Commonwealth Parliament 
limits their representation in Commonwealth decision-making processes on laws and policies that 
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concern their cultural identity and affairs.311 If anything, without much of a political presence and 
invested interest to represent their interests from other candidates who they would then depend on 
to advocate on their behalf for their rights and affairs, their interests go overlooked, un-prioritised 
and become inappropriately represented.312  
This was evident in Australia’s rolling out of the Northern Territory Intervention Package (‘NT 
Intervention’).313 The NT Intervention saw the Australian Government using parliamentary law-
making powers contained within the Australian Constitution314 to partially suspend several existing 
laws that protected Indigenous rights.315  
The intent was to establish ‘emergency response’ legislation that would add further regulation of the 
civil rights of citizens living within the packages identified ‘prescribed areas’.316 However, the 
‘prescribed areas’ were several Northern Territory communities that were mostly populated by 
Aboriginal people who became in that context, the indirect subjects of the limiting civil rights 
legislation.  
Prior to drafting the NT Intervention package legislation, the Australian Parliament did not make 
any effort to consult with citizens residing in the targeted prescribed areas.317 The Australian 
Parliament did not evidence, when drafting the NT Intervention package legislation, a need to 
consult with citizens that would be potentially affected by the package.  
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A primary contributor to the government’s lack of consultation with citizens affected, many of 
whom were Aboriginal, was the absence of a political voice to represent their interests prior to 
drafting the legislation. The result of not having a political voice and presence in federal decision-
making left those citizens, particularly Aboriginal people, with an additional layer of 
disappointment and distrust towards the Australian Government.318 
This suggests that elected parliamentary representatives may only feel compelled to represent and 
be held accountable for protecting the interests of their electors and constituents with whom they 
share common interests. This helps to understand how the NT Intervention package was 
implemented: via a lack of representation of Aboriginal interests in the development and 
implementation of the package.  
To date, formal inclusion has proven to not be enough. Engagement and encouragement of 
Aboriginal Australians to vote and participate at Commonwealth elections so they are eligible to run 
as a political candidate are also not enough if the structure and incentive to represent their cultural 
affairs as candidates in parliament is not respectful of their colonialist past, and meaningful 
representation and inclusion.  
VII. AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION INITIATIVES 
 
The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) was established in 1962 and is an independent 
statutory body separate from the Commonwealth Parliament. As part of its mandate, the AEC has 
established voter education programs to provide Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians 
with education on Australia’s democratic political system and processes.319  
The AEC also produces a range of resources to educate Indigenous Australians on the Australian 
electoral system, which include posters, brochures, materials that promote enrolment and voting, 
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videos, images, audio files, publications on the history of the Indigenous vote and electoral 
milestones. It also produces specific materials on elections and referendums.320 
In particular, the Aboriginal Electoral Education Program has sought to educate Aboriginal 
Australians that reside in remote communities of Western Australia, South Australia and the 
Northern Territory on Australia’s political system.321 The AEC also encourages Indigenous youth to 
be more politically aware of how the Australian Government and parliamentary processes operate 
in its National Indigenous Youth in Parliament Program. The National Indigenous Youth in 
Parliament Program selects Indigenous youth representatives across the country to travel to 
Canberra to attend Commonwealth Parliament for a week to learn about federal political 
processes.322  
The Indigenous Electoral Participation Program also employs Indigenous Engagement Officers 
across Australia to be involved in a professional capacity during elections.323 Those measures are of 
particular importance in contemporary times since the new system for voting Senate preferences at 
federal elections has been established in 2016. Since the new Senate voting system has been 
introduced, many electors have been confused by AEC instructions and as a result have incorrectly 
filled in their ballot papers.324  
Thus, educational support measures and a considerable increase of AEC mobile polling teams 
dispersed across Australia, that target remote town camps with high Indigenous populations, would 
be beneficial and supportive of Indigenous political participation.325 However, these programs 
administered by the AEC have suffered either extinguishment entirely or limitations placed upon its 
operations as a result of Australian government budget cuts to make savings. This occurred in 1996 
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under the administration of the John Howard Government and again in 2009 under the Kevin Rudd 
Government.326 
Despite those cuts, the JSCEM Report suggested that Indigenous targeted outreach programs would 
require additional funding to financially support initiatives like mobile polling teams for example, 
that would target Aboriginal citizens whose vote at federal elections is particularly important given 
their minority status.327 
Each of the electoral initiatives implemented by the AEC that work to increase Indigenous staff as 
part of the AEC's Reconciliation Action Plan (‘AEC RAP’) have sought to deliver electoral services 
that represent the needs and aspirations of Indigenous Australians.328 However, despite their 
establishment, it is clear statistically in Australia329 that they are not enough to fully enhance and 
empower Aboriginal political participation. The statistics alone of the lack of Aboriginal 
engagement apparent across Australia, through voting and candidacy, are evidence of that.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Australia lacks full adherence to principles of political equality that underpin its representative 
democracy regime. This is evidenced just in acknowledgement of both direct and indirect legislative 
limitations placed upon Aboriginal citizens’ rights when we compare those experiences to non-
Indigenous citizen experiences and access to such rights. The Australian Constitution through its 
legislative powers and control over electoral laws and processes, limits full access of what 
internationally recognised threshold requirements require for universal suffrage. This has 
implications for the political presence of Aboriginal members in federal parliament and for voting 
engagement amongst Aboriginal citizens. 
Legislatively, the Australian Constitution electoral provisions that impact elector and candidacy 
qualification, and the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, both qualify and disqualify citizens 
equally in terms of their application. The blanket-ban application on persons without additional 
regard to their differentiating backgrounds and individual circumstances – like, for instance, taking 
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into account a person’s cultural identity – goes against principles of justice and representative 
democracy.  
Under current Commonwealth electoral laws and processes, Aboriginal disenfranchisement is a 
major issue. Historically, their democratic inclusion and experiences have been vastly different and 
unequal compared to non-Indigenous citizens as a result of their colonisation and political, financial 
and social oppression within Australia. Of all citizens, electoral reform of key provisions that limit 
their political participation should take prioritisation.  
In terms of electoral law reform, this thesis recommends that s 93 (8AA) of the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918, which is the prisoner disqualification provision, be repealed. The premise for 
that recommendation is that there is a greater need for structural issues within Australia’s criminal 
justice system to be reformed also, given the high and disproportionate rates of Indigenous 
incarceration and, deaths in custody.330 Limiting the franchise of those most subject to the failures 
of the criminal justice system only further continues to contribute to the overall marginalisation and 
institutional and political oppression of Indigenous people. The changes required, that would protect 
the cultural identity and lives of Indigenous people incarceration issues statistically target the most, 
are reliant on political interest, investment and advocacy to reform those structural issues. The 
pathway forward to achieve that end, is reliant on the political participation through voting, of those 
who are most subject to its detrimental effects who are Indigenous people. 
In addition, this thesis suggests s93 (8) (a) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, which is the 
‘unsound mind’ disqualification provision, also be repealed or in the alternative, be expanded upon 
in both legislative wording and policy reform, to provide greater consideration and protection of 
Indigenous people. The premise here is that Indigenous people are subject to racial bias within 
Australia’s healthcare system and the history of their disenfranchisement as a people was reliant on 
justifying their exclusion from the franchise on a false presumption that they lacked the capacity 
and intelligence to understand voting at a political election.331 This section, if repealed, would adopt 
an approach that is more inclusive of the Indigenous franchise. That approach would show a more 
                                                             
330 Tim Rowse,  ‘The Royal Commission, ATSIC and Self-Determination: A Review of the Australian Royal 
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Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (National Report Volume 1, 15 April 1991); Royal Commission into 
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mature understanding by the Australian government, of the range of mental health issues 
Indigenous people still experience, post publication of the Closing the Gap Report,332 that the 
Australian government still needs to address. This again, is reliant on the political advocacy and 
investment of political candidates elected by people whose interests they best represent. The people 
whom this disqualification mostly disenfranchises are Indigenous people. They are also a group of 
people who are most vulnerable to health care racial discrimination and require significant political 
advocacy in healthcare support and treatment. As such, Indigenous Australians should have full 
access to exercising their voting rights at Commonwealth elections to afford them better chance for 
their interests to be properly politically represented in combating some of those issues.333   
Furthermore, the AEC engagement initiatives targeting Aboriginal citizens and communities have 
not had the impact required to compensate for the lack of political participation. Incarceration, 
literacy, mental health, and birth registration all remain barriers to participation in the democratic 
process. These are not yet embraced by the AEC initiatives. 
Given the Australian constitutional framework is grounded within the idea of being a representative 
democracy, the interaction between electoral laws and constitutional provisions in the face of 
intergenerational structural barriers to Indigenous political participation highlights a deficit in the 
Australian institutional framework. A consideration of the capacity of similar jurisdictions to 
support Indigenous political participation may reveal the means of improving the Australian system. 
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CHAPTER 3  
INDIGENOUS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION WITHIN  
CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND 
 
Maori and indigenous leadership are about the work being done and how leaders are preparing the 
next generation of leaders to accommodate the needs of our people. You can’t be an effective leader 




Citizens within Commonwealth jurisdictions most at risk of being the most excluded politically are 
Indigenous colonised peoples.2 The colonial past shared by Indigenous peoples of Commonwealth 
jurisdictions has resulted in subjection not only directly, through immediate and ongoing acts of 
dispossession from their land3 and racial discrimination,4 but also more indirectly through 
disempowerment and oppression arising from the operation of political institutions themselves.5  
Commonwealth political systems, including in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have a 
historical background that evidences a political and cultural intent by non-Indigenous leaders to 
limit the access to political participation and representation of their Indigenous peoples.6 A lack of 
                                                             
1 Dr Margie Maaka (Karaitiana Taiuru, 2020) <https://www.taiuru.maori.nz/maori-leaders-quotes-sayings/dr-margie-
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Business? Rethinking Indigenous Self-determination (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2005) 61; Miranda Johnson, 
‘Reconciliation, Indigeneity, and Postcolonial Nationhood in Settler States’ (2011) 14(2) Postcolonial Studies 187. 
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Nicholas D. Spence et al, ‘Racial Discrimination, Cultural Resilience, and Stress’ (2016) 61(5) The Canadian Journal 
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5 This reflects the operation of levels of power described by Steven Lukes in Power: A Radical View (Palgrave 
Macmillan Ltd, 2nd ed, 2004). 
6 Samantha Stronge et al, ‘Perceived Discrimination Predicts Increased Support for Political Rights and Life 
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Minority Psychology 2–3. Maori political representation in parliament dates from the passing of the Maori 
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prior, sought-after consent, consultation and the means of overall inclusion of Indigenous peoples 
within institutions of governance, are key examples of longstanding political exclusion from the 
colonial order.7 Consequently, Indigenous peoples are vulnerable to laws and policies that have not 
considered and do not represent their interests. The blindness of legislation and policy to Indigenous 
needs leaves First Nations peoples exposed to systematic injustices evidenced, for example, by 
overrepresentation in incarceration statistics, and negative outcomes in health, education, housing 
and other measures of equality.8 As canvassed in Chapter 2, such systemic issues have flow-on 
effects to access to voting and political candidacy, thus reinforcing structural disadvantage.  
Aligned with the colonial purpose of securing territories for empire,9 political regimes in the early 
post-colonial era of many Commonwealth jurisdictions evolved as one means of maintaining 
control over Indigenous colonised peoples who may well have been subjects of the Crown10 but 
whose civil rights were suppressed.11 In the longer term, the foundations of colonial governance 
systems constrained equality of Indigenous citizens relative to the broader population including 
through voting and political candidacy. 
Despite this foundation, some jurisdictions have adapted their governance institutions to 
accommodate Indigenous peoples’ political participation, albeit to varying degrees. Progressive 
changes, however, are dependent on the way in which Indigenous peoples were colonised and how 
successive leaders have guided and influenced change domestically.  
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‘An Unsettled History’ (1999) 9(2) New Zealand Studies 34. 
 
101 
Canada and New Zealand are examples of Commonwealth democracies that have overcome some 
of the major substantive political inequality barriers their Indigenous peoples have faced 
historically. Without claiming that these systems are perfect, and acknowledging serious 
contemporary issues in terms of how these jurisdictions treat Indigenous rights,12 there are 
nonetheless beneficial legislative and policy measures that have been implemented domestically 
that provide relevant comparators for analysing the institutional framework in Australia.   
First, this chapter uses the case study of Canada enhancing political access to its First Nations in the 
face of prisoner electoral voting disqualification. Like Australia, First Nations of Canada are 
disproportionately represented in imprisonment13 and, like Australia, Canada’s current electoral 
legislation14 disqualifies persons incarcerated for two years or more from enrolling and voting at 
elections.15 The key difference this chapter highlights is the way in which courts of Canada16 have 
deployed the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to find disqualification ineffective and 
constitutionally invalid.17 Consequently, legislative disqualification of prisoners in Canada is not 
applied and instead electoral policy measures and services seek to engage its prisoners, particularly 
those of First Nation descent, to enroll and to vote at elections through mobile prison voting 
stations. 
Secondly, this chapter examines how the New Zealand political system has reformed itself to 
benefit and include Maori politically. In particular, it analyses the Maori Electoral Roll Option and 
establishment of designated seats in parliament that work hand in hand to empower Maori to 
identify as culturally autonomous and differentiated citizens through enrolling on their own Maori 
electoral roll. 
The aim of this chapter is to identify a comparative framework of governance designed to overcome 
the barriers to political participation of Indigenous peoples in colonised states.  
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II. CANADA PRISONERS’ ELECTORAL RIGHTS 
 
Canada is a representative democracy18 that, like Australia, was colonised and politically influenced 
by the United Kingdom. At the time of drafting the governing framework of Canada, First Nations 
were not included or consulted. Furthermore, First Nations were not provided with an opportunity to 
give their prior and informed consent to being subjected to a system of governance under non-
Indigenous leadership.19  
As a result, the Canadian governance system and laws and policies that followed after its construction 
pre-1982, were drafted without First Nation political and cultural input, and without formal 
acknowledgement of their rights and interests.20 Much of Canadian First Nation experiences reflect 
clear forms of racial discrimination and political exclusion from law and policymaking processes 
implemented by the Canadian Government that negatively impact upon their affairs as a people.21  
Change and progressiveness only truly started to occur in Canada post-confederation when successive 
governments began to reform the Canadian Constitution Act 1982 and entrenched the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982.22 Both legislative instruments recognise the importance of the 
political inclusion of First Nations and reaffirm values upon which the Canadian democratic regime 
is based, namely equality and self-determination.23  
The Canadian Constitution Act 1982 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 have, 
alongside the establishment of treaties across the nation between First Nations and the Canadian 
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Government, guided and influenced Canadian constitutional conventions.24 Those actions have also 
progressively shifted post-colonial treatment of First Nations in Canada in terms of respecting and 
protecting their democratic rights to political participation and representation.25  
While there are multiple features of the framework of the Canadian Constitution and Charter that 
promote the civil rights of First Nation peoples,26 of interest here is the case study of the effect of this 
framework on First Nation political participation through its impact on electoral disqualification of 
prisoners. Like Australia, Canada’s 4 per cent First Nations population27 is overrepresented within its 
national incarceration statistics that comprise almost 25 per cent of the overall prison population.28  
The Canada Elections Act 2000 disqualifies persons from enrolling and voting at federal elections if 
they have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years or more.29 However, since the case 
of Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)30 the legislative provision no longer applies – despite 
the lack of its repeal.31 It is entrenched provisions of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982 and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982,32 interpreted by the Canadian courts, that provide 
the vital institutional framework to overcome laws that would otherwise indirectly impede First 
Nations people’s franchise. 
To fully explore the effect of the prisoner disqualification on Canadian First Nations political 
participation, this part will first analyse political participation under the Canadian Constitution and 
Charter, followed by a close examination of its electoral legislation. Finally, it assesses the effect of 
this legal framework on prisoner participation, including through the efforts of Elections Canada, the 
electoral commission with oversight of voting in Canada. 
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A. Political Participation under the Canadian Constitution and  
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
 
At the core of protections for Canadian First Nations lies the political participation provisions of the 
Canadian Constitution and the democratic rights contained within the entrenched Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms 1982.33 Canadian courts have pluralistically treated citizen democratic rights to vote 
in Canada as incorporating several other fundamental political participation rights such as rights to 
effective political representation; meaningful political participation; equal participation; and a free 
and informed vote.34 
This part discusses provisions that have been developed over some 230 years to enhance the 
political standing and participation of First Nations through their access to voting rights as citizens. 
In particular, it addresses the rights of those sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
The first Constitution in Canada was the Constitutional Act 1791 (Imp)35 which separated Upper 
and Lower Canada through an Act of the British Parliament. A primary step towards confederation 
in Canada, its voting franchise standards were inclusive to the extent it enfranchised Canadian 
women who owned private property in Lower regions of Canada during the 18th and early 19th 
centuries. However, it was not yet inclusive for all citizens equally in terms of access to the 
franchise.36 
Many historians have criticised the 1791 Act for its failure to align with responsible government for 
all persons.37 Despite the broadness of its franchise provisions, particularly as it did not expressly 
exclude women from the franchise, the Act was still limiting for citizens who fell outside of the 
broad qualifying provisions including First Nations who did not consider themselves as citizens and 
subject of the monarch but rather as their own sovereign people; 38 there were also First Nations 
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who were not landowners or paid minimal rent, and others convicted of a serious criminal offence 
or treason.39 
The initial disenfranchising provision of persons attainted for treason or a serious criminal offence 
reflected the common law at the time on matters concerning the qualification of electors and 
candidates for the House of Commons.40 The rationale for disqualifying candidates was that persons 
attainted of treason and felony ‘could not answer the description in the writs of the election of 
knights, citizens and burgesses as being persons of discretion, in the sense of prudence and sound 
judgment’.41 According to Blackstone, those persons were ‘unfit to fit anywhere [in the House of 
Commons]’.42  
With respect to electors, Blackstone considered several statutes that were of the view that ‘persons 
who were convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury were incapable of voting at any election’.43 
Disqualification of members was then further included within the Union Act 1840 (Imp) which 
came into force after the rebellion of 1837 and lasted until confederation in 1867.44 Section 7 of the 
Union Act 1840 (Imp) disqualified Legislative Councillors attainted of treason or convicted of a 
felony ‘or of any infamous crime’.45  
After Confederation in Canada, the British North America Act 1867 (Imp) was established.46 
Section 31(4) of the British North America Act 1867 (Imp)47 carried over the disqualifying 
provision of Canadian members of parliament in replacement of the Union Act 1840 (Imp). Its 
establishment forms a major part of Canada’s Constitution Act of 1867.48 Both instruments form 
Canada’s federal system of governance; however, in contemporary times, the Constitution Act of 
1867 describes Canada’s federal and political system and framework, its electoral system and 
processes and how powers are divided between federal and provincial governments.49 
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Despite the exclusion of First Nations of Canada during the drafting and negotiation phases of the 
Constitution Act of 1867,50 the Constitution Act of 1867 still regulates the way in which First Nation 
citizens are governed. Federal electoral voting rights, however, are contained within the 
Constitution Act 1982 in Part 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 under 
‘Democratic Rights’. Section 3 of the Charter provides express voting rights for Canadian citizens 
and their qualification for running for public office.51  
This evidences a clear distinction from Australia’s implied right to vote.52 Further, it has also 
prevented the Canadian Parliament overriding those rights through the implementation of electoral 
legislation that would, without reasonable justification, limit voting rights under s 33 (1) of the 
Charter.53 This means that, in accordance with the principle of universal suffrage emblematic of 
representative democracy,54 voting rights in Canada can only be limited if parliament can 
demonstrate its reasons for doing so are reasonably justified in a free and democratic society. 55  
Despite an express, enshrined right to vote, the struggle to uphold voting rights56 and to protect 
them from being overridden by parliament57 has caused interpretive and application issues in 
Canadian common law.58 
Canada’s 1991 Supreme Court ruling Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries held that s 3 of 
the Charter should be interpreted so that equality of voting power amongst citizens guides the 
capacity for ‘effective representation’.59 The majority held that ‘factors like geography, community 
history, community interests and minority representation may need to be taken into account’ so that 
Canadian legislative assemblies effectively represent all citizen interests no matter how diversified 
they are.60  
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The ruling in Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries established Canada’s longstanding 
electoral principle that recognises individual voting power within s 3 must also acknowledge the 
importance of communities of interest and identity. In doing so, the interpretation of s 3 may also 
include special measures to ensure genuine electoral equality.61 This can involve differentiated 
treatment of persons associated with different minority cultural and group identities that require 
additional support to enhance their political participation so that meaningful minority representation 
is present.62 This can be contrasted with the Australian blanket approach to electoral 
disqualification.63 
In terms of political candidacy rights of Canadian citizens, like Australia, the Constitution Act of 
1867 disqualifies persons incarcerated to a term of imprisonment from becoming a member of the 
Senate.64 This disqualification of members is vague as s 31 (4) lacks specificity as to whether the 
disqualification ends once a sentence is served. This has, like voting rights, been a contentious issue 
before the Canadian courts.65 
Ultimately, electoral rights within the Canadian Constitution are protected through statutory 
interpretation provided by the courts, and formally through the rule of law66 and principles of 
equality acknowledged formally in the Canadian Constitution and Charter.67 Courts have 
approached their role of statutory interpretation for those provisions to achieve, so far as possible, 
substantive justice and not a denial of it.68 The formal acknowledgment and constitutional 
entrenchment of such provisions for such fundamental democratic rights of citizens together show 
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how at a constitutional level the Canadian Constitution recognises the importance of protecting all 
citizens’ rights equally.69  
Statutory interpretation by courts of those provisions has led to a shift in the application of Canada’s 
electoral laws, in particular, rendering provisions disqualifying prisoners from voting as both 
ineffective and inoperative. The electoral system has moved towards placing a greater emphasis on 
citizen political participation, including representation, as democratically important. The shift has 
highlighted key barriers to First Nation political participation and representation including their 
overrepresentation in prison. 
B. Canada Elections Act 2000 and the Canadian Charter 
 
In addition to rights under the Constitution and Charter, like Australia, Canada provides mechanisms 
for the enactment of its representative system through electoral laws. Comparing the Canada 
Elections Act 2000 to Australia’s electoral legislation reveals many similarities. For instance, Part 1 
of the Canada Elections Act 2000 provides Canadian citizens with ‘electoral rights’ under s 3: ‘every 
Canadian citizen who is 18 years of age or older on polling day is qualified as an elector’.70   
Further, like Australian electoral legislation, s 4 of the Canada Elections Act 2000 temporarily 
disenfranchises prisoners from voting at federal elections if they are serving a term of imprisonment 
of two years or more.71 The Canadian term is one year less than that in Australia.72 Another point of 
difference in voting disqualifications is that the Canada Elections Act 2000 does not disqualify 
persons of ‘unsound mind’ whereas Australian electoral legislation does.73 
In terms of candidacy limitations, the Canada Elections Act 2000 provides that a person is ineligible 
for running as a political candidate if imprisoned in a correctional institution.74 This disqualification 
mirrors Australian electoral legislation that similarly disqualifies persons from running as a political 
candidate if they are serving a term of imprisonment of one year or more. The disqualification ends 
after the sentence has been served.75  
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Canadian electoral legislation also provides similarly to Australia76 that persons ineligible to enrol 
and vote as an elector under s 4 of the Canada Elections Act 2000 are, because of that ineligibility, 
restricted from running as a federal political candidate in Canada.77 However, what differentiates 
Canada from Australia is that Canada’s prisoner disqualifying provision has no practical effect since 
the case of Sauvé v Canada [2002] (‘Sauvé’)78 – a landmark electoral law case which rejected 
temporary disenfranchising prisoner legislation.79  
Sauvé considered the amendment of s 4 (c) with Bill 58 200380 and how limiting such voting rights 
of prisoners conflicted with fundamental rights and freedoms under the Canadian Constitution81 and 
Charter.82 Prior to the repeal of s 51 (e) of the Canadian Elections Act 198583 prisoners were 
disqualified from voting at federal elections entirely.84 It was only after the section was repealed with 
the enactment of s 4 (c) of the Canada Elections Act 2000 that prisoner disenfranchisement from 
voting became a temporary limitation on those citizens’ rights. 
Sauvé considered the effect of Canada’s prisoner voter disenfranchisement legislation alongside the 
application of s 1 of the Charter that requires the Canadian Government to show that it has a valid 
purpose or objective reason in any circumstances where it seeks to erode Charter rights. Further, it 
must show it is reasonable and demonstrably justified if it enacts legislation that infringes a right or 
freedom.85  
McLachlin CJ and LeBel J in Sauvé declared it was clear that the framers of the Charter intentionally 
placed emphasis and importance on Canadian citizen voting rights under ss 3 and 33. Section 3 of the 
Charter provides that every citizen has the right to vote in elections for members of the House of 
Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.86 Section 33 limits 
legislative override by the Canadian federal parliament.87 
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Despite those constitutional conflicts, the Canadian Government in Sauvé sought to justify its actions 
on two bases. First, it did so to enhance prisoner civic responsibility and their respect for the rule of 
law. Second, it sought to provide an additional punitive measure on criminals through limiting their 
access to political participation rights whilst in custody.  
L’Heureaux-Dubé, Gonthier, Major and Bastarache JJ were all in dissent. Gonthier J cited Tribe, who 
wrote:  
Every state, as well as the federal government, imposes some restrictions on the franchise. Although 
free and open participation in the electoral process lies at the core of democratic institutions, the need 
to confer the franchise on all who aspire to it is tempered by the recognition that completely unlimited 
voting could subvert the ideal of popular rule which democracy so ardently embraces. Moreover, in 
deciding who may and who may not vote in its elections, a community takes a crucial step in defining 
its identity.88 
All dissenting Justices held that the Canadian Government was acting within reason given persons 
who commit serious offences lack demonstrated respect for the community. Thus, the Canadian 
Government’s policy position was necessary, justified and consistent with civil responsibility and 
respect for the rule of law.89  
According to Gonthier J, the additional penalty imposed also sent an important message to both 
serious criminal offenders and the community that serious criminal activity will not be tolerated. 
Thus, he viewed the Canadian Parliament to have acted well within its rights in disenfranchising 
prisoners and that two elements of punishment were necessary. Those elements included a physical 
element which dealt with incarceration and the deprivation of a range of liberties normally exercised 
by citizens and, secondly, a symbolic element which included temporary disenfranchisement.90 
However, the dissenting judgment lacked appropriate consideration of other extrinsic factors not 
included within the Canada Elections Act 2000. One important factor acknowledged by the majority 
in Sauvé was the historical and political oppression experienced by First Nations. Further, the 
majority also considered the overrepresentation of First Nations in prisons. Therefore, the court held 
that principles of democracy are undermined, when legislative limitations are placed upon a portion 
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of citizens’ rights to political participation, particularly those who are already marginalised like First 
Nation citizens who are overrepresented in prisons.91  
Sauvé affirmed that incarcerated First Nations must have their unique perspectives politically heard 
and represented at the ballot box and in parliament.92 As in Australia, Canada’s constitutional 
framework and electoral processes were transplanted at colonisation from the United Kingdom and 
Europe. First Nations were dispossessed from their lands and made wards of the State under racially 
discriminatory government protectionist policies which sought to obliterate their cultural and political 
institutions.93 First Nations have, since the protectionist policy era, been a primary target of Canadian 
government agencies which have proven to execute the law on First Nation citizens with negative 
perceptions of them and who they are in society.94 This history has contributed to an unreconciled 
and untrusting relationship between First Nations and the State. 
In the view of McLachlin CJ, colonisation of First Nations was highly relevant in considering the 
Charter to determine whether prisoner-disenfranchising laws should remain in place. This is because, 
as McLachlin CJ highlights, there are is a ‘disproportionate number of Aboriginal people in 
penitentiaries’ and that the negative effect of s 51(e) placed upon who identify as Aboriginal, 
disproportionately disenfranchises Canada’s already disadvantaged Aboriginal population.95 
In addition to First Nations’ experience of negative stereotyping by police, they are also a cultural 
population with high rates and long-term experience of intergenerational trauma. This is relevant for 
consideration when assessing prisoner disenfranchising legislation disproportionately comprised of a 
minority population that has been historically racially discriminated against, dispossessed and as a 
consequence has a negative relationship with the Canadian Government and authority. 
Like Aboriginal Australians, First Nations of Canada experience higher levels of poverty, societal 
exclusion, institutionalisation and racial discrimination than other Canadian citizens.96 Those 
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experiences over time contribute to an increased likelihood of First Nations acting out in frustrated 
antisocial behavioural ways including substance abuse, social dysfunction and destructive 
behaviour.97 Chief Justice McLachlin found that these accumulated factors contribute to First 
Nations’ involvement in criminal activity and antisocial behaviour that can further lead to their 
overrepresentation in rates of incarceration in Canadian prisons compared to non-Indigenous 
Canadians98 borne out by First Nations comprising almost 25 per cent of the overall prison population 
but a mere 4 per cent of the Canadian population overall.99 
On this reasoning, the majority in Sauvé held that the justifications relied upon by the Canadian 
Parliament were too vague and lacked adequate consideration of principles of proportionality and 
extrinsic factors relevant to disenfranchising citizens.100 The majority held that electoral legislation 
which disenfranchises prisoners from voting should be rejected because it attributes moral 
unworthiness to those citizens and conflicts with citizen rights under the Charter.101  
In addition, the case of Sauvé highlighted issues with having such electoral disqualifying legislation 
applied in a blanket manner.102  
 
Chief Justice McLachlin highlighted that: 
 
Section 51(e) imposes blanket punishment on all penitentiary inmates regardless of the particular 
crimes they committed, the harm they caused, or the normative character of their conduct. It is not 
individually tailored to the particular offender’s act. It does not, in short, meet the requirements of 
denunciatory, retributive punishment. It follows that it is not rationally connected to the goal of 
imposing legitimate punishment.103 
 
Accordingly, the majority held in Sauvé that the application of the blanket exclusion in the electoral 
legislation, directed at all prisoners, unnecessarily removes their fundamental constitutional rights 
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and further punishes them as the government sees fit. Additionally, the court held that the legislative 
override of fundamental constitutional rights is arbitrary and conflicts with goals of sentencing. This 
is a particularly important aspect for consideration when First Nations overrepresented in 
incarceration in Canada are subject to the application of such limiting of rights legislation.104 
The effect of Sauvé was to render prisoner-disenfranchising legislation in Canada unconstitutional 
and provide all eligible Canadian citizens, including prisoners, with access to fundamental democratic 
political participation rights and inclusivity when Canadian elections occur.105  
C. Continued Political Participation of Canadian Prisoners 
 
Since Sauvé, the majority decision set a standard for Canadian courts that required them to support 
government legislation denying citizens the right to vote only where there are strong justified reasons 
to do so.106 Sauvé affirmed that disqualifying prisoners of the right to vote fell below that standard 
and, as such, their right to vote should be maintained provided that they have attained 18 years of age 
by polling day.107  
Since Sauvé and despite electoral prisoner disqualifying legislation not yet being repealed, prisoners 
can still enrol and vote in both federal and provincial elections in Canada by way of a special ballot 
in general elections and referenda.108  The special ballot process is governed by a staff member of a 
prisoner’s correctional institution appointed by Elections Canada as a liaison officer for the election 
prior to it being held.109 The liaison officer facilitates the special ballot electoral process of prisoners 
enrolling and voting.110 Prisoners are responsible for signing an application for registration and 
special ballot111 and a declaration112 before the 12th day before polling day.113  
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The benefits of implementing such processes can be seen with Canada’s increased registered voter 
population of those incarcerated. In the last 2015 federal election, there were approximately 22,000 
eligible voters out of Canada’s prisoner population.114 Statistics from Elections Canada evidences an 
increase of the Canadian prisoner population voting at elections from 25 per cent of 36,000 inmates 
in 2004 to roughly 45 per cent of 38,000 prisoners in 2011.115 The 2011 federal election had a 54 per 
cent turnout of prisoner voters in federal prisons, which fell just under the 61 per cent general 
population turnout.116 
Given First Nations occupy high rates of incarceration as part of a minority cultural group within 
Canada’s overall national population,117 those measures established since Sauvé have improved First 
Nation access to citizen democratic rights in two respects. First, some prisoner voters are very 
politically engaged. Their objective is to use their ballots to bring change to the correctional system 
of Canada, particularly as it is experienced by those who experience institutionalisation through 
incarceration as a revolving door when reintegration support for those trying to exit the system is 
lacking.118 Voting provides imprisoned people with the means of having their voice heard through 
the electoral process – with the means, therefore, of contributing to meaningful political change that 
reflects their particular experiences. 
Secondly, so too has First Nations candidacy improved. Currently, there are 10 First Nation members 
within the federal parliament – an increase from seven in 2011.119 Although First Nation 
representatives still comprise only 3 per cent of the 338 seats within the House of Commons, their 
political participation is strong. This is evidenced by the actual incentive they have to even run as 
political candidates in an election which was 54 First Nations who ran as candidates in 2015 and, 120 
the amount of political opportunities and processes available for self-governing First Nations to 
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engage with politically as sovereign people exercising their rights under an agreed upon treaty with 
the Canadian government.121  
Although it is not possible to identify prisoner voting as the cause of this increase, there is clearly a 
stronger First Nations involvement in Canadian federal politics in recent years. Given the high rates 
of incarceration of First Nations peoples, removing the barrier of electoral disqualification is a vital 
step in enhancing political participation. 
D. Elections Canada Support Programs for Indigenous Electors 
 
In addition to the special ballot process for prisoners established from the handing down of Sauvé, 
Elections Canada has acknowledged through its research that First Nations electors remain subject 
to other barriers that can limit their political participation in federal elections.122  
Some of the barriers identified include a lack of knowledge amongst Indigenous electors of 
Canada’s Online Voter Registration Service123 to register to vote at federal elections, and 
Indigenous electors, including Indigenous youth, not receiving ‘voter information cards’.124 The 
identification of such barriers has led to an increased consultative process undertaken by the Chief 
Electoral Officer of Elections Canada with national and regional Indigenous organisations. The 
objective behind such consultations is to ensure that First Nations electors feel supported and 
encouraged by the Canadian Government in exercising their right to vote at federal elections.125  
In addition, Canada’s ‘Indigenous Elder and Youth Program’ appoints an Indigenous Elder and 
young person to attend polling stations on Election Day to assist with interpretation, explain the 
voting process and answer general questions. This support program has already benefited 
Indigenous electors at federal elections with the last 2015 election appointing 285 Elders and youth 
to assist Indigenous electors and thus support their political participation.126 
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Alongside appointed Indigenous Elders and youth, Indigenous electors also have access to 
community relations officers appointed by Elections Canada that work with local community 
leaders to improve access to registration and voting in communities. Since the 2015 election saw 
169 community relations officers appointed to help with Indigenous electors’ voting and reduce 
barriers, the program has since been expanded to include Métis communities as seen with Canada’s 
last 2019 federal election.127 Furthermore, Elections Canada has launched a pilot project in 87 
remote communities across 27 electoral districts in Canada to provide greater information to voters, 
and to identify barriers to registration and voting so that officers can best support remote 
communities.128 
Elections Canada has also set up special ballot voting services at post-secondary institutions for 
federal elections. In the 2015 election, this proved to be of benefit for Indigenous electors, making it 
easier for them to cast their ballots whilst living in remote communities. Accordingly, Elections 
Canada has increased these services and expanded its special ballot voting stations at post-
secondary institutions since its last 2019 federal election.129 
Elections Canada has also implemented and increased its advanced and ordinary polling stations on 
reserves. The 2015 federal election saw 34 reserves across Canada have access to advanced polling 
stations and 309 reserves have access to ordinary polling stations.130 Those figures increased yet 
again in the 2019 federal election for Indigenous electors residing in remote communities.131 
To ensure that all electors are informed as best as possible, in Canada’s last 2019 federal election 
Elections Canada expanded its campaign advertisements for ‘It’s Our Vote’ in the lead up to the 
2019 election. The expanded campaign advertisements were available for voters to access them in 
English, French and/or Inuktitut on Indigenous TV, radio networks, Indigenous print publications 
and Indigenous digital networks.132 
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In sum, to support the rights enshrined in the Constitution and Charter, Canada has a number of 
useful and practical support and outreach programs that assist Indigenous electors to enrol and vote 
at federal elections.  
Whilst the Canadian Charter and Constitution have had a considerable effect on the operation of 
electoral laws that have enhanced First Nation political participation in Canada, the New Zealand 
mixed-member proportional system has developed over time to embrace Maori cultural identity 
within its political system. New Zealand offers a framework that works to enhance Indigenous 
political participation within its Mixed Member Proportional electoral system.  
This chapter now considers important established constitutional arrangements between the New 
Zealand Government and Maori that align with principles of representative democracy, self-
determination and political inclusivity of Maori.  
III. NEW ZEALAND: MAORI VOTER ENROLMENT AND CANDIDACY 
 
The New Zealand model for voter enrolment and candidacy within its mixed-member proportional 
democratic regime adheres to rights of Maori self-determination formally acknowledged in the 
Treaty of Waitangi 1840. The Treaty of Waitangi’s role is to acknowledge and protect Maori rights 
to cultural identity within New Zealand’s constitutional framework. 
The Treaty, however, makes no explicit reference to dedicated Maori representation in the New 
Zealand Parliament.133 Despite that, Article 3 requires measures that create a sense of substantial 
equality for Maori through recognition of their sovereignty and rights to self-determination.134  
The recognition of Maori sovereignty and self-determination rights within the Treaty has been of 
particular importance to Maori as they call for New Zealand Government actions to extend beyond 
mere formal equality. Formal acknowledgment would limit the practical access to and exercise of 
Maori self-determination rights and would limit the expression of the distinct identity of Maori 
people. Treating Maori as an identically equal group of citizens to New Zealand’s non-Indigenous 
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population would omit important consideration of the post-colonial detrimental effects on Maori 
resulting from Western structures imposed upon them under colonial rule.135  
To determine how the Treaty has affected institutional governance, including the Maori franchise, 
this part begins with an overview of New Zealand’s constitutional framework in light of the Treaty, 
followed by an analysis of its electoral system. In the final sections, it identifies two institutional 
responses to shore up Maori political participation: the Maori Electoral Roll Option and dedicated 
seats in parliament. 
A. New Zealand’s Constitutional Framework and the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 
 
The New Zealand Constitution lacks the same amount of detail the Canadian Constitution provides 
in designating roles and powers between the Executive, Legislature and Judicature. Its unicameral 
structure also means that it does not have to pass legislative proposals through an upper house of 
parliament or divide powers between state and federal governments. 136 The Constitution provides 
for the role and powers of the Governor-General137 and their responsibility to represent the 
sovereign whilst acting on the advice of ministers of the Cabinet. The New Zealand Constitution 
also sets out the structure of the courts and their relation to the other branches of government.138 
The New Zealand Constitution provides for only the basic composition of parliament, how its 
members are elected and, the procedure by which it enacts legislation. Instead, New Zealand’s 
constitutional framework comprises several additional legislative sources that work alongside the 
New Zealand Constitution as conventions and laws that guide its overall governance structure and 
political regime.139  
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Prior to the establishment of the current mixed-member proportional system in New Zealand in 
1996, members of parliament were elected by and accountable to mostly non-Indigenous citizens. 
This was because despite New Zealand being was one of the first nations in the world to give 
women the right to vote, its elector qualifications for voting were restrictive in that they required 
private property ownership to qualify. In reality, most women and minority groups like Maori 
lacked private property ownership and so were indirectly disenfranchised because they were unable 
to meet the elector qualification criteria to vote.140  
In contrast to Australia, the New Zealand system affords Maori an additional source of rights that 
formally recognises and protects their right to self-determination. Those rights and recognition of 
Maori cultural identity, self-determination and, most relevantly, Maori political participation, are 
found in the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 (‘Treaty’).141 The Treaty forms part of New Zealand’s 
collection of constitutional documents that together, guide important constitutional conventions 
acknowledging the partnership Maori have with the Crown.142 The Treaty’s primary purpose was to 
transfer Maori sovereignty to the British Crown in a way that was acceptable and valid according to 
international law standards.143 
The Treaty comprises three short articles but has had longstanding interpretative issues given that it 
is written in both English and Maori languages.144 Each version of the Treaty conflicts with the 
other as to the definition of Maori rights and constraints on government powers.145 This, of course, 
has raised issues surrounding which version should be applied. 
For instance, Article 1 in the English version of the Treaty cedes Maori sovereignty over their land 
to the British Crown and assumes an implied right of unlimited legal authority.146 However, when 
translated in the Maori version, the term ‘kawanatanga’ means ‘governorship’ which means that 
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only Maori governance is ceded. This does not extend to ceding sovereignty over Maori land, and it 
limits the English version’s Crown implied right of unlimited legal authority.147 
Second, Article 2 of the English version guarantees Maori chiefs and tribes’ full exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries, and other properties. It also 
grants the Crown the sole right to purchase land from the Maori.148 However, in contrast, the Maori 
version guarantees all the people of New Zealand the ‘unqualified exercise of their chieftainship 
(tino rangatiratanga) over their lands (whenua), villages (kainga) and all their treasures 
(taonga)’.149 The Maori version, therefore, entrenches Maori land rights, chief powers, and political 
autonomy, and speaks to the heart of Maori leadership through self-determination.  
Lastly, Article 3 of the English version of the Treaty provides Maori with ‘all the Rights and 
Privileges of British Subjects’.150 The Maori version translates to mean the ‘Queen will give 
[Maori] the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England’, thus requiring that the 
Crown grant the same rights and privileges to Maori as to non-Indigenous citizens.151  
Ultimately, when interpretation issues arise with conflicts that exist with the meanings that underpin 
each of the three articles of both versions of the Treaty, both parties take a purposive approach and 
are guided by the ‘spirit and meaning’ of the document.152   
As a consequence of the content of the Treaty and the interpretive approach, other formally 
recognised constitutional legislative instruments that recognise in finer detail ways in which Maori 
are to assert and exercise their political voice and politically participate are considered alongside the 
Treaty. Maori rely, for example, on voting rights found in several instruments in New Zealand. Of 
particular note, a prominent legislative measure established in contemporary times permits Maori to 
opt to enrol to exercise their right to vote: the Maori Electoral Roll Option. 
B. The New Zealand Electoral System 
 
The New Zealand electoral system was, prior to 1996, a first-past-the-post electoral system.153 This 
system is known for being one of the oldest and simplest electoral systems because candidates that 
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receive the most votes from their district win.154 In this system, each elector gets one vote to choose 
a political candidate they believe best represents their interests from a single-member electoral 
district.155 In addition, the political party that wins the most seats in parliament usually forms the 
majority government and if it becomes the governing party, it then makes public policy decisions 
until the next election.156 However, this system was detrimental to smaller parties that represented 
minority interests in terms of considering their chances of securing enough votes to win any seats in 
parliament.157 As a result, minor parties tended to go underrepresented compared to major parties 
that were typically overrepresented.158 
The first-past-the-post system based on Great Britain’s Westminster system was established early 
post-colonisation in New Zealand as a result of New Zealand becoming a British colony under the 
Crown’s authority in 1840.159 The colonisation of New Zealand extended the Crown’s power over 
New Zealand so that it assumed control over the activities of New Zealand subjects and regulations 
surrounding the purchasing of land from Maori.160  
The original first-past-the-post electoral system was originally labelled an ‘elective dictatorship’ as 
it offered minimal measures of ensuring government accountability as elections were initially held 
every five years until 1881. From 1881 onwards election periods were shortened to every three 
years with the exception of the years 1914–19, 1931–35 and 1938–43 where parliaments ran 
longer.161 In addition, the electoral system was heavily dependent on entrenched democratic values 
and conventions that required Cabinet ministers to adhere to their electoral commitments and party 
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principles; members of parliament to act in the interests of electors from their electorate and 
consultation with interest and minority groups.162 
Over time, it became clear that the reliance and trust in government officials to adhere to those 
democratic conventions was not enough to create appropriate levels of political accountability. New 
Zealand members of parliament instead continuously broke election promises and party principles, 
ignored interest groups and used their extensive powers in ways which conflicted with citizen 
interests rather than working in their favour.163 Under those circumstances, major structural reform 
of New Zealand’s electoral system was deemed necessary by the government in 1992 and by 1993 
the majority of the New Zealand public was ready to put their faith in a radically different electoral 
system.164 
The first-past-the-post electoral system established under the Electoral Act 1956 was therefore 
repealed and replaced with the Electoral Act 1993, which introduced the mixed members 
proportional electoral system.165 New Zealand’s electoral legislation is an important source of law 
that forms part of New Zealand’s important constitutional documents since its approval and 
implementation following New Zealand’s 1993 Referendum.166 This is due to New Zealand’s 
electoral legislation outlining the way elections are to take place within New Zealand, how they are 
regulated and how New Zealand’s governance institutions are formed.167  
The mixed-member proportional system exemplifies a true show of political proportionality in 
terms of the way in which it provides political parties with winning seats, proportionate to their 
share of the national party vote.168 It also established the New Zealand Electoral Commission which 
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became responsible for overseeing the registration of political parties and promoting public 
awareness of electoral matters.169  
The mixed-member proportional system redefined the way in which constituencies are represented 
in New Zealand by providing electors with two votes instead of just the one offered by the previous 
first-past-the-post system. Votes under the mixed-member proportional system provide electors 
with one vote for choosing their preferred political party and a second vote to choose their preferred 
political candidate from their electorate.170  
Consequently, two types of political members were represented within the New Zealand 
Parliament: members that represent their geographical electorate; and members elected from party 
lists (if they can secure 5 per cent of the nationwide vote).171 The additional vote for electing 
members from a party list provides parties with their proportional share of seats in parliament.172  
The proportional system thus also better represents minority interests. It does so through creating 
proportionality of citizen interests represented within a more multi-party representative parliament. 
Having a multi-party representative parliament decreases the likelihood of majority dominance in 
parliament that could previously occur under a first-past-the-post system. As a result, the new 
proportional system has shown to constrain government powers more effectively than its 
predecessor.173 
New Zealand’s electoral system also has a Representation Commission, which is an independent 
body that oversees the adjustment of electorate seats if there is any movement in national 
population statistics but so that the size of parliament does not change.174 Furthermore, the 
Commission also determines the allocation of seats for parties based on their share of the party vote 
after seats have been allocated to winning electorate members.175 
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The mixed-member proportional system in New Zealand offers more flexibility than its previous 
first-past-the-post system, reflecting its goal of ensuring interests are proportionately represented.176 
Integral to an understanding of the New Zealand electoral system is the influence of the Treaty of 
Waitangi 1840 on electoral laws, policies and processes, and the New Zealand Constitution. 
Because of the Treaty, all legislative instruments guide and protect Maori political participation 
through formal and substantive acknowledgment of Maori rights to self-government and self-
determination – principles and rights that underpin Maori citizenship rights within New Zealand. 
One such example is the Maori Electoral Roll Option. 
C. The Maori Electoral Roll Option 
 
This section considers the current voting framework within New Zealand, highlighting the historic 
development of Maori enfranchisement. This provides context for and an explanation of why the 
Maori Electoral Roll Option is beneficial to Maori cultural identity and political participation in 
New Zealand.  
Like Australia, the right to vote is inferred from the New Zealand Constitution. Sections 6 and 10 of 
the New Zealand Constitution require Ministers of the Executive Council be elected as persons 
already members of parliament177 and those be elected in accordance with the provisions of the 
Electoral Act 1993.178 
In addition, voting rights in New Zealand are also recognised under the ‘Democratic and Civil 
Rights’ part of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. However, unlike Canada’s Charter the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is not a constitutionally entrenched legislative instrument. The 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 does, however, in s 12, provide that every New Zealand citizen 
who is of or over the age of 18 years has the right to vote in genuine periodic elections of members 
of the House of Representatives. It also requires that those elections be by equal suffrage and by 
secret ballot.179  
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The right to vote in New Zealand is also a compulsory obligation placed upon persons once 
qualified to register to vote as electors of electoral districts.180 Registered persons must be a New 
Zealand citizen181 or a permanent resident182 of New Zealand, and have resided continuously in 
New Zealand for a period of not less than one year.183 Accordingly, persons disqualified from 
voting include New Zealand citizens who have not been in New Zealand within the last three 
years184 or who are permanent residents of New Zealand that have not been in New Zealand within 
the last 12 months.185 
Despite the electoral system forming part of New Zealand’s system of representative democracy, 
the proportionate representation of minority rights, for example of Maori, has been slow-moving. 
This is because as a minority group comprising approximately 14 per cent of the total population,186 
Maori have lacked a political voice relative to non-Indigenous New Zealand citizens, at least partly 
as a consequence of historically unequal and limited access to voting rights.187  
For instance, Maori have historically lacked the private property ownership that limited their ability 
to meet this voting qualification.188 Property ownership as a voter qualification omitted 
consideration of the communal ownership more likely in Maori communities.189 In addition, from 
1893 and until 1975, enrolment to vote as an elector was categorised by an individual’s ancestry (or 
blood quantum).190 Maori deemed ‘full-blooded’ were required to be on a separate Maori roll. 
Those with less than 50 per cent ‘Maori blood’ were included on the European roll.191 During this 
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period, only those considered ‘half-castes’ were able to choose either roll. In 1975 electoral policy 
reform gave all Maori electors the option of choosing either roll.192  
In another example of differential treatment, Maori were prohibited from voting on the same day as 
non-Indigenous New Zealanders – a rule which did not change until 1951. In addition, unlike the 
broader population, before 1956 the Maori vote was not compulsory. For many years, Maori paid 
taxes and lived under laws of the New Zealand Parliament the same as the majority population with 
unrestricted access to fundamental civil rights, yet Maori themselves were limited both directly and 
indirectly from the franchise193 which also limited their political representation.194  
In terms of voter disqualifications, the New Zealand electoral legislation is similar to Australia in 
that persons deemed of unsound mind195 and/or detained in a prison to a sentence of imprisonment 
imposed after the commencement of the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) 
Amendment Act 2010 are disqualified from voting.196  
Like the Aboriginal Australian and First Nations of Canada experiences with electoral 
disqualifications, Maori of New Zealand are also vulnerable to high and disproportionate levels of 
incarceration. Despite comprising 14 per cent of the total New Zealand population,197 Maori occupy 
50 per cent of the national prison population.198 Like Aboriginal Australians and First Nations of 
Canada, the Maori imprisonment population of New Zealand largely comprises Maori from 
communities of scarcity and deprivation as a result of their colonisation. The high and 
disproportionate figures of the Maori imprisonment population and, the New Zealand prisoner voter 
disqualification (which disqualifies persons sentenced to a term of incarceration of three years or 
more) limits Maori voting participation at New Zealand elections.199  
New Zealand electoral legislation also disqualifies persons who are detained in a hospital under the 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 or are detained in a secure facility 
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under the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003.200 That 
disqualification works as an equivalent to what Australia has within its electoral legislation as the 
‘unsound mind’ disqualification. However, the disqualification is a lot narrower than what 
Australian electoral legislation affords its citizens. This New Zealand electoral disqualifier only 
applies to persons subject to a court order that declares their mental impairment201 or compulsory 
treatment order.202 
In addition, New Zealand electoral legislation has compulsory enrolment however it does not have a 
compulsory requirement to vote which offers some protection for citizens that do not wish to 
exercise their right to vote.203 The New Zealand electoral system also affords Maori additional voter 
incentives legislatively recognised to mitigate those barriers and encourage Maori to vote and 
politically participate. Section 76 of the Electoral Act 1993 introduced the Maori Electoral Roll 
Option in 1975,204 providing Maori electors with an opportunity to decide which electoral roll they 
wish to be enrolled on.205 As such, Maori electors can choose to register their enrolment to vote on a 
Maori electoral district or a general electoral district.206  
The Maori Electoral Roll Option operates by providing Maori with a period of four months after the 
Minister of Justice has published a notice in the Gazette to register their enrolment as electors for 
New Zealand elections on the Maori roll or general roll.207 The Electoral Commission must also 
issue a notice to Maori electors to clarify whether they are registered for a Maori electoral district or 
general electoral district.208  
After Maori electors have received those notices, they must stipulate whether they wish to remain 
registered on the roll they are already registered on, or whether they wish to change rolls.209 Once 
Maori electors receive notice of their enrolment status and do not exercise the option given by s 76 
(1) during the option period, they will continue to remain registered on the roll as an elector of the 
electoral district in which they are currently registered.210 Regardless of the choice of the electoral 
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roll, and where they live, the voting system ensures that all electors have the same list of political 
parties to choose from when using their party vote.211  
A key benefit of the Maori Electoral Roll Option is that its statistical data is collated with annual 
census data of Maori that is then used to determine whether adjustments need to be made to Maori 
designated seats in parliament. Both sources of data are considered by the Electoral Commission 
when revising whether electorate boundaries need to be adjusted.212   
As a result, the Maori Electoral Roll Option provides Maori electors with an incentive to register to 
vote through an enhanced chance of gaining more Maori seats in parliament. Since the introduction 
of the Maori electoral option, Maori designated seats in New Zealand Parliament have increased 
from the original four to seven.213 In terms of political participation, a system of designated seats 
cannot be overlooked as a key institutional adaptation. The following section, therefore, considers 
the historical development and contemporary benefits of Maori designated seats. 
D. Maori Designated Seats in Parliament 
 
Maori designated seats in parliament are a key feature of the New Zealand electoral system. They 
are viewed as not only a symbolic but a practical expression of Maori self-determination and 
constitutional legitimacy in accordance with the Treaty.214 In that context, Maori designated seats 
exemplify an assertion by Maori of substantive parliamentary representation of Maori cultural 
identity as required by the Treaty.215  
At first instance, s 10 of the New Zealand Constitution216 provides that persons qualified for 
membership of the House of Representatives must be already qualified as electors to vote at 
elections.217 More specifically though, Maori representation is outlined in s 45 of the Electoral Act 
1993 which provides that it is the duty of the Representation Commission, for the purpose of the 
representation of the Maori people in the House of Representatives, to divide New Zealand into 
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Maori electoral districts from time to time.218 This is to ensure that Maori representation in the 
House of Representatives is proportionate to their population. 
The introduction of Maori designated seats under the Maori Representation Act 1867 has been 
considered tokenistic.219 Designated seats were originally introduced to provide guaranteed 
representation to Maori. However, in a more practical sense, they were restrictive because they 
were disproportionate to the Maori population at the time of their introduction. If seats were 
reflective of the Maori population in 1867, there would have been 20 allocated seats out of the 70 in 
existence.220 The New Zealand Government at the time was concerned to ensure that the 70 
European electorates were not ‘swamped’ by Maori voters.221 Proportionate Maori representation 
was therefore restricted significantly – only four seats were allocated to Maori representatives. 222 
Following the repeal of the Electoral Act 1956 by the Electoral Act 1993 introducing the mixed-
member proportional system, Maori electorates were recalculated and adjusted according to the 
number of Maori registered to vote on the Maori electoral option.223 The seven Maori electorates 
established provide Maori with their own special category of an electorate that covers the whole of 
New Zealand and overlies the 64 general electorate seats.224  
Maori electorates provide a better opportunity for proportionate Maori representation to occur in 
New Zealand politics as they afford Maori voters with a more direct voice for Maori representation 
that would best represent their interests as a minority culture. In doing so, the special category of 
Maori electorates prioritises the protection of Maori property and self-determination rights225 that 
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both work hand and hand, and are fundamental to, Maori cultural identity and their fair share of 
citizen benefits in New Zealand.226  
Both measures since their introduction to New Zealand’s electoral system have increased enrolment 
on the Maori electoral roll, which by 1996 had resulted in an increase in Maori designated seats in 
parliament from four to five.227 By 1996, designated seats for Maori increased to six and by 2002, 
they had increased again to seven, the current number.228  
Despite designated Maori seats securing and increasing Maori representation in parliament, the 
most significant impact on Maori representation has been the introduction of party lists.229 Party 
lists allow for the additional representation of Maori representatives and are not restrictive. For 
example, in 1996, five Maori representatives were elected into Maori electorate seats and one was 
elected into a general seat. In contrast to their electorate representation, 11 Maori representatives 
were elected on party lists and, to date, between one-third and one-half of all Maori members of 
parliament are elected from party lists.230 
As a consequence of the capacity for a wider distribution of power to a more diverse range of 
candidates, most parliamentary parties now include Maori in their line-up of candidates. Over time 
this has boosted numbers of Maori members of parliament, including ministers.231 In addition, 
Maori have two registered political parties, the Maori and Mana parties, which offer distinct self-
determined Maori perspectives to executive and legislative agendas.232  
New Zealand party lists, however, have posed issues in terms of their predetermined rankings from 
the honours board system that make it harder for electors to distinguish genuine list candidates from 
those that have been added purely to bolster a party’s image.233 This can be particularly problematic 
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for electors reliant on candidates to represent and fulfil policy promises and objectives surrounding 
minority interests like Maori rights. Maori rights and the political representation of those rights is of 
particular importance given the colonial dispossession those interests have been oppressed by and, 
their status as a minority cultural group of people. Further, despite Maori representation increasing 
slowly over time, their proportionate political representation still lacks entrenchment and protection 
within the New Zealand Constitution. There is argument however, that the lack of constitutional 
entrenchment of such representation, would avoid concerns that Maori members of Parliament in 
reserved seats, would decide who formed governments. Yet, the lack of reserved seats constitutional 
entrenchment also provides Maori members with real bargaining and even veto power over 
legislation affecting Maori interests in parliamentary law-making processes.234 
Designated Maori representation has remained a contested issue even without considering 
constitutional entrenchment.235 In 2013, the Constitutional Advisory Panel issued a report which 
considered arguments for and against the retention and abolition of Maori seats in parliament.236 
Arguments in favour of abolishing Maori designated seats drew upon findings within the 1986 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System.237 The Report suggested that whilst there 
is a special significance for Maori obtaining designated seats in parliament, the mixed-member 
proportional system would achieve the same benefit given that it is entirely based on political 
proportionality and representation within the electoral system. On this argument, there is no further 
need for separate representation.238 
The ‘undemocratic argument’ in favour of abolishing designated seats suggests that they undermine 
principles of equality.239 They seek to safeguard Maori representation in parliament, applying only 
to a portion of New Zealand society and not the rest.240 There is a presumption under that line of 
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reasoning that, if designated seats are maintained, Maori will continue to be treated in a more 
privileged way politically than others.241 This stance, however, fails to acknowledge the historic 
political exclusion and oppression Maori have faced since colonisation. On the contrary, the 
political inequality in New Zealand’s representative electoral system was derived from a foundation 
of white privilege and colonial dominance over all other cultures.242 
Additionally, the Report considered perspectives that suggested designated seats create a form of 
apartheid in that Maori representatives are not only separated in parliament and government but 
under their designated seats their roles diminish in both institutions.243 This perspective observes 
the impure reasons for creating the seats originally, namely to restrict Maori political representation 
rather than protect and increase it.244 Even since their creation, the Royal Commission has observed 
how the non-Indigenous majority government continues to dominate Maori representatives, making 
it difficult for those representatives to fully advocate for and protect the interests of their people.245 
The third argument speaks of multiculturalism effects. It criticises racial separatism in politics 
labelling it unfair for other ethnic groups such as Pacific peoples and Asians.246 This argument calls 
for the abolition of all race-based legislation including the designated Maori seats in parliament. 
However, it ignores that under the mixed-member proportional system Maori representation is 
already reasonable and proportionate to their population.247 
In the alternative view, the Report notes arguments that support maintaining designated seats. 
Firstly, it notes that the seats represent and draw upon treaty principles of partnership and self-
determination rights of Maori. Designated seats for Maori in that context represent symbolically and 
practically the legitimacy of Maori rights in partnership with the Crown.248 This establishes a dual 
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political effort through both parties participating in decision-making processes within parliament 
and recognises important treaty principles and constitutional conventions that place respect and 
value on Maori representation. On these arguments, Maori designated seats in the sovereign 
parliament are an important act by which government highlights that relationship and the respect 
due to Maori.249 
The Report also notes arguments that support the constitutional entrenchment of Maori designated 
seats to prevent future abolition of the seats without a 75 per cent majority vote in support.250 The 
challenge for constitutional entrenchment is that principles that underpin treaty partnership as 
understood by its Maori interpretation conflict with its English version. According to the English 
interpretation, the Maori interpretation threatens State sovereignty through the formal application of 
self-determination rights.251 Furthermore, the entrenchment of seats would be unlikely to gain non-
Indigenous majority support if there is a perceived threat of more radical changes being explored – 
such as the creation of a Maori parliament and an entirely separate Maori nation-State.252  
Despite those concerns, the report did note that without Maori seat protection, levels of Maori 
representation could quickly decline as was seen in the early 2000s with the Mana Motuhake 
movement.253 The Mana party had one parliamentary seat and lost it in 2014, affecting the gains 
made in the political representation of its electors’ interests.254  
Nonetheless, at a bare minimum, the Report notes the amount of strong support for Maori seats 
amongst party voters.255 The abolishment of seats would mean that the interests of Maori electors 
would be reliant on the goodwill of party elites. Maori rights to exercising self-determination would 
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then be implicitly limited. On the other hand, if the seats are to remain, Maori electors’ political 
control over the way in which their cultural and political interests are represented.256 
Despite ongoing examination of the system of designated seats, there is no immediate call for 
change to the current arrangements for Maori representation in parliament. Given the benefits of 
having separate, self-regulated and maintained Maori seats, Maori have a political avenue for self-
determined political representation both through their engagement with the Maori Electoral Roll 
Option and through its related system of designated parliamentary seats.257 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In contrast to the Australian framework of political participation, both Canada and New Zealand offer 
a range of institutional responses that, while not perfect, enhance Indigenous peoples’ political 
participation.  
In Canada, even in the face of parliamentary attempts to disqualify incarcerated citizens from the 
vote, they are protected in practical terms by Canada’s constitutional makeup. Despite Canadian 
electoral legislation formally disqualifying from voting those incarcerated for two years or more, 
these provisions have been declared ineffective and are not applied.258 Overriding case law259 has 
recognised that the restriction of voting rights is undemocratic and constitutionally invalid. This 
analysis depends upon the interpretation of the constitutionally entrenched Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms260 as protecting the democratic voting rights of all Canadian citizens. 
Elections Canada also has far more effective support initiatives established for its First Nations 
compared to those of the Australian Electoral Commission in support of Indigenous Australian 
electors. Further, the Canadian initiatives are focused on more practical outcomes that immediately 
address barriers to First Nations people in terms of their voting at Canadian elections. In addition, 
data collected annually track the progression and success of such initiatives and is continuously 
reviewed and acted upon. As a result, the Canadian system is a relatively effective, supportive and 
inclusive system for all citizens, including its First Nations. 
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Although not constitutionally entrenched as in Canada, the New Zealand electoral system provides 
within its constitutional framework a further example of an institutional framework that supports 
the political candidacy of its Indigenous people. Firstly, and in contrast to the Australian 
Constitution’s disqualifying provisions,261 the New Zealand Constitution does not explicitly 
disqualify persons in any of its provisions. Given the lack of detail in New Zealand’s Constitution 
and the way in which its electoral system is guided by several legislative instruments, it is better 
equipped to reform and adapt. As a consequence of the role of the Treaty in interpreting the 
Constitution and legislation more broadly, the contemporary institutional framework for Maori 
political participation better represents Indigenous self-determination than in Australia. 
As part of the New Zealand institutional approach, Maori citizens are encouraged to self-identify, a 
key component of self-determination and cultural identity, through the Maori Electoral Roll Option. 
This initiative is reflective of New Zealand’s commitment to adhering to principles of political 
equality and proportionality that underpin its democratic regime.262 
Lastly, the Maori Electoral Roll Option data, together with Maori census data, determine whether 
Maori designated seats in parliament are increased and electorate boundaries require further 
adjustment. Having separate seats designated for Maori representatives in New Zealand Parliament 
adheres to principles of proportionality and representation of Maori interests and identity that are 
hallmarks of self-determination within a representative democracy.263  
Electoral laws in both Canada and New Zealand depend upon the constitutional framework to quite 
a different extent from the Australian electoral system. Rights of self-determination, whether 
situated within a constitution, treaty, or charter, are common to both of these legal systems and 
absent from Australia. The role that these rights play within a domestic system becomes apparent in 




                                                             
261 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901, s 25, s 41. 
262 Tim Schouls, ‘Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral Reform in Canada: Differentiated Representation versus Voter 
Equality’ (1996) 29(04) Canadian Journal of Political Science 736. 
263 Schouls, ibid, 735; Philip A. Joseph, The Maori Seats in Parliament (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 2008) 6; S. 
A. McClelland, ‘Maori Electoral Representation: Challenge to Orthodoxy’ (1997) 17 New Zealand Universities Law 






CHAPTER 4  
INDIGENOUS REPRESENTATIVE BODIES WITHIN 
AUSTRALIA 
 
We seek constitutional reforms to empower our people and take a rightful place in our own country. 
When we have power over our destiny our children will flourish. They will walk in two worlds and 
their culture will be a gift to their country. We call for the establishment of a First Nations Voice 
enshrined in the Constitution. Makarrata is the culmination of our agenda: the coming together after 
a struggle. It captures our aspirations for a fair and truthful relationship with the people of Australia 
and a better future for our children based on justice and self-determination. We seek a Makarrata 
Commission to supervise a process of agreement-making between governments and First Nations 
and truth-telling about our history. In 1967 we were counted, in 2017 we seek to be heard. We leave 
base camp and start our trek across this vast country. We invite you to walk with us in a movement 




Beyond the features of electoral systems including voting and candidacy rights, this thesis explores 
the potential in representative institutions designed to give voice to particular concerns of 
Indigenous peoples. Nationally recognised representative bodies for Indigenous people are an 
essential component in meeting the need for their political representation through providing an 
institutional means of exercising their rights to self-determination. As argued in this thesis,2 this is 
an essential ingredient in protecting cultural identity and heritage. This chapter engages with the 
experience of national Indigenous representative bodies within Australia. 
This chapter posits that the Australian political system has not yet been able to implement such a 
body as it lacks a correct understanding of self-determination.3 To do so, it reflects on government 
actions that historically have limited the expression of Indigenous Australians’ self-determination 
and which have also limited the longevity, support of and respect for past and present Indigenous 
representative bodies. It highlights the effect of the absence of constitutional entrenchment and 
protection of those bodies, allowing successive governments to repeal their establishing legislation 
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and abolish them. Those government actions have disregarded the purpose of establishing such 
bodies – namely, to provide a differentiated political and cultural platform for advocacy by 
Indigenous people so they are fairly represented. 
This chapter explores a contemporary example of flawed government actions undertaken in the 
absence of an established representative body to advocate on laws affecting Indigenous peoples’ 
cultural affairs: the Northern Territory Emergency Response.4 It then considers current calls for 
substantive political equality within the Uluru Statement from the Heart (Uluru Statement).5 The 
Uluru Statement is built on three key themes to be embodied in three types of institutional 
Indigenous representation designed, together, to facilitate Indigenous Australians to exercise self-
determination. Those themes are voice, treaty and truth.6 
Although there are several constitutional law reform proposals included within the Uluru Statement, 
this chapter focuses on the proposal to establish national Indigenous representative bodies which 
aim to safeguard Indigenous inclusion in decision-making processes within mainstream federal 
politics on matters that concern their cultural identity and affairs. Those bodies include the Voice to 
Parliament, the Makarrata Commission, and the Truth-Telling Commission,7 and the final part of 
this chapter explores the broad, preliminary suggested role and design of each of the proposed 
bodies.  
II. INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION  
 
Self-determination is a foundation right vital for Indigenous peoples that goes some way to remedy 
the failure of ostensibly representative democratic regimes with colonial backgrounds.8 Its objective 
is to realise the cultural rights and heritage of Indigenous people without limitations placed upon 
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those rights by a government.9 To achieve this object, a government is required to seek free, prior 
and informed consent from its Indigenous people10 and consult with them in decision-making 
processes that concern matters affecting their cultural affairs both directly and indirectly.11  
From an Australian perspective, the current legislative official view of the right of self-
determination is recognised in s 3 of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth). 
Section 3 requires the Australian government ensure the maximum participation of Aboriginal 
persons and Torres Strait Islanders in the making and implementation of government policies that 
affect them. In addition, it also requires the Australia government to promote the development of 
self-management and self-sufficiency among Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.12 
Despite the legislative understanding of self-determination, there still remains differing 
interpretations of self-determination in terms of how it is exercised by Indigenous people in 
practice.13 Historically, the Australian government has perceived self-determination as a threat to its 
sovereignty, particularly when certain Indigenous groups interpret self-determination as an exercise 
of their sovereignty over land and deciding their political status and self-government. Successive 
Australian governments have in that context, limited self-determination by interpreting it more 
narrowly compared to international standards which is in contrast, a broad understanding of self-
determination that aims to decolonise and politically empower Indigenous people.14  
The pathway to undertaking such consultative tasks that seek to place Indigenous people at the 
forefront with decision-making on matters that concern their cultural affairs within Commonwealth 
democracies is to ensure that its westernised institutions are accepting and inclusive of Indigenous 
practices of traditional governance. To negate or even limit, that kind of self-determination of 
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Indigenous people further constrains meaningful progression towards reconciliation.15 It is thus 
imperative for the Australian Government to ensure its institutions and overall governance provide 
Indigenous groups with the ability to freely develop and maintain their cultural identities.16 As a 
signatory to the several International Conventions that recognised standards of self-determination,17 
Australia too must adhere to those recognised standards of self-determination that respect and 
acknowledge the special and distinct identity of Indigenous Australians as a people.18 
Enacting self-determination requires a relationship to be formed between Indigenous people and the 
Settler State that fosters partnership and mutual respect – as much of the exercise and practice of 
self-determination is relational. Such a relationship is vital in representative liberal democracies like 
Australia that place a strong emphasis on citizenship through political participation. Self-
determination is therefore exercised by Indigenous citizens within representative democracies 
through their political participation evidenced by the exercise of free choice through voting at 
elections19 and their overall engagement in political decision-making processes by providing 
sought-after prior consent without limitation and domination.20 
Whilst much of self-determination is best understood as political participation,21 the right extends 
also to inclusive self-governance.22 Self-governance provides Indigenous people with a sense of 
cultural autonomy in matters relating to their internal and local affairs.23 This is manifested in 
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Australia through a continuous call for political empowerment by Indigenous Australians.24 The 
problem within Australia, however, has been the lack of acceptance of their differentiated 
citizenship identity by the Settler State.  
Australia, like other Commonwealth democracies with a colonial background, has been reluctant to 
accept differentiated citizenship expressed through Indigenous self-governance.25 Instead, its push 
for such groups to integrate and assimilate into a common national identity26 has been the dividing 
factor behind the unreconciled relationship that exists between Indigenous people and the Settler 
State. Those actions have led to an even greater indifference and resentment experienced by 
Indigenous Australians.27  
There are a variety of ways forward for modern Commonwealth democracies like Australia to 
support Indigenous claims to identity which may be seen through the establishment of a treaty28 and 
other frameworks and institutions of self-determination within federal regimes.29 Those options 
provide an avenue to accommodate the political aspirations of Indigenous people.30  
Whichever way Indigenous self-determination is exercised, it must be supported by a State in a 
culturally appropriate way.31 This requires a government to establish a mutually respectful 
negotiation process between the majority culture and Indigenous people as the minority. From 
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there, a more reconciled process towards national unity can be achieved in democracies with 
differentiated citizen identities and interests.32 Citizen unity of this kind shifts the focus of citizens 
to achieve a shared goal. That goal is to be part of a modern and reformed system that provides 
them with the free and equal opportunity to contest and reshape previous rules and norms that have 
historically failed them, not least by creating a sense of separatism within society.33  
The process of implementing self-determination can include ‘constitutionalism’ whereby a colonial 
State’s constitution provides recognition of the different cultures of its citizens.34 Again, this 
requires adherence to conventions that oblige mutual contribution, consultation and consent by all 
citizens, including those who are of Indigenous descent.35 This process of negotiation and equal 
contribution forges unity of citizens through the affirmation of cultural differences, public 
acknowledgement and respect exercised within governing institutions free from the impoverishment 
of one’s own identity.36  
Since federation, the Australian Government had not adhered to the currently recognised standards 
of adequate consultation with all the people it governs.37 This was particularly so during the 
drafting phases of its governing institutional order and structures.38 Rather, some of its citizens, 
especially women and Indigenous Australians, were unjustifiably excluded according to 
contemporary standards of democratic governance.39  
The result of the exclusion of women and Indigenous people is the creation of institutions that 
function in a way that is discriminatory, and frequently detrimental to their interests.40 Further, their 
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lack of representation within those institutions, because of those embedded structures, has also 
worked to maintain their institutional oppression and subordinate status as differential and distinct 
groups.41  
For Indigenous peoples, it is essential that representation exercised through their own institutions is 
Indigenous-led and controlled. Their control must not just be inclusive of service deliverables, but 
most importantly their broader decision-making on laws and policies that affect their cultural affairs 
and organisational objectives.42   
In the face of a longstanding struggle for Indigenous self-determination in Australia,43 theorists 
have observed that there is no threat to its national identity if diverse political arrangements or 
differentiated rights are created.44 Increasing support amongst the international community with a 
growing number of international legislative instruments that recognise the importance of Indigenous 
rights to self-determination, including acceptance of cultural and political freedoms, further 
evidence this.45 
To achieve self-determination in Australia thus requires a shift away from minimalistic and 
symbolic ways of recognising such rights and international standards, towards more substantive 
change.46 The next part examines the extent to which the Australian settler State has adhered to 
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those international standards of self-determination of Indigenous Australians. In doing so, it 
considers the structures of previous Indigenous representative bodies and assesses whether those 
bodies have, through their design, been able to properly represent the interests of Indigenous 
Australians.47 
III. HISTORY OF ABORIGINAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES  
 
Despite self-determination being first formally recognised as Australian policy by the Whitlam 
government in 1972,48 its recognition was significantly limited compared to what was required in 
accordance with international standards.49 Although the Australian Government supported an 
increase of Indigenous political participation and engagement with its decision-making processes on 
Indigenous affairs, it only provided a constrained degree of control for Indigenous-led service 
delivery.50  
Nonetheless, successive Australian governments have managed to establish a number of nationally 
recognised Indigenous representative bodies. However, despite those advancements, the issue 
remains as to how long those bodies survive and how much meaningful impact they bring to 
Indigenous lives under what is the limited guise of self-determination.51 
The Australian Aborigines League was one of the first Indigenous representative bodies to be 
established and was formed in Victoria in 1934.52 Under the leadership of Aboriginal rights activist 
William Cooper, the Aborigines League made significant ground with Indigenous political 
representation progression when it petitioned to King George V for the inclusion of Aboriginal 
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representation in the Australian Parliament. The agenda was to enable increased Aboriginal 
advocacy for full and equal citizenship rights of Aboriginal people.53  
Three years later in 1937, the Aborigines Progressive Association was formed and run by William 
Ferguson, Pearl Gibbs and Jack Patten.54 The Aborigines Progressive Association collaboratively 
worked with the Aborigines League to bring together Aboriginal Australians for Australia’s very 
first ‘Day of Mourning’ in 1938.55 That conference is a monumental milestone for Aboriginal 
citizenship rights. The first Day of Mourning marked a day where Aboriginal Australians could 
rally together and advocate for full and equal access to citizenship rights in Australia.56 In that same 
year, the Aborigines Progressive Association advocated for the abolition of the Aborigines 
Protection Act 1909 (NSW) and Aboriginal designated seats in parliament. However, the 
association ended in 1944 – another short-lived lifespan of seven years for an Indigenous 
representative body that advocated and contributed significantly to achieving national recognition 
of Indigenous citizenship in Australia.57 
The next organisation of note was the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and 
Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI). The FCAATSI was established in the late 1950s and 
campaigned for constitutional reform and played a crucial role for advocating for Indigenous rights 
during the lead up to the last successful referendum in 1967.58 Advocacy led by the FCAATSI was 
at a time when Australia had hit a peak in advocating for Indigenous politics and citizenship. As 
time passed, this movement of advocacy shifted from individual Indigenous citizenship rights to 
their broader collective rights and identification as their own distinct peoples.59 
By 1973 the FCAATSI became a self-managed and controlled organisation. Alongside its gradual 
progression with functioning as a self-managed and controlled organisation from 1972 until 1975, 
the Northern Territory cultivated an increased Indigenous representative sector. The intent behind 
the Northern Territory instigating an Indigenous representative sector was to ensure delivery of 
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services to Indigenous communities was Indigenous-led and run.60 Despite those efforts, the 
FCAATSI struggled to survive with structural mechanisms being increasingly established at both 
local and national levels.61 With an increase of structural mechanisms being created, funding was 
eventually cut which significantly limited the capacity of the FCAATSI to continue delivering its 
services and continue its operations. As a result of lost funding, the FCAATSI was extinguished by 
1978.62 
Before the end of FCAATSI, the Council for Aboriginal Affairs (CAA) had begun operation, 
although it lasted only from 1968 until 1971. Although the CAA came under the guise of 
advocating for Aboriginal rights, it did not truly represent their voices given that it was led by three 
non-Indigenous men.63 This was a very similar set up to the Office of Aboriginal Affairs that 
worked alongside the CAA and was incorporated into the Prime Minister’s Department. The Office 
of Aboriginal Affairs also held little weight and value as an advisory body within the Prime 
Minister’s Department and more generally.64  
By 1973 the CAA and Office for Aboriginal Affairs joined to form the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs (DAA).65 Unlike its predecessors, the DAA employed Aboriginal people to provide a more 
accurate representation of Aboriginal people and their cultural affairs.66 The DAA’s primary 
function was to provide advice directly to the Australian Government on Aboriginal affairs through 
recognition and exercise of self-determination rights.67 Unlike previously established bodies, DAA 
lasted for 17 years from 1973 to 1990 when it was dissolved and replaced by the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC).68 
In terms of considering representative bodies comprised of representatives self-determined and 
chosen by Aboriginal electors, the first to be established was the National Aboriginal Consultative 
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Committee (NACC) in 1972.69 However, like previously formed Aboriginal representative bodies, 
the NACC only held advisory functions that the Australian Government gave very little weight to 
when considering any form of guidance and recommendations it would receive.70 
By 1989, the Labor government passed the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 
1989 (Cth). John Howard, the Opposition leader at the time, stated to the House of Representatives 
in parliament that: 
The only way to bring about a proper accord between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians is 
to embrace Aborigines fully within the Australian community; to treat their deprivation and their 
disadvantage – which I do not dispute – as a manifest responsibility of the entire Australian 
community. The Government will not lift up Aborigines, embrace them, and right their wrongs by 
signing treaties or creating black parliaments. It will bring upon them more distrust, more hostility 
and more misunderstanding.71 
John Howard’s statement evidenced a clear position of the Opposition that misinterpreted and 
misunderstood internationally recognised obligations Commonwealth governments owed to 
Indigenous Australians by providing opportunities for them to self-represent culturally through an 
established national body. Howard’s position would later limit significantly the objectives and 
lifetime of ATSIC.72 
ATSIC is one of the most prominent bodies Australia established to represent the interests of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander citizens. The body was from the outset empowering and had 
culturally internal electoral processes for electing members that mirrored parliamentary electoral 
processes. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders constituents elected their preferred cultural 
representatives from their regional councils every three years,73 to represent their interests in 
providing advice to parliament on areas for reform for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
economic, social, political and cultural wellbeing.74  
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In terms of ATSIC’s functions, it operated at a national and regional level so that funding could be 
allocated and utilised with community-based organisations.75 However, there were a number of 
constraints that emerged over time from the Howard government that limited ATSIC’s 
representative voice and service delivery rollout. For instance, parliamentary representatives were 
only obliged to merely consider ATSIC recommendations which, without veto power, left ATSIC 
vulnerable to being sidelined in parliamentary processes.76 
That formal recognition of self-determination lay only within the preamble of the ATSIC Act was 
telling. As a preambular commitment only, it was easy for parliamentarians to ignore and those who 
opposed formal recognition of self-determination preferred more limiting language to define 
ATSIC’s functions – such as ‘self-management’.77 Consequently, despite being legislatively 
recognised as a ‘self-managed’ body, ATSIC became increasingly placed under a microscope by the 
Australian Government through administrative compliance obligations and reporting.78 This was a 
significant issue for ATSIC as it was frequently provided with inadequate funding to fulfil its 
obligations and ongoing performance evaluations under s 76 of the ATSIC Act.79 In time, it became 
abundantly clear that ATSIC was more of an accountable body rather than one that was self-
managed or self-determined as it was originally envisioned to be.80 Thus, it was evident under those 
circumstances that the Howard government placed less emphasis on self-determination than on 
formal equality, uniform processes and national cohesion.81  
By 24 March 2005, almost inevitably, ATSIC was abolished with bipartisan support.82 During this 
process, ATSIC representatives and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities were not 
consulted and, given the lack of funding, powers, control and opportunity ATSIC was given to 
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achieve its objectives and meet its obligations, the Australian Government labelled ATSIC and self-
determination as failures.83 Howard stated ‘the experiment in separate representation, elected 
representation, for [I]ndigenous people has been a failure’.84 However, most of the policy areas 
termed ‘failures’ fell under the control and oversight of mainstream government departments, 
especially health and education.85 
The role of ATSIC received significant criticism throughout its lifespan, divided into two 
conflicting opinions. At one end of the spectrum there were those who thought ATSIC divided the 
nation’s identity and at the other end there were those who argued it lacked enough autonomy and 
was in that respect too accountable to mainstream processes.86 In practice, the limitations placed on 
ATSIC by the Australian Government strategically made it an inadequate vehicle of true self-
determination. Instead, ATSIC became a mechanism for the government to replace its 
accountability for its failure to empower Indigenous peoples.87  
On those terms, the Australian Government directed the failure of ATSIC and self-determination 
towards ATSIC representatives. In doing so, it failed to acknowledge the significant constraints it 
placed upon ATSIC which effectively set ATSIC up for failure. ATSIC barely came close to having 
full self-management rights to represent the wants and needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Australians.88 Despite this, ATSIC did set a useful example as to how Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islanders can self-determine their own representatives through the utilisation of 
Westernised democratic election processes.89  
A year after ATSIC was established, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) was 
established to investigate all options that would advance reconciliation between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous Australians. CAR was also established as a fall-back option from previous 
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unsuccessful efforts under Prime Minister Hawke’s leadership.90 Its primary purpose was to 
promote awareness amongst Australian society of Indigenous disadvantage and history, and to 
consult with Indigenous communities, to make formal recommendations to the Commonwealth 
Government on negotiating documents beneficial to achieving reconciliation.91  
Membership of the CAR comprised Indigenous and non-Indigenous leaders including Patrick 
Dodson as the initial chair.92 By 1996 when the Howard government had come into power and just 
five years after its establishment, CAR was at its peak and had generated a range of educational 
material and projects to reach the broader Australian population with its promotion of 
reconciliation.93 One of the most noteworthy achievements of CAR was its promotion in the year 
2000 of the popular ‘bridge walks’ which over a million people turned up for to advocate for 
reconciliation in Australia.94 
Despite CAR’s successes, systemic and long-standing government failure concerning the treatment 
of Indigenous Australians was being revealed by the so-called Stolen Generations Inquiry. The 
Inquiry by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) into past policy 
failures of forcible removal of Aboriginal children sparked debate and criticism by Indigenous 
Australians of past and present government actions.95 The report brought to light the extent to which 
policies introduced during the White Australia policy era paved the way for what has been 
described as genocide of Indigenous Australians.96 The Inquiry recommended the Commonwealth 
Government compensate victims of the policy and apologise formally for past government 
actions.97 
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The Howard government rejected a formal apology to Indigenous Australians and instead declared 
that all efforts made towards achieving reconciliation under Howard government leadership would 
not involve different treatment of law or systems of accountability based on race.98  
Despite the Howard government’s reluctance to meet the wants and needs of its Indigenous citizens 
and CAR as their representative body,99 CAR maintained its advocacy for reconciliation with its 
publication of The Australian Declaration Towards Reconciliation100 and Roadmap for 
Reconciliation101 reports.102 The reports were conservative, modest aspirations and expressions of 
reconciliation which sought to advance ‘Indigenous economic independence, overcoming 
disadvantage, recognising rights and sustaining the reconciliation process’.103  
In spite of those efforts, the Howard government did not give its full support to CAR’s 
recommendations and instead provided CAR with a preferred, revised Declaration Towards 
Reconciliation.104 The revision deleted recommendations on self-determination, respecting the 
rights and cultural identity of Indigenous Australians, and taking active measures to empower them 
fully. The goal was to ensure that all citizens remained under a unitary system of law and its 
Indigenous citizens be given no concession to differentiated treatment because of their cultural 
identity.105 
The only exception to the Howard government refusal for acting on CAR’s recommendations was 
its establishment of the Productivity Commission to report nationally on Indigenous 
disadvantage.106 Since its establishment, it has paved the way for further government reconciliation 
policies and practical outcomes to be implemented and achieved that surround Indigenous social 
and economic disadvantage.107 
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By 2003, the Howard government had made very little effort in implementing any other 
recommendations CAR provided in both reports. Its lack of response was later criticised by the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee as a failure of national leadership on one of 
the most critical issues in Australia.108  
Since 2003, there has been a void in the advancement and establishment of nationally recognised 
Indigenous representative bodies in Australia.109 The National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples 
was formed in 2010 as an incorporated company independent from the Australian Government. Its 
independence was a key design feature based on the lessons learnt from the demise of ATSIC.110  
As with ATSIC electoral processes, the National Congress provides Indigenous Australians with an 
electoral process for annually electing its executives – representatives from Aboriginal 
organisations and communities, as well as individuals.111  
The Congress had its own ethics council responsible for the oversight of the integrity and ethics of 
officeholders. 112 However, although the National Congress represented a unified voice for several 
thousand Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, advocating for full access to self-
determination rights, it went into administration in June 2019 due to a lack of government funding 
to meet its objectives.113 The lack of sustainable funding is a recurring issue for Indigenous 
representative bodies which affects their ability to meet their objectives, including reaching 
members across the country. Ongoing dependence on government funding leaves Indigenous 
representative bodies at the mercy of political imperatives and is a function of entrenched 
disenfranchisement from political participation. 
The recent demise of the Congress leaves the Aboriginal Provisional Government (APG) and the 
recently established Prime Minister’s Indigenous Advisory Council as the two remaining national 
Indigenous representative bodies. However, given the constraints on their powers and contingency 
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of funding, they will struggle to provide a meaningful improvement in the lives of Indigenous 
people.114 
The APG was formed in 1990 and grounds itself in representing Aboriginal sovereignty, self-
determination and self-government while rejecting any form of assimilation of Aboriginal people.115 
On those terms, the APG works to provide Aboriginal people with Aboriginal passports and birth 
certificates as contemporary measures to assert their differentiated Aboriginal citizenship. In 
addition, the APG also sends its own diplomatic delegates overseas to assert Aboriginal sovereignty 
to the international community.116 Although the Australian Government rejects differentiated 
Aboriginal citizenship in these contexts, particularly Aboriginal passports,117 the establishment and 
continuation of the APG itself, alongside its initiatives, give Aboriginal people a mechanism to 
assert their sovereignty in de facto terms.118 
Like the current proposed Voice to Parliament, the Prime Minister’s Indigenous Council established 
in 2004 is responsible for advising the Australian Government on all matters and proposed laws that 
concern Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs.119 The Council is guided by Australia’s 
Minister for Indigenous Australians120 and is comprised of members who are experts and 
practitioners that advise the Australian Government on policy design, implementation and practice 
that advance Indigenous affairs.121  
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However, the current Minister for Indigenous Australians is also a representative of the Liberal 
Party which has, over the last two terms of its national leadership, rejected and made little progress 
with calls for substantial equality and self-determination by Indigenous people across Australia.122 
As a result, whilst the council supports the Uluru Statement from the Heart, the co-design process 
of the Voice to Parliament that is currently being coordinated through the council is very much led 
by Aboriginal political elites and dominated by non-Indigenous bureaucratic conservative decision-
making. Those views lack support of the constitutional entrenchment of a Voice to Parliament 
which strays away from the proposals called for by community-led local Aboriginal groups, land 
councils and elders from the Uluru Statement from the Heart.123 
As a result, Indigenous Australians and their calls for improved access and support with advancing 
their cultural identity and political participation – comprising the heart of self-determination – has 
remained significantly limited in this current leadership climate. 
IV. IMPACT OF THE ABSENCE OF INDIGENOUS REPRESENTATION  
 
Whilst Australia currently has two key and differing nationally recognised Aboriginal 
representative bodies (the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples and the Aboriginal 
Provincial Government) that specifically advocate for equal citizenship rights for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people, their existence alone does not suggest that self-determination rights 
have been fully exercised by Indigenous people. Nor does the existence of those bodies imply that 
any of them holds meaningful weight and consideration in decision-making processes concerning 
Indigenous affairs.  
In fact, as of July 2019, the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples was forced out of 
operation mostly due to government funding cuts it relied upon to fulfil its obligations as an adviser 
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to government on behalf of Indigenous Australians.124 As a result, whilst it still advocates for 
Indigenous rights as a body, it does so in a more limited capacity reliant on government grants, 
charitable donations and bequests and other revenues.125 
It is self-evident that the restriction of access to self-determination rights through institutionalised 
Indigenous representation is ongoing, supported by the absence of government commitment to 
meaningful change. As many have argued,126 continued colonial oppression of Indigenous 
Australians limits the national identity of Australia, limits the cultural identity and protection of 
Indigenous Australians, and interferes with the achievement of reconciliation between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous Australians. 
A contemporary example of the ramifications of the Australian Government’s failure to provide 
adequate voice and representation of Indigenous people on Indigenous issues is evidenced in the 
numerous flawed decisions that led to the 2007 Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) or 
‘Intervention package’.127 The NTER shows how the settler-State can, whenever it likes, implement 
racially discriminatory measures, and assert its control over, Indigenous communities.128 It shows a 
national failure of cultural progressiveness, thorough consultation, and consent, and a lack of 
consideration of and respect for Indigenous people, their communities, and representatives.129 
The NTER significantly limited and indirectly targeted Aboriginal Australians through 
discriminatory laws and policies as a government response to the Little Children are Sacred Report 
(LCS Report).130 The LCS Report found that excessive consumption of alcohol in remote Northern 
Territory communities was caused by poverty, unemployment, a lack of education, boredom and 
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overcrowded and inadequate housing.131 The LCS Report also found that alcoholism combined with 
the use of drugs and petrol sniffing lead to violence and the sexual abuse of children.132  
From those findings, the Australian Government decided, in the absence of sought-after consent and 
consultation within its preliminary stages of the NTER, to mitigate the issues identified by the LCS 
Report. The minimal consultation that was undertaken with persons living within targeted 
communities indicates that views expressed by Aboriginal people affected were not respected or 
taken into adequate consideration.133  
The effect of the Intervention has been a reimposition of the colonial order involving greater 
disempowerment of and indirect racial discrimination against Aboriginal people within those 
communities.134 
The Australian Government termed its targeted actions ‘special measures’ which were introduced 
under s 132 (1) of the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth).135 The ‘special 
measures’ sought to quarantine people’s income, limit land leases over declared Aboriginal land, 
restrict alcohol consumption, license community stores, establish business managers in 
communities, restrict pornography and control public-funded computers.136  
The Australian Government also, under s 132 (2) of the Northern Territory Emergency Response 
Act 2007 (Cth), immunised the NTER from legal allegations of racial discrimination by exempting 
it from the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).137 The issue here was that, firstly, one of the 
government’s ‘special measures’ included enhanced law enforcement measures in the targeted and 
high populated Aboriginal communities within the Northern Territory referred to as ‘prescribed 
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communities’.138 This triggered significant critique and controversy given the extent to which the 
‘special measures’ intruded upon the lives of those living within targeted communities–notably, 
Aboriginal Australians.139  
For those who fell under the measures, the new program was a stark reminder of the harsh actions 
imposed by Australian governments during Australia’s Protection Board era. For instance, during 
the Protection Board era, the Australian Government deployed army personnel to Indigenous 
communities to enforce laws that would significantly restrict and at times, totally suspend, their 
access to civil rights. The actions by the Australian Government and their outcomes were seen yet 
again in Australian contemporary times with the rollout of the NTER package.140 
The NTER was also criticised in highlighting the capacity of parliament to utilise unchecked, 
constitutional powers to racially discriminatory ends. Parliament is able to pass laws on the basis of 
race, which does not necessarily need to benefit those persons explicitly affected.141 This has been 
confirmed by Australian courts142 and shows the significant fragility of the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975143 and Australia’s adherence to its international obligations.144 
This is but one example of the consequences of the failure by the Australian Government to 
embrace the establishment and maintenance of national Indigenous-led, controlled and represented 
bodies. In light of the NTER, such representative bodies might have provided the opportunity to 
give voice and guidance on laws and ‘special measures’ taken by the government that have 
adversely affected the lives of so many Aboriginal people. To do so would require negotiating a 
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relationship and partnership between Indigenous bodies and the Australian Government guided by 
mutual respect and inclusivity in national decision-making processes.145  
Preferably, and learning from what has gone before, those bodies should be established as separate 
from the Australian Government to give independence, but be entrenched constitutionally, so that 
the Australian Government cannot totally defund those bodies, limit their capacity to achieve 
objectives and on that basis decide their extinguishment through repeal of their establishing 
legislation, such as occurred with ATSIC.146 Further, the creation of such bodies should steer away 
from previously taken top-down approaches that have not historically empowered and alleviated 
poverty of Indigenous communities. Indigenous representative bodies must be self-determined, 
managed and represented from the bottom-upwards so that grassroots Aboriginal advice, consent 
and consultation occurs that gives differentiating Aboriginal communities meaningful control over 
their affairs.147 
In the face of ongoing government resistance, there has remained a continuous call for change by 
Indigenous Australians and non-Indigenous allies across the country – most recently in the Uluru 
Statement from the Heart. 
V. ULURU STATEMENT FROM THE HEART 
 
The beginning of Australian contemporary Indigenous resurgence started in 1999. During that year, 
Prime Minister John Howard put forth to the Australian people a proposal for a referendum to 
reform the Australian Constitution’s preamble and recognise Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples. This proposal was limiting as it only pursued formal recognition of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples and not structural reform alongside constitutional recognition – a key 
recommendation of the CAR and the suggested statutory reconciliation process.148 Despite those 
recommendations, the Howard government rejected the views of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
                                                             
145 Building a Sustainable National Indigenous Representative Body – Issues for Consideration (An Issues Paper 
prepared by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, in accordance with section 46 C (1) 
(b) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), 2008). 
146 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth). 
147 Responding to the Intervention, the HRC suggested Australia ‘redesign measures in direct consultation with the 
Indigenous peoples concerned, in order to ensure that they are consistent with the RDA and the ICCPR’. This 
participatory approach was promoted in Stavenhagen’s 2007 HRC report on the human rights of Indigenous peoples, 
where he stated ‘no project should be imposed from outside’; UN HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, ‘Situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people’, 15 November 2007, 219. 
148 Alison Vivian et al, ‘Indigenous Self-government in the Australian Federation’ (2017) 20 Australian Indigenous Law 




Islander peoples and cultural authorities and backed its own alternative form of recognition 
proposals which failed to take hold in the public imagination.149 
By 2007, when the Kevin Rudd Labor government came into power, the National Indigenous 
Reform Agreement was signed by the Council of Australian Governments. The significance of that 
agreement was that it provided six objectives to improve Indigenous outcomes in education, health, 
life expectancy, economic participation, healthy homes, safe communities, governance and 
leadership.150 In 2008, the Rudd government delivered, finally, a formal apology to the Stolen 
Generations,151 adopted United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
into its domestic laws,152 and established the National Congress.153 Most notably for these purposes, 
however, the Rudd government appointed an Expert Panel to investigate ways in which the 
Commonwealth Parliament should advance constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians.154 
The Expert Panel was tasked with consulting with Indigenous Australians across the country to 
determine ways they wished to be recognised within the Australian Constitution.155  
The national inquiry ran from 2010 until 2012. From May to October 2011, the Expert Panel 
captured the aspirations of Indigenous Australians through publishing a discussion paper, a formal 
public submissions process, a website and public consultations across the country.156 It also sought 
advice for potential unintended consequences surrounding proposed constitutional reforms from 
constitutional law experts.157 The intention was to prepare Australia for a referendum on issues 
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identified in the thorough consultation that took place with constitutional experts and Indigenous 
Australians across the country.158  
The inquiry and the Expert Panel’s recommendation gained the support of the Coalition.159 At the 
time it was anticipated that this meant the Expert Panel recommendations were sufficient to secure 
widespread support in a potential future referendum.160 However, issues arose that began to threaten 
bipartisan support when details of the type of structural changes and preferred substantial 
protections from government discrimination emerged.161 While Indigenous Australians had moved 
away from mere symbolic gestures of recognition, resistance to substantive change became 
firmer.162 
The Expert Panel report recommended that s 25 ‘Provision as to races disqualified from voting' and 
s 51 (xxvi) the ‘Races Power’ of the Australian Constitution be repealed. That a new s 51A 
‘Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ be inserted which recognises 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as first occupiers of the Australian continent with 
continued exercise of their cultural identity and rights to land and language.163  
The report also recommended that a new s 116A be inserted into the Australian Constitution which 
prohibits racial discrimination and that a new s 127A be inserted which recognises that Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander languages are the original Australian languages and a part of Australia’s 
national heritage.164 
The Expert Panel report also reflected Indigenous Australians’ preferences for substantive 
change.165 The recommendations166 were subsequently presented to an inquiry of the Joint Select 
Committee on Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (JSC).167 
In June 2015, the JSC made 10 recommendations for the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal 
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and Torres Strait Islander people which included advice that a referendum takes place ‘when it has 
the highest chance of success’.168  Most of JSC’s recommendations centred on what was termed 
more ‘radical’ ideas of establishing a treaty and acknowledging sovereignty and self-determination 
rights from Indigenous activists.169  
From December 2016 to 2017, under the leadership of the Turnbull government, the Expert Panel 
conducted a series of First Nations Regional Dialogues.170 There were 12 dialogues held across the 
country with an additional information session hosted by the United Ngunnawal Elders Council in 
Canberra.171 
In May 2017, the regional dialogues culminated into a National Constitutional Convention held at 
Yulara and Mutitjulu near Uluru. Previous dialogues held in the lead up to the National 
Constitutional Convention were necessary for informing and guiding discussion led by the 
legitimate cultural authority of the country – the traditional owners of the First Nations.172 This 
aspect of the process was important to ensure cultural authority and consent was received prior to 
any progression with ideas of proposed constitutional reform options. Second, it exemplified just 
how consent and consultation should be sought after by Indigenous and non-Indigenous agencies, 
that recognised and respected self-determination rights of First Nations.173  
On those terms, the National Constitutional Convention comprised a culmination of 250 Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander delegates from across the nation who came together to debate and 
consider proposals for Indigenous constitutional recognition and moving forward with 
reconciliation.174  
From the Convention, the Uluru Statement from the Heart was drafted and presented to the 
Australian public calling for substantive measures to better include Indigenous voices in federal 
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decision-making.175 It focused on three key elements that captured the political and cultural wants 
and needs of Indigenous Australians which surrounded voice, treaty and truth-telling.176 These three 
key elements were crucial in providing the foundation for proposals to establish three types of 
Indigenous representative body.  
The Voice to Parliament would act as a body similar to ATSIC, comprised of First Nation 
representatives to provide advice and guidance to the Commonwealth Parliament on laws and 
policies that affected First Nation affairs.177 The Voice to Parliament would not have a power of 
veto nor would it decide on every piece of legislation. It is proposed as a modest advisory body to 
parliament on laws and policies that affect Indigenous affairs.178 
The element of the treaty would underpin the establishment of a treaty supervising commission 
known as the ‘Makarrata Commission’ to oversee treaty disputes and negotiation processes between 
First Nations and the Commonwealth and state and territory parliaments. Both the Voice to 
Parliament and Makarrata Commission are proposed to be constitutionally entrenched to protect 
them from being legislatively repealed and extinguished by the parliament.179  
The element of truth-telling, intended to occur prior to negotiations for the co-design of the 
proposed institutions, is likely to fall outside constitutional entrenchment and instead be established 
as a legislative body. This would create a Truth-Telling Commission to provide an informative 
educational purpose of telling the full version of Australian history incorporating Indigenous 
experiences and perspectives.180  
The Voice to Parliament represented an exercise of Indigenous self-determination through its 
guided process of development by, and political inclusion of, Indigenous Australians. Despite this, 
the Prime Minister dismissed the Voice to Parliament proposal. His rejection was significant given 
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that the Voice to Parliament comprised the key elements of political participation sought by 
Indigenous Australians.181  
Reminiscent of the objections to the Maori designated seats,182 the Prime Minister’s rejection turned 
on the incorrect assertion that the Voice to Parliament would amount to a ‘third chamber’ of the 
parliament,183 but also that the proposal conflicted with principles of equality and the rule of law 
given its differentiated Indigenous citizen only, representation status.  184 It was clear the rejection 
had no regard for self-determination rights and international standards pertaining to the rights of 
Indigenous colonised people.185 
Despite Turnbull’s rejection, the Voice to Parliament has remained on the table as a key 
representation of the type of recognition Indigenous Australians want within Australia’s 
contemporary liberal democracy. It is clear that from the Uluru Statement from the Heart186 and the 
Final Report187 that many Indigenous Australians are seeking substantive measures of equality to be 
implemented that give them a political voice. This would require structural reform of Australia’s 
political system so that full access to self-determination rights is respected, protected and not 
limited. Thus, establishing meaningful national Indigenous representative bodies is integral. 
As the Final Report identifies, separatist structures are necessary for improving the effects of past 
discrimination and the colonisation of Indigenous people.188 The following sections consider further 
details on each key representative body proposal, including consideration of their proposed 
functions, structure and the benefits they might bring in terms of political participation.189  
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A. The Makarrata Commission 
 
Prior to the 2017 Uluru convention, national debate about a treaty had already been undertaken in 
Australia between 1979 and 1983.190 This was the decade before the landmark decision in Mabo 
(No 2)191 and a time when Indigenous connections to the international community were at a peak – 
notable connections with jurisdictions that shared Australia’s colonial past: New Zealand, Canada 
and the United States.192 
Treaty debates had been instigated by the National Aboriginal Conference193 which adopted the 
Yolngu word ‘Makarrata’ given that ‘treaty’ was rejected by the Fraser government.194 By 1981, the 
Senate Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs examined reforms that would be necessary to 
establish a Makarrata between Aboriginal Australians and the Commonwealth.195 Ultimately the 
Senate Committee concluded that the idea of ‘recognition’ of Indigenous Australians within a treaty 
during this era centred around acknowledging Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
separate cultural identities, heritage and pre-existing land rights.196 Acknowledgement of those 
rights would entail recognition of self-determination rights, the return of traditional lands, 
compensation for dispossession and socioeconomic equality.197  
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When the Hawke government came into power in 1983, Makarrata stagnated. Instead, the 
Australian Government chose to focus on implementing land rights legislation – a plan that was 
later abandoned in 1986.198 
In the lead up to 1988, treaty advocacy re-emerged under the banner of the ‘Treaty 88’ campaign 
that protested the bicentenary of Australian colonisation.199 The idea of ‘recognition’ at this point 
‘blended constitutional and international recognition’ in lieu of a treaty.200 These conceptions and 
identification of rights that would form part of a treaty were outlined in the Barunga Statement: 
We, the Indigenous owners and occupiers of Australia, call on the Australian Government and 
people to recognise our rights, including self-determination, land, compensation, culture and 
equality.201 
The Barunga Statement of 1988 also called for ‘a treaty recognising our prior ownership, continued 
occupation and sovereignty and affirming our human rights and freedom’.202 Both the Treaty ’88 
campaign and Barunga Statement sought to ‘force recognition of our full inherent entitlements’.203 
When ATSIC replaced the National Aboriginal Conference in 1989, it continued to advocate for 
Indigenous recognition and establishing a treaty.204 However, calls for a treaty throughout the 1990s 
were ignored by the Hawke government in favour of calls for reconciliation.205 Reconciliation took 
the form of social justice in the 1990s under the advocacy work of several government-funded 
Indigenous organisations including ATSIC, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and the 
Social Justice Commissioner.206 Although they lacked influence, they did continue linking the 
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conceptions of ‘social justice’ and ‘recognition’ with a treaty.207 By 2000, a community poll found 
that 53 per cent of Australians would vote yes to a treaty.208  
The Howard government in power during this period rejected any progress on a treaty209 and the 
ascension of the Gillard government to power in 2010 revisited the notion of ‘recognition’ of 
Aboriginal Australians. By 2016, however, Indigenous communities across Australia opted for 
more radical visions of sovereignty and self-determination to the extent that having a treaty was of 
more importance than constitutional recognition.210 
The Statement from the Heart revived Makarrata, and a treaty has now re-entered the political 
landscape.211 Contemporary proposals envisage a treaty body, namely the Makarrata Commission 
that would be entrenched in the Australian Constitution. Its role would be to oversee agreement-
making and truth-telling processes of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.212 
Implementing an institutional response is crucial for agreement-making so that the body, in the 
most efficient and transparent way possible, ensures principles of equality and cultural respect are 
adhered to during consultations and negotiations between Indigenous Australians and all 
governments.213 In short, the Makarrata Commission aims to ensure the best cultural practice.214 
This alone represents a facet of self-determination and engages Indigenous Australians in political 
processes. 
The National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples has identified two spheres of operation of a 
Makarrata Commission. First, it would seek to address intergenerational trauma, which remains an 
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enormous barrier to Aboriginal Australians in giving full expression of their civic engagement.215 
Secondly, the Commission would facilitate a greater connection to culture for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples.216 In addition, an educational role was also highlighted as integral to 
‘a process of consultation, education, healing and meaningful reconciliation’.217 A treaty established 
from a Makarrata process would be binding on its own terms. Its proposed recognition of its 
establishment and functions within the Australian Constitution would also provide authority to the 
Australian Government to implement terms of the treaty/treaties. 
Many submissions to the Joint Select Committee218 referred to the role and other relevant 
considerations of state and regional Indigenous land rights agreements as an indication of the 
mechanisms for carrying out treaty terms.219 The most comprehensive agreement negotiated so far 
has been the South West Native Title Settlement (‘Noongar Settlement’) formed between the 
Western Australian Government and the South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council, comprised 
of six groups of Noongar native title claimants.220 The Noongar Settlement is significant because it 
sets out the framework of preliminary steps to agreement making, including seeking prior consent 
from persons affected, consulting with those persons, and negotiating the terms of the agreement 
with those persons. Although not without falling under native title legislation,221 the Noongar 
Agreement was registered in the National Native Title Tribunal.222  
The Noongar Settlement was recognised by many stakeholders as amounting to a treaty,223 given 
the extent of its terms – such as rescission by Noongar claimants of their rights to claim native title 
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in the area, land and money to be granted to the Noongar by the government – and that the West 
Australian Parliament passed legislation that recognised the Noongar as traditional owners of that 
country.224 
Some aspects of the Final Report have found currency in other, state contexts such as the Victorian 
Government’s policy of self-determination.225 For instance, a working group has been established 
comprising Traditional Owners, Aboriginal community-controlled organisations, and young people 
from across the state226 to advise on the formation of an Aboriginal Representative Body in 
Victoria. The Aboriginal Representative Body would advise the Victorian community and 
government throughout the treaty-making process,227 establishing ‘treaty authority’ and creating a 
guiding framework with the Victorian Government for treaty negotiations to take place.228 The end 
of 2017 saw Victoria hold an Aboriginal Community Assembly, comprised of independently 
selected Aboriginal representatives who further contributed to the working group’s 
recommendations on the design of an Aboriginal Representative Body.229 
In 2018, Victoria established its Treaty Advancement Commission and Commissioner – both of 
which work collaboratively with the working group in further consulting with the Victorian 
Aboriginal population on matters related to the treaty.230 The Advancing the Treaty Process with 
Aboriginal Victorians Bill 2018 was passed, advancing the treaty process; establishing the 
Aboriginal Representative Body to support future treaty negotiations; enshrining principles of the 
treaty process; and requiring the Aboriginal Representative Body and Victorian Government work 
together for future treaty negotiations.231 
The most important part of this legislation is that it solidifies, legislatively, the approach and view 
the Victorian Government will have towards the Aboriginal Representative Body once it’s 
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established, which is to recognise it as an equal partner throughout every stage of negotiation with 
the state.232 
This type of reconciliation and political inclusion of Indigenous Australians is still yet to be 
achieved at a Commonwealth level in Australia. That type of progression with creating 
representative body mechanisms for which Aboriginal Australians will use to voice their concerns 
on all matters related to their cultural affairs is typically viewed incorrectly by non-Indigenous 
political elites as discrimination and in conflict with principles of equality. The argument from that 
perspective questions whether a society based on equality should give its Aboriginal Australians 
special authoritative powers to make constitutionally binding agreements with the government.233  
B. A First Nations Voice to Parliament 
 
In 2014, leading up to the 2017 Uluru Convention and amidst campaigning for Indigenous 
recognition and constitutional reform, Noel Pearson, an influential member of the Expert Panel, 
spoke of Australia needing its own Indigenous advisory body to parliament.234 This was the first 
formal instance of such a proposal and was notable for its support from constitutional 
conservatives,235 the Aboriginal Provisional Government, and Indigenous advocates.236 
In its Final Report, the Joint Select Committee acknowledged the broad stakeholder support for 
establishing and constitutionally entrenching a First Nations Voice to Parliament.237 The proposed 
role of the Voice to Parliament aims to create a permanent mechanism for Aboriginal and Torres 
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Strait Islander people to provide input, consent and guidance on laws and policies that govern their 
cultural affairs.238 
The objective behind creating a distinct First Nations Voice to Parliament is to reconcile the 
historically unequal and unjust relationship First Nations of Australia have had with the Australian 
Government. The representative body for First Nations will essentially represent formal recognition 
of their equal status and partnership relationship with the Crown given their sovereignty has never 
been ceded.  
Proposals put forth for the constitutional entrenchment of the Voice to Parliament are crucial to its 
success and the enhancement of Indigenous political participation for several reasons. Firstly, 
constitutional entrenchment would provide a long-awaited commitment to institutionalising the 
security of First Nations’ voices in federal decision-making on matters that concern their cultural 
affairs.239 As illustrated in the history cited above, this has not occurred yet in Australia. Notably, 
the only formalised recognition of First Nations representative bodies has occurred through either 
an administrative or legislative means where bodies have been defunded and extinguished at the 
will of successive Australian governments.240  
Second, entrenching the Voice also provides a sense of symbolic formalised respect for First 
Nations. The Australian Constitution maintains a historic narrative that excludes acknowledgment 
of First Nations having the prior occupation of the land and, given First Nations’ sovereignty has 
never been ceded, their role in partnership with the Crown on laws and policies concerning First 
Nations peoples. At the heart of the argument in this thesis, such acknowledgement is integral to 
uphold political equality and self-determination of Indigenous Australians within Australia’s 
democratic regime.241 
The Voice will also be able to support legislated Aboriginal representative bodies. Its guidance to 
the Commonwealth Parliament on ‘making and breaking’ legislation under Australia’s 
constitutional race powers provision242 will protect the longevity and existence of legislation 
creating such bodies. It will also have the capacity to advise on mitigating historical suspension of 
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the Racial Discrimination Act243 and Australia’s compliance with its international obligations 
surrounding racial discrimination244 – in other words, to avoid a replay of the NTER package.245 
Entrenchment of the Voice to Parliament is vital to the representation of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Peoples’ interests in the review of legislation and advice given to the Executive, to 
overcome continued post-colonial disadvantage.246 Constitutional entrenchment would have the 
additional advantage of securing ongoing funding through the implied obligation to uphold 
constitutional institutions.247 Financial independence will ensure that the institution remains in 
control of its own affairs and is treated equally to and in partnership with the Crown.248  
This is of particular importance because it protects the Voice to Parliament from being forced into 
ceasing its operation like the National Congress of Australia's First Peoples and legislative 
extinguishment like ATSIC. Thus, whilst the Voice would have an advisory role like its 
predecessors, that role would be protected from extinguishment if the Voice is put to a 
constitutional referendum, was successful in getting a yes vote and from there became 
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C. The Truth-Telling Commission 
 
Lastly, the Statement from the Heart also called for a Truth-Telling Commission to oversee 
measures implemented by the Australian Government that would educate and provide a more 
thorough account of Australian history that acknowledged Indigenous experiences.  
While less familiar in Australia, the international community acknowledges truth-telling of past 
injustices as a starting point for reconciliation and understanding of past conflicts, upheaval or 
injustices.249 Since the 1970s, countries across the globe have established formalised processes, 
including commissions such as that envisaged in the Statement from the Heart, to engage citizens in 
comprehending past wrongs and their ongoing impacts as a precursor to reconciliation and a greater 
sense of peace amongst society.250 
In Australia, despite the injustices experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
since colonisation,251 there is widespread ignorance about this history.252 There is, consequently, an 
urgent need for Indigenous Australians to be given an opportunity to share their experiences to 
ensure a fuller understanding of Australia’s history by the broader public.253 This need was 
expressed clearly and consistently in the regional dialogues.254 
Although currently in the broader debate about the Statement from the Heart, truth-telling has been 
proposed before in Australia: the CAR acknowledged the need for truth-telling in its final report 
delivered in 2000. After nearly a decade of undertaking thorough consultation with Indigenous 
communities across the country, it found there was: 
a strong desire within the Australian community to make amends for the past, to recognize and value 
the unique status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and to work towards a future 
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where all Australians enjoy their rights, accept their responsibilities and have the opportunity to 
achieve their full potential.255 
Whilst truth-telling should have an emphasis on ensuring non-Indigenous Australians are aware of 
the historical negative impacts colonisation have had and continue to have on Indigenous 
Australians,256 it also provides Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with a chance to share 
their cultural identity with those within their community and the broader population at large.257 
Given its widespread acceptance as an essential element for reconciliation and healing to occur,258 
the Statement from the Heart proposed the Makarrata Commission supervise a process of 
agreement-making and truth-telling.259 This was supported by the National Congress of Australia’s 
First Peoples which suggested its primary role should be to address intergenerational trauma and 
facilitate a greater connection to culture for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.260  
Unlike the Makarrata Commission and the Voice to Parliament, there is no proposal to 
constitutionally entrench the Truth-Telling Commission. Instead, it is likely to part of the Makarrata 
Commission261 as a further institutional response to the question of political participation through 
supporting a foundation for justice and equality within the polity more broadly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In the past, legislated Indigenous representative bodies in Australia have operated without financial 
stability or control over their operations.262 The historical and continuing relationship between the 
Australian Government and Indigenous Australians excludes them from political participation 
through an absence of understanding and support of their experiences and issues. The aim of the 
modern Australian Government should instead showcase a meaningful commitment to achieving 
cultural reconciliation in Australia and closing the gap of opportunity arising from intergenerational 
exclusion.263 Political participation is the key. 
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As this chapter has outlined, the expression of Indigenous political participation in Australia, 
however, has been hampered through the absence of constitutional recognition and the inability of 
institutions to protect self-determination rights of Indigenous Australians. The system itself has 
limited the capacity of Indigenous Australians to influence the political agenda as a minority group 
not only colonised but also both economically and socially marginalised.264 
Attempts to overcome such marginalisation through the establishment of national Indigenous 
representative bodies have been limited, and the attempts made have failed to achieve their goals. 
Indigenous representative bodies have been used as tools of accountability for the government 
rather than as a meaningful voice, respected and valued, and that represent the interests of 
Indigenous Australians. Successive Australian governments have controlled such bodies, which 
have been relatively short-lived, have lacked funding to carry out their objectives and make 
meaningful change, or have lacked necessary respect and inclusion during decision-making 
processes on their cultural affairs. 
Ongoing exclusion of Indigenous Australians through institutional representation has resulted in a 
lack of their adequate representation of their best interests when circumstances like the NTER occur 
which significantly limit their access to full civil rights. While more institutions might be created, 
past experience shows that, without constitutional entrenchment, expression of cultural identity and 
empowerment through institutional representation remain at risk.265 
The Statement from the Heart was presented to the Australian people as a call for recognition of 
self-determination for Indigenous Australians. The three key proposals for reform represent three 
different types of representative bodies. Each of those bodies, however, must have financial and 
substantive operational autonomy if they are to remain sufficiently independent from the Australian 
Government as a measure of self-determination. Failure to secure sustainable finances for an 
independent institutional voice will constrain those bodies in their capacity to support the delivery 
of services, implementation of policy, and implementation of independent governance, which will 
support a culturally appropriate and therefore inclusive process that will promote Indigenous 
political participation.266
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CHAPTER 5  
INDIGENOUS REPRESENTATIVE BODIES WITHIN  
NEW ZEALAND AND CANADA 
 
A warrior confronts colonialism with the truth in order to regenerate authenticity and recreate a life 
worth living and principles worth dying for. The struggle is to restore connections severed by the 
colonial machine. The victory is an integrated personality, a cohesive community, and the restoration 




This chapter analyses the distinct ways in which equivalent Commonwealth jurisdictions have 
interpreted and applied rights to self-determination of Indigenous peoples through enhanced 
political participation. It examines Canadian and New Zealand frameworks for self-determination 
that afford Indigenous peoples a degree of control over their lands, resources and cultural 
governance. In particular, New Zealand and Canada have each established treaties between their 
Indigenous peoples and the State, and those treaties guide constitutional arrangements and 
conventions that generate representative bodies.2  
Part II explores self-determination frameworks established in New Zealand for Maori. At first 
contact in New Zealand, Maori–Crown relations (or Indigenous–State relations) recognised Maori 
as Aotearoa (or sovereign).3 That recognition paved the way for Maori to exercise self-
determination, self-governing in their own territories. The rights established under the Treaty have 
been fundamental to Maori establishing practical self-determination through national representative 
bodies.4 Maori representative bodies have served as primary consultative mechanisms for Maori 
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with the New Zealand Government, maintaining Maori political presence at a national level on laws 
and policies that impact upon Maori affairs.  
Secondly, this chapter analyses the experiences of First Nations in Canada and the means by which 
they assert and exercise self-determination including a degree of self-governance. As with Maori, 
Canada has established treaties with First Nations. But by contrast, in Canada, these rights are 
constitutionally entrenched. In Canada these two legal mechanisms of treaty and constitution 
interact, empowering First Nations to choose how they govern themselves as distinct people.  
In comparing the outcomes for Indigenous peoples in Canada and New Zealand, this chapter 
evaluates the role of Indigenous representative bodies in representing the rights and interests of 
Indigenous peoples, as a means of promoting political participation. 
II. MAORI SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
The New Zealand Constitution does not explicitly oblige the government to recognise the self-
determination rights of Maori.5 However, there are other important constitutional documents and 
national Maori organisations that do recognise such rights.6 This part provides an overview of New 
Zealand’s constitutional history to highlight how it has come to accept and formally recognise 
Maori self-determination as part of its constitutional arrangements with Maori citizens. 
As with the Australian experience, Maori have been subjected to the forces of colonisation, facing 
the loss of land and governmental refusal to recognise claims to self-determination and self-
government. In contrast to the Australian experience, however, Maori rights were enshrined in the 
Treaty of Waitangi. While not always adhered to, over time its provisions have effectively curtailed 
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the worst excesses of governmental exclusion of Indigenous political participation. But not without 
a struggle. The following section details that struggle for recognition of a Maori polity represented 
through recognised institutions, to demonstrate the longer-term effect of treaty rights in the New 
Zealand experience. The sections after that each outline a particular representative body, 
highlighting the capacity for self-determination – and therefore political participation – through 
particular representative structures.7 
A. The Maori Struggle 
The starting point for advocacy for a more representative form of governance over New Zealand 
slowly emerged from colonists between 1840 and 1852, seeking to replace the Constitution of the 
Crown colony with one that aligned more so with the principle of responsible government.8  
Maori, however, were reluctant to accept the notion of a new Constitution to establish an 
independent New Zealand Government.9 Most Maori were insistent in their refusal to have any 
dealings with the governor or government as their acknowledged authority given those 
representatives had not signed the Treaty.10 Following New Zealand’s independence and 
emancipation from Great Britain under the establishment of the New Zealand Constitution Act 
1852, Maori continued to perceive their rights to be threatened by the authority of the New Zealand 
Government given it was not technically a party to the Treaty.11 In the face of New Zealand’s 
independence, British officials continued to reassure Maori of the ‘special relationship’ they had as 
a people with the Crown under the Treaty.12 The New Zealand Government was still required to 
uphold its obligations under the Treaty on behalf of the Crown against the aspirations of colonisers, 
to ensure the protection of Maori rights and privileges.13  
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Despite their ‘special relationship’ with the Crown, Maori citizens have experienced long term and 
continuous struggles with holding the New Zealand Government accountable for its actions towards 
Maori when it acts on behalf of the Crown as per the Treaty.14 Quite often, Maori rights are left 
neglected compared to non-Indigenous citizens who oppose Maori cultural identity protection and 
rights recognition as they largely represent non-Indigenous interests as the majority status quo.15  
By 1856, the New Zealand Constitution was amended to establish government accountability 
through formal acknowledgment of the principles of responsible government.16 It was, however, 
only symbolic so that the Crown had no real political or legislative power in New Zealand. Instead, 
conventionally, the Crown acted upon advice provided by New Zealand Government ministers.17 
But the amendments also affirmed the British Crown’s continued control over Maori affairs.18 As a 
result, Maori rights were left vulnerable within both British and New Zealand governance 
institutions: the Crown’s power over Maori affairs was symbolic, but the New Zealand settler 
government continued to fail to uphold Treaty obligations19 on behalf of the Crown.20  
By 1858 and, in response to their political disempowerment, in 1858 Maori selected a common 
King to represent their interests and protect sovereignty over Maori land.21 This became known as 
the ‘Maori King Movement’ which sought to assert greater control over Maori affairs.22 Meanwhile, 
wars over land between Maori and Pakeha (non-Maori New Zealander) had spread across New 
Zealand and peaked between 1860 and 1864.23 Maori warriors were fighting for control over Maori 
land while the Maori King Movement sought control over Maori cultural affairs, the ‘Queen’s 
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mana’ (political sovereignty) to be reasserted, and Maori chieftainship and land rights restored.24  
Overall, the Maori King Movement acknowledged the importance of the partnership between Maori 
self-determination and self-governance, and the Queen’s sovereignty established under the Treaty.25  
Maori self-determination became a reality following the wars with the establishment of a Maori 
Parliament in 189226 to represent Maori tribal and intertribal grievances through passing laws and 
resolutions on matters that concerned Maori affairs. Importantly, it functioned without any 
administering authority.27 The Maori Parliament remained until it was disbanded in 190228 as a 
result of its members failing to cooperate with one another – creating a barrier to achieving its 
objectives.29 While the Maori Parliament functioned, it proved a useful mechanism for Maori 
representation during a period in which the Crown had gradually withdrawn from Maori affairs and 
land management in New Zealand.30  
With the dawn of the ‘Liberal Era’ and party politics in New Zealand in 1891,31 the possibility of 
protection under Crown Treaty obligations was increasingly under threat by the domination of the 
settler-State order.32 Nevertheless, Maori continued to appeal unsuccessfully to the British Crown 
for protection from the 1880s to early 1900s.33  
By 1907 New Zealand became a self-governing Dominion34 and with the passing of the Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act 1947, the New Zealand Parliament gained full law-making powers from 
Britain.35 The Constitution Act 1986 later replaced the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp) 
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which meant from thereon institutional ties between New Zealand and Britain were finally 
severed.36 
Since New Zealand independence, Maori have continued to struggle to ensure that their rights are 
protected and have turned to various domestic legislative agreements to do so. Domestic legislation 
explicitly focused on restoring and upholding Maori rights has become a new mechanism for 
guiding the expression of the New Zealand Government’s relationship with Maori, through 
legislative and institutional acknowledgement of Maori self-determination rights37 which together 
have acknowledged Maori independence and cultural autonomy within New Zealand38 with 
implications for political participation. 
The Waikato Act,39 for instance, legislates the Deed of Settlement made on 22 May 1995 between 
the Crown and Waikato-Tainui (one of several Maori tribes).40 The Waikato Act provides for the 
transfer of available Crown land in the Waikato region back to the Waikato-Tainui tribe along with 
compensation.41 The Act formalises, through legislation, acknowledgement of past injustices 
concerning Maori land rights and is representative of the New Zealand Government’s progressive 
commitment to providing compensation to Maori citizens for past government actions that have 
conflicted with rights recognised within the Treaty.42 
Similarly, the Ngai Tahu Act 1998 43 provides a legislative mechanism that highlights failures of the 
Crown in honouring treaty conditions when purchasing Ngai Tahu land.44 The Ngai Tahu claim on 
which the Act is based on identified issues of overexploitation and expropriation of Ngai Tahu sea 
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fisheries and the destruction of Ngai Tahu mahinga kai (traditional food gathering sources).45 The 
Act has sought to rectify those wrongs through compensation for Maori affected. 
Further examples of the New Zealand Government commitment to adhere to treaty principles46 are 
found in both the Waikato Act47 and Ngai Tahu Act.48 Both statutes, most importantly, acknowledge 
Maori tribal sovereignty and self-determination by providing frameworks for Maori tribes to 
recover compensation for land loss as a result of wrongful past government actions.49  
The Waikato Act 199550 and the Te Runanga O Ngai Tahu Act 1996 also establish Maori corporate 
bodies so that each tribe is recognised as a distinct legal personality, enabling them to receive and 
manage settlement assets.51 Both acts, alongside similar pieces of legislation like the Maori Affairs 
Act 1953, indicate a slow emergence within New Zealand of reformed Maori and New Zealand 
Government relations that point to a partnership between both parties.52  
The rise of Maori self-determination throughout the 20th century, exercised through Maori body 
representation, has provided Maori with differentiated cultural representation within the 
overarching framework of governance under the colonial legal system.53 In addition, representation 
has been undertaken by collective Maori interest groups.54 These bodies have different functions55 
and objectives from legislated bodies, but nonetheless provide perspectives and support for Maori 
self-determination. Through continuous consultation with the New Zealand Government, before it 
takes action on matters connected to the collectives, Maori voices can be accommodated within the 
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body politic and, more particularly, in governmental decision-making on matters affecting Maori 
themselves.56  
B. Differentiated Maori Interests 
 
Alongside the constitutional, legislative and treaty arrangements that collectively promoted aspects 
of Maori self-determination, there was an increase in formal representative bodies.57 This section 
examines some of the principal bodies to illustrate models of Indigenous political participation. 
As early as 1840, a Protectorate was established which, although a government-established body 
and not in that sense representative of Maori voices,58 had the intent behind its establishment to 
protect Maori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi by advising the Governor on Maori affairs.59 The 
Protectorate would also provide Maori interpretative services for New Zealand courts, colonial 
officials and the military.60 In a similar vein, but much later, the Native Department provided 
support services for Maori with land management and healthcare, later focusing on achieving 
economic equality and employment for Maori.61 Throughout the mid-1900s, the Department took 
on more of a welfare role for Maori citizens. By 1947, it was then renamed to the ‘Department of 
Maori Affairs’ with the word ‘native’ being substituted with ‘Maori’ in all official references and 
dealings with the Department.62  
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From the mid-1900s until 1989, the Department’s portfolio also continued to expand to include the 
office of the Maori Trustee; housing, vocational training, relocation; the administration of New 
Zealand’s Pacific Island affairs for those living in New Zealand (including the protection of their 
welfare); and Maori language revival.63 Those expansions in the Department led to the 
establishment of district Maori councils and the New Zealand Maori Council to represent Maori 
interests in New Zealand policies.64 However, it should be noted that each adaptation of the 
Department, despite the intent and objectives behind those actions, were government-led and were 
not a representative result of Maori consultation reflective of distinct Maori cultural needs and 
aspirations. 
In contrast to government-centred departmental consideration, there are a number of prominent 
bodies comprising Maori themselves such as the Federation of Maori Authorities, the Maori 
Women's Welfare League, the Te Ohu Kaimoana Trustee Limited and the Tuhono. Each of these 
functions in a different way. 
The Tuhono is a charitable trust established under the Electoral Act 1993 responsible for holding a 
register of iwi (tribe) affiliation to facilitate their communication and interaction between one 
another, including their members.65 Tuhono links Maori to their iwi organisation through the 
collection of consenting Maori voters’ up-to-date electoral data.66 In reconnecting Maori citizens, 
tribes and services, this organisation has promoted an empowered and united community amongst 
Maori and iwi organisations across New Zealand. 
Other bodies are established under the Maori Fisheries Act 2004, focusing on specific aspects of 
Maori rights that form important components of Maori cultural identity and self-determination. For 
instance, the Federation of Maori Authorities is responsible for the promotion and development of 
sound management and economic advancement rights of national Maori Authorities.67  
Also concerned with fishing rights, the Te Ohu Kaimoana Trustee Limited (also known as the 
Maori Fisheries Trust) is responsible for creating and sustaining an environment for successful ‘iwi’ 
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management of their commercial, customary and recreational fisheries.68 Te Ohu Kaimoana 
provides policy advice on fisheries to iwi, the Maori Fisheries Settlement entities and industry 
groups which cover management issues, stock abundance and sustainability, regulations around 
fisheries compliance, marine protected areas, customary regulations and aquaculture management.69 
The body is comprised of seven directors who are appointed by Te Kawai Taumata (Maori 
Fisheries Electoral College) – a mechanism promoting its authority as a representative body.70 
This organisation must ensure iwi receive 20 per cent of designated Aquaculture Management 
Areas under the Maori Commercial Aquaculture Settlement Act 2004.71 It has allocated $500 
million of fisheries assets to Maori ownership and management through effective consultation with 
iwi stakeholders on legislative, regulatory and policy developments that affect Maori Fisheries 
Settlements.72 
Finally, the Maori Women's Welfare League focuses on promoting wellbeing amongst Maori 
women through the spiritual, physical, social and economic development. This body is comprised of 
eight regional representatives to allow for Maori women’s representation to include Taitokerau, 
Tamaki Makaurau, Tainui, Tairawhiti, Waiariki, Aotea, Ikaroa and Te Waipounamu women’s 
interests.73 
Each of those bodies illustrates the operation of differentiated Maori interests represented through a 
recognised body. Each body can focus on achieving beneficial outcomes for the specific interests 
they represent and provides a mechanism for consultation by the New Zealand Government and 
consent by those affected. 
In addition to these localised bodies, there are two Maori representative bodies that exist within the 
broader governance structure, namely the Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand Maori Council. Both 
are tasked with quite broad functions at a national level in New Zealand, representing Maori rights 
and interests in New Zealand laws and policies that affect their cultural affairs. 
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C. The Waitangi Tribunal 
 
The Waitangi Tribunal, established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, plays an important role 
in protecting Maori self-determination rights through its role as a permanent commission of inquiry. 
The Tribunal makes recommendations on claims brought by Maori relating to Crown actions that 
breach the promises made in the Treaty.74  
Breaches of Treaty promises generally occur when there is a conflict with interpretations of the Te 
Reo Maori and English versions of the Treaty.75 When that occurs, the Tribunal must determine the 
meaning and effect of articles contained within both versions of the Treaty, based on claims that 
come before it.76 Previously, claims that dealt with breaches of the partnership between the Crown 
and Maori identified in Treaty principles went disregarded by courts and tribunals.77 
The Queen v Symonds78 was the first New Zealand case of political controversy surrounding Maori 
rights that considered the extent the Crown could have control over profits to be made in the 
process of extinguishing Maori title and making land available to incoming settlers. It was not until 
that decision of The Queen v Symonds79 and its flow on effect seen in subsequent progression in 
New Zealand case law surrounding Maori rights, and the first substantive report of the Waitangi 
Tribunal in 1983,80 that the Maori version of the Treaty (Te Tiriti) was given proper respect and 
value in the New Zealand legal system. Before that, the views and legal standards from over two 
centuries of case law in colonial and English courts took precedence.81 
The Tribunal must, under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ‘determine the meaning and effect of the 
Treaty as embodied in the two texts and to decide issues raised by the differences between them’.82 
To do so, the Tribunal takes a Maori approach to interpret the Treaty to imply that its Wairau or 
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spirit is something more than a literal construction of the actual words used.83 The spirit of the 
Treaty in that context goes far beyond its written words.84 
The Tribunal’s work has been significant in protecting Maori rights and claims to protecting their 
rights to cultural identity. For example, in the Te Atiawa Report 1983, the Tribunal identified in its 
recommendations surrounding Maori fishery rights that the Maori language version of the Treaty 
does not explicitly refer to fishing grounds of Maori. 85 Thus, it was unclear as to whether those 
rights fell within the purview of the Treaty.  
However, fishing grounds were provided for within the English version of the Treaty and so the 
Tribunal, in applying a broad purposive approach to interpreting the scope of rights covered by the 
Treaty, held that those rights were at the very least implied in the Maori version.86 The Tribunal has 
been fundamental to ensuring those types of cultural rights are protected and, as such, has made 
recommendations in successive reports that those rights are covered within other legislative 
instruments in New Zealand and are taken into consideration.87 
Another example of how the New Zealand Government has had to not only recognise Maori 
cultural interests but, most importantly, actively protect those interests, can be found with the 
Tribunal’s role in New Zealand’s ‘Manukau claim’ which is considered one of New Zealand’s most 
wide-ranging claims.88 The Tribunal produced a report from that claim with several 
recommendations the Tribunal has had to consider.89 The Manukau Report findings from the 
Waitangi Tribunal recognised the importance and history behind Maori development and 
exploitation of natural resources.90 The Manukau claim highlighted significant ongoing 
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industrialisation and pollution of the Manukau Harbour and identified the impact that the loss of 
certain surrounding lands of the Manukau tribes have had on their protection of cultural identity 
under the Treaty.91 The claim alleged there was a failure of recognition of the Crown’s promise to 
protect Maori rights to having undisturbed possession of their lands, homes and fisheries.92 Maori 
rights of those from the Manukau and lower Waikato river areas were limited or completely 
denied.93  
As such, the Tribunal identified historic and contemporary issues that continue to limit or deny 
Maori from Manukau and lower Waikato river areas of their rights and, from that information, 
made numerous law and policy reform recommendations to the New Zealand Government.94 
The Tribunal’s role and function also extend to contributing to protecting the Maori language as 
was seen in its consideration of and advice given in the Te Reo claim of 1985.95  The Te Reo 
(meaning ‘language’) claim advocated for official recognition of Te Reo in New Zealand for all 
purposes.96 The Tribunal was tasked with taking into consideration the history of the Maori 
language since the Treaty of Waitangi. In doing so, it acknowledged precedents of parliamentary 
proceedings during the establishment of the colonial government of 1852, in both Maori and 
English.97   
When the Tribunal considered the historical context of Maori use of language and elders’ testimony 
it identified that those rights had been limited, particularly through the prohibition on children in 
schools from speaking their native tongue.98 Limitations were exacerbated as more Maori moved 
from rural areas to the city, affecting knowledge of Te Reo with the inevitable consequence that 
most Maori lost fluency in Te Reo.99 
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In that context, the Tribunal was tasked with firstly establishing its jurisdiction under Article 2 of 
the Maori version of the Treaty.100 The Tribunal held that Article 2 of the Maori version assured 
protection of chief authority over ‘all their treasures’ or ‘valued possessions’ and that language was 
a ‘valued possession’.101 The Tribunal reviewed all evidence put forth in the claim that showed 
clear restrictions on, and limited protection of, Maori speaking Te Reo.102 On the evidence, the 
Tribunal was able to conclude that Maori interests in New Zealand courts, education and 
broadcasting had been disregarded and efforts should be made to rectify the impacts of such 
restrictions to Maori cultural identity.103  
The recommendations made by the Tribunal included the establishment of a permanent body to 
supervise the use of Te Reo by Maori in New Zealand courts and Maori dealings with government 
agencies. The Tribunal also recommended that an inquiry be conducted into New Zealand 
Department of Education policies to enable Te Reo to be taught in schools; expansion of the use of 
Te Reo in broadcasting; and designated positions in the State Services Commission marked as 
bilingual.104 Those recommendations were all accepted by the New Zealand Government despite 
opposition raised by broader society. The Tribunal played the vital role of protecting Teo Reo – a 
fundamental aspect of Maori cultural identity and thus self-determination.105 
The Tribunal has in that context, contributed significantly to the protection of Maori cultural 
identity since 1985 where its function was expanded from hearing only current claims to being 
enabled to investigate events dating back to 1840. The expanding upon the types of claims the 
Tribunal can hear and investigate has meant that hundreds of historical claims by Maori could be 
heard which in turn, has required the Tribunal to group those historical claims into district inquiries. 
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By 2015, the Tribunal had registered 2501 claims, fully or partly reported on 1028 claims, issued 
123 final reports and issued district reports covering 79 percent of New Zealand.106 
The primary function of the Tribunal is to inquire into Maori claims made before it that concern the 
practical implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 and whether the New Zealand government 
has acted inconsistently with treaty principles. If the Tribunal finds that the New Zealand 
government has acted inconsistently with treaty principles, it must then determine whether its 
actions are prejudice to Maori claimants. If it finds that they are, it must then determine what 
actions should be taken to compensate for, remove or prevent the prejudice.107 The Tribunal can 
also refer claims to mediation, and in certain circumstances, make binding recommendations for the 
return of land owned by the Crown where the Crown and the claimants have not been able to 
negotiate a settlement.108 
The Tribunal’s structure includes a chairperson and up to 20 members who must be appointed by 
the Governor-General. Maori Land Court judges and members who hold legal qualification can also 
serve as inquiry presiding officers. As part of its broader structure, the Tribunal also has a 
‘Governance Group’ which is convened by the chairperson and is responsible for the strategic 
direction, and reviews the progress of, the Tribunal’s work programme. 109 The Ministry of Justice 
of the Tribunal is responsible for providing operational support to the Tribunal through the 
Waitangi Tribunal Unit which delivers a range of services including being a registrar, undertaking 
event management, research, report writing, and administrative services.110 
Overall, the Tribunal is the primary forum in New Zealand for hearing and reporting on Maori 
claims against the Crown that allege breaches of the Treaty. In doing so, it contributes to fair 
resolutions of Treaty claims and to uphold the partnership relationship between Maori and the 
Crown.111 
Therefore, the Tribunal provides a useful example of Maori representation that protects the 
expression of their cultural identity. It establishes a mechanism that affords Maori a sense of control 
over their affairs through their ability to bring claims seeking to uphold principles of responsible 
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government and accountability under obligations owed to them under the Treaty. This has allowed 
Maori to ensure the New Zealand Government seeks their prior consent on matters concerning 
Maori affairs and land, through consultation on and inclusion in decision-making processes.112 
Although the Tribunal’s powers are limited to only acting as an advisory body,113 its 
recommendations are given weight114 and support the legitimacy of New Zealand constitutional 
arrangements involving Maori.115 The Tribunal’s function, powers, and interpretative principles all 
exemplify how an Indigenous representative body can self-govern, culturally empower and protect 
Indigenous cultural identity whilst providing a mechanism of representation, accountability and 
consultation for Maori citizens. 
D. The New Zealand Maori Council 
 
In addition to the Tribunal, Maori of New Zealand also have an established New Zealand Maori 
Council to represent their cultural identity and interests as a consultative and representative body on 
their behalf, with the New Zealand Government. The New Zealand Maori Council, alongside the 
advice and representation the Tribunal provides, also works to guide necessary policy reform within 
New Zealand that impacts upon Maori self-determination rights and cultural identity. 
The New Zealand Maori Council had initially formed part of the Kotahitanga (unity) movement and 
creation of Maori parliaments during the 1800s.116 The Kotahitanga movement was aimed at 
unifying Maori in a non-traditional and non-tribal specific way to assert collective cultural 
autonomy and independence.117  The movement was guided by Maori chiefs from across New 
Zealand who had even chosen a separate flag and signed a declaration of independence to officially 
acknowledge the unification of Maori tribes as independent from the State.118 Both the unification 
and increasing independence of Maori aspects of the Kotahitanga movement have been fundamental 
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to Maori and their exercise of self-determination,119 notably through the establishment of Maori 
Councils at national and district levels, arising from the Kotahitanga movement.120  
Maori District Councils were the first to be established by 1945121 and by 1962 the New Zealand 
Maori Council was established as a national legislative body under the Maori Welfare Act 1962.122 
The New Zealand Maori Council is comprised of an executive which has up to three delegates from 
each of the 16 District Maori Councils across New Zealand.123 The delegates hold a three-year 
tenure until the next election cycle.124 Its functions and role are set out under the Maori Community 
Development Act 1962, to ensure it continuously consults with Maori Committees and makes 
representations on their behalf to Ministers and other stakeholders.125 The consultation undertaken 
by the Council has been beneficial for and integral to connecting all District Maori Councils to the 
New Zealand Government on matters that concern Maori rights and affairs.126 
As a national and community-based policy adviser, the Council deals predominantly with policies 
that affect the partnership, protection, consultation and compensation for Maori.127 The Council 
undertakes that task through providing policy advice and guidance to the New Zealand Government 
according to the objectives of and Maori rights embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi, alongside and 
complementary to the Waitangi Tribunal. The Council assists with claims and disputes before the 
Waitangi Tribunal and frequently represents Maori where Maori seek outcomes in common, rather 
than where they seek outcomes concerned with iwi (their tribe) alone.128 The following sections 
outline the impact of the Maori Council on self-determination, outlining three important claims. 
1 The Land Case 
The Council’s first landmark dispute was the ‘Land Case’.129 The Land Case came as a result of 
New Zealand’s fourth Labour Government enacting significant social reforms and involved the 
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enactment of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 which allowed assets and land owned by the 
Crown to be transferred to State-Owned Enterprises.130 
Before the enactment of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the Waitangi Tribunal issued an 
interim report following the introduction of the Bill in the House of Representatives on 30 
September 1986.131 The report expressed concerns that with land being transferred to State-Owned 
Enterprises such as the Forestry Corporation or Land Corporation, the Crown would lack the power 
to return the land to iwi.132 Furthermore, the land would likely be sold to a private buyer from a 
State-Owned Enterprise or the State-Owned Enterprise would be unlikely to sell the land back to 
the Crown.133  
The New Zealand Government’s response to the interim report was to introduce amendments to the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. Under s 9, ‘Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in 
a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi’.134 In addition, s 27 
made provision for land claims: where a claim had not been submitted to the Tribunal before 18 
December 1986, the land could be transferred to a State enterprise with the conferral of registered 
title, and that State enterprise could dispose of the land in the course of its ordinary business 
activities.135 This raised serious concerns for the New Zealand Maori Council, as significant 
amounts of land were implicated in the Act’s procedures.136 
Consequently, the New Zealand Maori Council challenged limitations to Maori land rights under s 
27 of the Act in the Lands Case.137 It argued that although the Crown may still compensate 
according to loss of land rights, the prospect of the restoration of the land to Maori ownership 
following a later claim would be slim.138  
Ultimately the court in the Land Case found in favour of the Maori Council’s claim and as a result 
the government was prevented from alienating land and resources subject to the Waitangi Tribunal 
and Treaty of Waitangi, in transfers to State-Owned Enterprises.139 
                                                             
130 R. K. Paterson, ‘Protecting Taonga: The Cultural Heritage of the New Zealand Maori’ (1999) 8(1) International 
Journal of Cultural Property 108; State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 29A. 
131 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 707; The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 Interim 
Report (The Waitangi Tribunal, 1986). 
132 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 707–709. 
133 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 707–709. 
134 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 9. 
135 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 653. 
136 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 643. 
137 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 687. 
138 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, 689. 
139 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, [29]. 
 
193 
2 Muriwhenua Fishery Claim 
The Maori Council has also contributed to the protection of Maori fishing rights in the Muriwhenua 
fishery claim.140 This claim identified that Maori fishing rights can be classified as property similar 
to land rights, differing though as to the extent of activities contemplated.141 For instance, the term 
‘fisheries’ as identified in the Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim is 
inclusive of the fishing location, the types of fish caught, the right to catch them and even the 
methods used to catch them. Fishing rights have been key to not only Maori survival but also to 
their economy in terms of inter-tribal trade.142 
Post-colonisation laws and policies had restricted Maori fishing rights to satisfying personal needs 
only.143 The restrictions enabled the government to manage fisheries in place of traditional Maori 
systems144 and consequently the national fishing industry ignored already established Maori fishing 
communities that had the potential to develop a fishing trade.145 Non-Maori commercial operations 
of fishing led to serious overfishing in the inshore fishery industry by the mid-1900s which 
threatened the ancient tradition and connection to the seas of the Muriwhenua people.146  
By 1986, the New Zealand Government introduced a quota management system apportioning the 
total commercial catch to individual commercial fishers.147 The quota system conflicted with Treaty 
principles as it apportioned full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of the property in fishing to 
non-Maori that had been guaranteed to Maori under the Treaty.148 In response, Muriwhenua brought 
a claim seeking to restore their tribal base, and re-establish their ancestral association with the seas 
to provide opportunities ‘for their employment, the development of an industrial capability, the 
restoration of their communities and the protection of their resource’.149 The claimants included 
leading tribal elders of the Muriwhenua area who represented Ngati Kuri, Te Aupouri, Te Rarawa, 
Ngai Takoto and Ngati Kahu. The claim included Maori incorporations and authorities of the 
district.150 
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The claim was successful and in 1987 the High Court granted an injunction to stop the 
implementation of the quota management system in the Muriwhenua district on the basis of a 
breach of Maori fishing rights under the Treaty.151 In 1989 the Crown and the Maori parties entered 
an interim agreement152 which later developed into a full a final settlement in 1992.153  
Subsequently, the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 was passed to ensure 
the Deed of Settlement bound non-parties.154 The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement 
Act 1992 required the Crown to pay the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission $150 million so 
that it could buy a 50 per cent share in Sealord Ltd (New Zealand fishing company that held 26 per 
cent of the total fishing quota).155 Maori were also required under the Act to stop certain civil 
proceedings to fisheries, endorsement of the quota management system and to give up claims to 
commercial fishing rights.156 
The Muriwhenua claim that resulted in the Fisheries Settlement was fundamental for Maori self-
determination. The Settlement formed the foundation of Maori management of resources by 
establishing property rights in those resources legislatively acknowledged outside of Maori law.157 
3 Wai 150 (Broadcasting Rights) 
In 1990, Sir Graham Latimer lodged the Wai 150 claim on behalf of the New Zealand Maori 
Council, seeking an interim ruling to place a caveat on the radio spectrum policy contained within 
the Radio Communications Act 1989. The intent was to stop implementation of the radio spectrum 
policy within the Act until negotiations and an agreement had been entered into that protected 
Maori title to radiofrequency products identified within the Act.158  
In the absence of an agreement, the claim submitted that the sale of frequency management licences 
under the Radio Communications Act 1989 would breach the Treaty of Waitangi and Maori 
interests.159 The claim was successful and it was held that the Radio Communications Act 1989 
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prohibits the Crown from alienating management rights to the spectrum from 9 kHz to 3000 GHz, 
without consultation with Maori.160 Also, the Act was held to not provide Maori with a fair and 
equitable share of those rights. The court acknowledged in this claim that Maori have the right to 
the technological exploitation of that spectrum under the Treaty of Waitangi.161 
In these three case studies of advocacy by the New Zealand Maori Council, it is clear that it 
functions to promote Maori self-determination through culture with implications for the protection 
of economic interests. It does so as a grassroots representative body, governed according to Maori 
norms, that has a voice within the New Zealand system of governance. Importantly, however, it is 
supported in its work through the provisions of the Treaty. It is, however, its formal recognition as a 
Maori institution that promotes substantive political participation and outcomes for Maori self-
determination. 
III. CANADIAN FIRST NATIONS’ SELF-DETERMINATION  
 
Like New Zealand, Canada’s Constitution does not explicitly recognise First Nation rights to self-
determination. However, Canada’s Constitution Act 1867 did recognise the special constitutional 
relationship that exists between the First Nations of Canada and the Crown.162 Section 91 (24) 
provided an accountability provision of the Crown to legally and politically protect the rights of 
Canadian First Nations.163  
In the same way that the race power in the Australian Constitution is not required to be read 
beneficially,164 so too has the Canadian provision been applied by the Canadian Parliament to 
regulate almost all aspects of First Nation lives, define the Indian status of First Nations and restrict 
their movement on and off reserves. The exercise of these powers has historically deprived First 
Nations of equal access to civil rights.165  
Since the implementation of the Constitution Act 1982 and entrenchment of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms 1982, recognition of First Nation rights in Canada has been better defined and 
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protected. For instance, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 expressly protects treaty rights 
and democratic rights of First Nations or Aboriginal people. Although s 25 of the Charter does not 
create any new rights, it does protect Aboriginal (or First Nation) rights against the abrogation or 
derogation of existing Aboriginal, treaty, or other, rights or freedoms.166  
The constitutional protection of s 25 is sympathetic to the longstanding history of treaty-making, 
land loss, and paternalistic federal administration of First Nations of Canada. The State’s historical 
approach to regulating First Nations has restructured First Nation political relationships and group 
boundaries, with implications for the ways in which, and the extent to which, those groups self-
determine as a community.167  
The damage has been exacerbated through the Indian Act 1876 which imposed Westernised 
standards on First Nations in its legislative identification of Aboriginal groups as ‘bands’ and land, 
on which those bands resided, as reserves.168 Most relevantly though, the Indian Act 1876 replaced 
Indigenous governmental forms with Westernised practices that were assimilationist in nature.169 
Consequently, the Indian Act 1876 was considered to be a complete regulatory framework for 
managing all of Indian/First Nation affairs including how they would sell land and gain 
citizenship.170  
By 1946 a review was undertaken by a joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, 
of the Canadian Governments’ administration of Indian affairs.171 The joint committee published a 
series of reports that set out new guidelines for future Indian policy,172 including recommendations 
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for the Canadian Government to protect and recognise the right of Indian self-government, and to 
support the exercise of that right through providing financial support for bands.173  
The measures implemented following the report included agreements with provinces to roll out 
services to Indian peoples, along with revisions of the Indian Act 1876 considerate of equal access 
for Indian education, economic development, federal–provincial relations, political development, 
welfare and local government.174 However, progress with self-government initiatives for Indian 
people took a step backwards in 1969 when the Canadian Government issued a White Paper 
flagging its intention to remove its responsibilities for Indian affairs, transferring them to provinces, 
and the repeal of the Indian Act 1876.175  
In seeking to suppress the legal and political acknowledgment of the differentiated cultural identity 
of Indian people, the White Paper is seen as a final step in assimilation of Indians.176 Further, the 
White Paper sought to render Indian reserves as fee-simple property of bands.177 Indians would be 
legally identified as Canadians and only identify as Indian in reference to their ethnic origin.178 
Those who identified as Indian, Aboriginal, and First Nation people of Canada rejected the White 
Paper and by 1973 it was formally withdrawn.  
After the White Paper was withdrawn First Nation communities across Canada became increasingly 
vocal in their advocacy and calls for the Canadian Government to recognise their rights to 
independently govern and internally decolonise themselves.179 Whilst self-governance rights of 
First Nations are recognised and protected as part of First Nation treaty rights within s 35 of the 
Canadian Constitution,180 more practical measures for self-governance of First Nations was 
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recognised by the House of Commons Special Committee on Indian Self-Government in 1983. That 
Special Committee was comprised of members of parliament and three non-voting representatives 
from First Nations organisations.181   
The Special Committee’s report called for an expansion of the concept of self-government to 
formally recognise and protect the distinct form of government of Indian First Nations.182 In doing 
so, the Special Committee acknowledged ways in which band administration could be further 
strengthened. This included the exercise of their self-governance rights over their community’s 
welfare, education and economic development which has enabled bands to establish economic 
enterprises on their reserve lands.183  
Furthermore, the report highlighted the importance of settling outstanding land claims with 
Aboriginal peoples in Quebec, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon Territory.184 It noted the 
integral role of Canadian courts in formally acknowledging the legitimacy of First Nation land 
rights under differing bands’ relevant treaties they have established.185 The result has seen a 
significant and progressive development in Canadian case law that has been used as a legislative 
and policy reform framework to provide legal recognition of self-determination and self-governance 
rights of First Nations of Canada.186  
An exercise of such rights by First Nations of Canada has been practiced through First Nation 
native title rights. Native title can provide successful First Nation claimants with an exclusive right 
to their claimed land and the ability to decide how the land is used and the right to benefit from 
those uses.187  
Prior to the establishment of the native title system in Canada, the Crown was required to consult 
with Aboriginal people of Canada in good faith about their proposed uses of the land. However, 
since the establishment of the native title system in Canada, the Crown comply with its fiduciary 
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obligations owed to Aboriginal people in accordance with s 35 of the Canadian Constitution.188 
Section 35 requires Canadian governments (both federal and provincial governments are subject), to 
must demonstrate, if they implement measures that might interfere with Aboriginal rights and their 
self-government, they are justified in doing so and that such infringement is required for some large 
purpose.189 
In those cases, the Supreme Court in Canada encourages dispute resolution through political 
negotiations rather than litigation.190 This has been beneficial in the northern territories of Canada 
where there is no provincial government. Furthermore, the negotiations and agreements reached 
have also been bilateral.191   
The following sections provide case studies of models of self-determination in Canada – from the 
innovation of self-government as the fullest expression of self-determination, through to particular 
representative bodies at the national level, all of which have the effect of enhancing political 
participation through embracing Indigenous rights to have a say in matters affecting them. 
A. First Nations Self-Government 
Reflecting its genesis within different cultural contexts, self-government of First Nations has taken 
a variety of different forms that have also depended upon the terms of the negotiated agreements or 
treaties with the Canadian Government.192 
The Nunavut and Nisga’a nations provide examples of self-governance for differing tribes within 
the same State. Both tribes exercise self-governance through autonomous political, legal and 
cultural practices that are independent of the State. Both have maintained their status as distinct 
peoples in dealings with the federal government.193 
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The Nunavut government represents the rights and interest of the Inuit people of Canada and was 
established by an Act of the Canadian Parliament.194 It is now regarded as the closest self-
governance system in Canada of First Nations – a comprehensive model of self-determination while 
remaining within the colonial polity.195  
Similarly, the Nisga’a nation established Canada’s first modern treaty with Canada and British 
Columbia. The terms of the Treaty include land rights and self-government, and it has constitutional 
status.196  
Previously, British Columbia governments were opposed to complying with the 1763 Royal 
Proclamation197 that required those governments to recognise native title rights through treaty 
agreements with First Nation owners when acquiring land for a new settlement.198 By 1973, the 
Supreme Court of Canada recognised Nisga’a native title in British Columbia in the landmark 
Calder case.199 However, even after Calder was decided, the government of British Columbia did 
not abandon the strict policy of terra nullius, which it upheld until the 1990s.200 From the 1990s, the 
British Columbia government finally worked with the federal government to negotiate a 
comprehensive treaty agreement with the Nisga’a Nation. British Columbia also established a 
treaty-making process to recognise Nisga’a land rights at a provincial level.201   
Those rights and the Nisga’a system of governance were challenged in early 2000,202 on the basis 
that the Nisga’a Agreement was unconstitutional in recognising Nisga’a sovereignty.203 Williamson 
J of British Columbia’s highest trial court overruled the challenge and reaffirmed their right to self-
governance as First Nations.204 
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The only real limitation on the Nisga’a Nation occurs when their laws conflict with federal and 
provincial laws, which are supreme.205 Despite that limitation, Nisga’a people are empowered to 
manage their lands, their constitution, citizenship, and to maintain and foster their language and 
culture.206 
Overall, the Nisga’a and Nunavut tribes have set the standard for treaty agreements and self-
governance frameworks in Canada.207 Both have been enabled to protect their cultural identity in 
multiple forms, including public order, environmental protection, education, health, social welfare, 
language, culture and citizenship.208  
This chapter now considers the history of self-governance rights being exercised by Canadian First 
Nations through their own nationally recognised representative bodies to determine whether they 
have had a meaningful impact in representing the rights and interests of First Nation affairs. 
B. First Nation Representative Bodies 
 
While self-government took a long time to evolve in Canada, as with Australia and New Zealand, 
there have been a number of nationally recognised representative bodies that have afforded the 
capacity for a degree of political participation in national affairs. 
The 19th century saw a number of First Nation representative bodies in Canada, including the 
Grand General Indian Council of Ontario and Quebec,209 resisting the control of Indian affairs and 
Indian status imposed under the Indian Act 1876;210 the League of Indians of Canada in Ontario, 
concerned with the loss of land and legislative restrictions on hunting, education, administrative 
practices, economic liberty and accessing health services on reserves;211 and the National Indian 
Brotherhood that led opposition to the White Paper.212 The Brotherhood survived and became the 
Assembly of First Nations (which this chapter later discusses) to represent broader First Nation 
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interests.213 In addition, there were other bodies specifically advocating for land rights, including 
the Allied Tribes of British Columbia, and the Nisga’a Land Committee.214  
Other more focused First Nation representative bodies of Canada include the Tapiriit Kanatami, 
representing Inuit people across four Inuit regions which are Nunatsiavut (Labrador), Nunavik 
(northern Quebec), Nunavut, and the Inuvialuit Settlement Region in the Northwest Territories.215 It 
deals with issues that surround Inuit environmental protection and sustainability and other social, 
cultural and political issues that affect those four regions.216 
Similarly, the Metis National Council represents the rights and interests of Metis people within 
national and international forums and, in doing so, ensures it conducts ongoing consultation with 
the Metis federal representatives and leaders that are chosen.217 It is comprised of executive council 
leaders who are elected from Metis governments from Ontario westward. 218  
The national Native Women's Association represents the rights and interests of Canadian 
Aboriginal women (particularly those who identify as First Nations and Metis).219 It highlights the 
increased awareness the Canadian Government has of intersectional discriminatory experiences 
First Nation women of Canada still experience within social and political decision-making 
processes.220  
As with Indigenous Australians and Maori, government departments and legislated bodies were, 
from time to time, charged with oversight of Indigenous affairs. The Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development,221 for example, continues to oversee governmental obligations to 
represent and protect the federal constitutional interests of First Nations, Inuit and Metis.222 The 
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department delivers programs and funding through partnerships with First Nation communities 
through federal–provincial or federal–territorial agreements.223  
In its contemporary guise, the Department (now comprising two departments) provides beneficial 
policy frameworks that guide and enable First Nations to self-govern.224 That it does so highlights 
self-governance rights of First Nations as inherent in the Constitution Act 1982,225 the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms226 and Canada’s Inherent Right Policy 1995227 and its most 
recently renewed 2019 collaborative self-government fiscal policy.228 
Against a broader context of historical and local or issues-based representation, the following 
sections outline key features of two representative bodies that represent the rights and interests of 
all First Nations in Canada: the Assembly of First Nations and the Congress of Aboriginal People.  
1 The Assembly of First Nations 
The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) is one of Canada’s most prominent national First Nation 
representative bodies which develops First Nations policy and represents First Nations interests to 
the federal government.229 The AFN replaced the National Indian Brotherhood in 1982 following 
the Declaration of First Nations (signed in December 1980)230 and represents First Nations with 
Indian status whose name is on a list according to the Indian Act 1876.231 In doing so, it has aimed 
to establish a First Nation political presence within Canada’s central democratic institutions through 
upholding the distinct special status and identity of First Nations.232 
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The AFN receives advice and guidance from regional First Nation Chiefs who are elected every 
three years by Chiefs and members of their respective communities.233 First Nation Chiefs represent 
the rights and interests of First Nations from regions across Canada and attend Chief Assemblies 
twice a year where they contribute to passing resolutions that guide the work of the AFN.234 The 
AFN represents this advice and guidance to the federal government of Canada.235 
The AFN’s structure is comprised of a national executive which includes the National Chief who is 
elected by Chiefs every three years, 10 Regional Chiefs, and the Chairs of the Elders, Women’s and 
Youth councils.236 The consultative process for both regional and national members and Chiefs to 
contribute to the dialogue surrounding First Nations rights in Canada is imperative.237 
The National Chief of the AFN facilitates and coordinates the advocacy work undertaken by the 
national executive council to ensure that it is reflective of First Nations across all regions, on legal 
and policy reform concerning their affairs.238 The AFN also ensures that is seeks prior consent and 
consultation from First Nations all levels of governance so that their interests are included and 
represented during decision-making processes on matters that concern First Nation affairs.239 
The AFN derives its mandate from cultural consent sought from all First Nation community 
members. To achieve that, the AFN is designed to capture all voices from differing First Nation 
communities through sub-groups in the form of interest-based Councils. For instance, the Elders 
Council is comprised of prominent elders of First Nation communities who represent community 
interests from an Elder’s perspective.240 Elders from the Elders Council communicate their 
community messages as representatives selected to participate at one of AFN’s 10 region Councils.  
The advice and guidance provided from representatives of the Elders Council integrate ancient 
cultural knowledge, spirituality and political guidance into AFN policies and consultations with the 
Canadian federal government and other national and international organisations.241 Therefore, the 
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Elder Council’s advice is given high regard and is integral to protecting ancient First Nation cultural 
identity and to best inform First Nation treaty rights and self-governance frameworks.242 Other areas 
of interest the Elders Council contributes advice to range from protection of lands and resources, 
mitigating climate change, new governance relationships and nation-building, the health and well-
being of First Nations and language.243 
Another sub-group of the AFN is the Women’s Council which recognises the importance of gender 
balance within First Nation community perspectives.244 The Women’s Council promotes the rights 
and aspirations of First Nation women on laws and policies concerning First Nation affairs, and 
these are taken to the Canadian Government and other stakeholder entities.245 The representative 
work of the Women’s Council has included, over recent years, their involvement in the National 
Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.246 
Finally, the Youth Council provides advice and guidance to the AFN on First Nation issues 
surrounding youth. It comprises 20 members with one male and one female representative from 
each of the 10 AFN regions.247 Those representatives are chosen by their regional youth councils or 
their Regional Chief and advocate for issues surrounding First Nations youth which include 
protection of languages, healthy lifestyles, culture and education.248  
All Councils that inform the AFN meet and consult with one another at AFN Tri-Council meetings 
which enable all Councils to strategise and work out ways to best support one another. Tri-Council 
meetings and consultative efforts are also ongoing both nationally and regionally at the AFN.249 
The AFN has represented First Nation interests in the realms of treaty rights, economic 
development, education, languages and literacy, health, housing, social development, justice, 
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taxation, land claims and environment.250 In particular, the AFN’s involvement with First Nation 
representation on issues concerning child welfare has influenced much of its policy development 
with self-government. For example, the 1989 report on First Nations child care called for immediate 
funding of community-controlled native child-care.251 It arose from two AFN conferences252 that 
considered a national strategy for First Nations child and family services including self-governance 
frameworks for First Nations to have greater control over First Nations child care. Steps towards 
self-governance included initiatives that would enable First Nation community traditions and 
approaches, to be implemented on child welfare at both national and regional levels. Further, self-
governance initiatives have provided government support that has contributed to reduced rates of 
First Nation children entering into the out-of-home through their own independent implemented 
approaches on governing such issues.253 
Overall, the AFN’s continuous and extensive consultative efforts for First Nation interest groups 
and regions provides an open and collaborative mechanism and representative voice for First 
Nations across Canada. Its commitment to developing self-governance frameworks across all 
societal and political issues that affect First Nations shows clear outcomes in protecting First Nation 
cultural identity and is a prime example of the benefits of representative bodies for political 
participation. 
2 The Congress of Aboriginal Peoples 
Unlike the AFN, the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP) does not specifically deal with 
individual members and service delivery programs.254 However, it provides a useful model for 
supporting affiliate organisations on Aboriginal issues. The overall objective of CAP is to ensure 
Aboriginal citizens of Canada are treated with respect, dignity, integrity, and equality.255  
CAP’s affiliate organisations256 span 10 provinces and territories and work with CAP to advocate 
for better socio-economic conditions for off-reserve status and non-status Indians, Metis and 
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Southern Inuit living in urban or rural areas.257 Its affiliate organisations have their own 
constitutions and rules for membership, their own elected officers, and their own administration. 
Affiliates have an elected President or Chief for each organisation who is elected by delegates at 
their annual assembly. Those organisations can also have several regional and local groups that fall 
under them.258 In turn, the consultation and inclusion of all stakeholders and interest groups are 
expansive. 
CAP’s board is composed by the National Chief, the National Vice-Chief (each elected for a four-
year term), the National Youth Representative (elected for a two-year term), the National Elder 
Representative and an elected representative from each affiliated organisation.259 The board meets 
several times a year, between annual general assemblies, and is the main decision-making body of 
CAP. Directors are elected annually and hold a one-year term.260 The governance structure allows 
for representation reflective of changing Aboriginal perspectives in CAP decision-making. 
Accountability is provided through annual general assemblies, comprising the national executive 
and representatives and delegates from affiliated organisations.261 Examination of financial 
statements and program delivery assists the assembly to identify issues that form the basis of further 
resolutions and policies.262 
As with the AFN, CAP also has a National Youth Council and National Elders Council which 
represent the authority of elders and their perspective and provide Aboriginal youth with a voice to 
communicate their perspectives. Both Councils have membership from the provincial and territorial 
affiliates.263 
CAP was the first National Indigenous Organization in Canada to formalise its relationship with the 
Canadian Government through a Political Accord.264 The Political Accord has been fundamental for 
formalising a co-designed and jointly agreed set of objectives, policy priorities and a process for 
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implementation with resources and funding between CAP and the Canadian Government.265 The 
objective of the Political Accord is to ensure the relationship between CAP and the Canadian 
Government is a cooperative, respectful, rights-based partnership to achieve socio-economic 
reconciliation between Aboriginal peoples and non-Indigenous Canadians.266 The Accord provides 
CAP with a formal legislative tool to draw upon when it is faced with holding the Canadian 
Government accountable for achieving reconciliation within the partnership.267 Many Indigenous 
representative bodies around the world lack such a formalised and respected agreement with their 
national government. 
Political Accords have been a feature of the relationship between CAP and the Canadian 
Government since 1994.268 The latest Political Accord of 2018 reflects a renewed relationship with 
the Canadian Government in response to the 2016 decision in Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development).269 
Daniels was a landmark unanimous decision in the Supreme Court of Canada that affirmed the first 
declaration sought in this case which was that Metis and non-status Indians are ‘Indians’ according 
to s 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867.270 Section 91 (24) provides the Canadian federal 
government with the power to legislate for Indians and lands reserved for the Indians. That power is 
also found in the Indian Act 1986 and has namely been exercised by Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada.271 
Two other declarations sought by CAP and others (Harry Daniels, Gabriel Daniels, Leah Gardner, 
Terry Joudrey) were that the federal Crown owes a fiduciary duty to Metis and non-status Indians, 
and Metis and non-status Indians have the right to be consulted and negotiated with.272 
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The court in Daniels highlighted the significance of granting a declaration for ‘settling a live 
controversy between the parties’273 and that, in granting the first declaration sought, it would enable 
Metis and non-status Indians to rely on guaranteed constitutional rights as opposed to ‘noblesse 
oblige’.274   
In that context, the court noted the importance of providing a declaration to guarantee both certainty 
and accountability given past experiences of Canadian history of federal and provincial 
governments denying legislative authority over non-status Indians and Metis.275 That denial, as the 
court in Daniels points out, has left those Indigenous communities as a ‘jurisdictional wasteland’ in 
terms of legislative authority.276 Furthermore, where the federal government has assumed such 
authority over those communities, it has only done so to achieve assimilation policy objectives.277   
The court also referred to Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v 
Cunningham,278 acknowledging the distinct cultural identity of the Metis and their unique 
communities.279 It also drew upon Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (AG)280 which held 
that the Canadian Government has a fiduciary relationship with Metis and an obligation to uphold 
the honour of the Crown in the promise to implement the land grant. On this argument, the court in 
Daniels held that ‘[t]his created a duty of diligent implementation’281 and on those terms the second 
and third declarations sought were not granted but, rather, acknowledged as ‘settled law’ that the 
fiduciary relationship exists.282 
The Political Accord of 2018 took Daniels into consideration by formally acknowledging the 
government’s responsibility to off-reserve Metis, status and non-status Indians, and Southern Inuit 
Indigenous Peoples.283 As a result, the policy objectives incumbent upon the Canadian Government 
require assurance that Metis and non-status Indians are not deprived of programs, services and 
intangible benefits recognised by the Canadian Government.284 Since Daniels, CAP has contributed 
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to and represented Aboriginal rights across many practical community-based issues within laws and 
policies that affect Aboriginal affairs. 
In addition, the federal government has, since Daniels, provided CAP with funding to establish a 
national Daniels Symposium to create a forum of meaningful dialogue between grassroots 
Indigenous Peoples, stakeholders, legal experts and the Government of Canada.285 The Daniels 
Symposium brings together CAP’s grassroots constituency over a two-day conference, allowing 
attendees to make contributions on what steps need to be taken post-Daniels on advocacy, policy 
and program development initiatives.286 
From 2013 to 2017, CAP also ran a ‘National Grassroots Engagement Tour’ which aimed to 
connect grassroots communities across Canada with CAP. 287 The tour provided grassroots 
community members across Canada with an opportunity to voice concerns with the management of 
matters affecting their rights and affairs as Indigenous people.288 
CAP has also represented Aboriginal women, youth and Elders in its submission of its 2017 
position paper for the 5th National Aboriginal Women’s Summit in Toronto.289 The National 
Aboriginal Women’s Summit focused on empowering Indigenous women, youth, and Elders, and 
CAP’s position paper provided recommendations on three key policy areas that affect Aboriginal 
women, to stimulate discussion amongst attendees with a focus on their experiences and lives as 
urban Indigenous women and girls.290  
Since Daniels, and since various Political Accords, CAP has worked to eradicate violence against 
Indigenous women and girls291 including establishing the ‘Walking in her Moccasins Bundle’ 
initiative, a collaborative effort with the White Ribbon Foundation, which equips Indigenous men 
and boys with the skills to respond to and prevent violence against Indigenous women and girls.292 
The ‘Walking in her Moccasins Bundle’ initiative engages Indigenous communities as a whole so 
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that the entire community can be involved in the healing process of overcoming various impacts of 
colonisation.293 
CAP has also created the ‘Miykiwan Toolkit’ which is geared towards improving the lives of 
Aboriginal families living off-reserve in Canada by providing a resource that builds upon the 
strengths and resilience of Aboriginal communities.294 It is an educational resource for Aboriginal 
families to access that encourages them to and provides them ways to live healthier lives and ways 
to prevent and reduce re-occurrence of the different forms of violence that may be present within 
their communities.295 
CAP provides an example of what a national Indigenous representative body can look like and how 
it can function. The Political Accords it has established with the Canadian Government have 
enabled a co-development partnership, contributing to beneficial policies and initiatives in support 
of all Canadian Indigenous identities. This has also been integral to ensuring accountability of the 
Canadian Government, in terms of adhering to both its constitutional and treaty obligations.296  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Both New Zealand and Canada have implemented a diverse range of representative bodies, both 
local and national, that promote Indigenous political participation through self-determination with 
resulting meaningful impact on their respective Indigenous communities. 
In New Zealand, the Waitangi Tribunal supports Maori to hold the New Zealand Government 
accountable for adhering to its treaty obligations and, in providing advice and recommendations 
from its findings, encourages Maori policy and law reform where need be.  
Although the Waitangi Tribunal’s powers are limited to that of an advisory body, its 
recommendations to the New Zealand Government are well respected, which fosters the partnership 
relationship established between the New Zealand Government and Maori. This is particularly so in 
cases where there lies uncertainty in the Treaty’s meaning and application.297  
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Overall, the functionality of the Waitangi Tribunal exemplifies a culturally empowering Indigenous 
representative body that protects Maori cultural identity and represents their interests to the general 
New Zealand law and policymaking institutions with the power to affect Maori affairs. In doing so, 
it serves as an institution of self-determination. 
It is not the only one, however. In addition, the New Zealand Maori Council holds a statutory 
mandate to work for and on behalf of the greater Maori community for land, forestry, fisheries, 
language and radiofrequency spectrum fundamental to Maori cultural identity. Given that its role 
covers a range of Maori areas of interests and issues, its ongoing consultation with Maori 
Committees has been integral to connecting all District Maori Councils to the New Zealand 
Government in making representations on laws and policies that concern Maori rights and affairs.298 
This role allows the New Zealand Maori Council to advise on both national and community-based 
policies that affect the partnership, protection, consultation and compensation for Maori.  
The New Zealand Maori Council works alongside and complementary to the Waitangi Tribunal 
through assistance in claims and disputes put before the Waitangi Tribunal. In doing so, the Council 
represents Maori who wish to be dealt with together rather than at a tribal level. 
As with New Zealand, in Canada, the AFN’s continuous and extensive consultation with First 
Nation interest groups and regions provides an open and collaborative mechanism and 
representative voice. Its inclusive National Executive structure has supported an effective formal 
consultative and election process, bringing together diverse interest group perspectives within First 
Nation cultural identity. Their contributions to the dialogue surrounding First Nations rights in 
Canada has been fundamental to First Nation legal and policy reform.299 
Lastly, CAP formalises the terms on which it engages with the federal government through a 
Political Accord. The partnership with the State has contributed to holding the Canadian 
Government to account on its constitutional and treaty obligations.300
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The key finding of this thesis is that Australia lacks the institutional responses to support 
Indigenous political participation in Australia’s representative democracy – both directly, 
through bodies that might articulate the aspirations of Indigenous Australians, and also 
indirectly through the failure of existing institutions and their processes to comprehend the 
lived experience of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. A wider range of colonial, 
culturally divisive and racially discriminatory factors contribute to this, limiting rights of self-
determination and their accessibility for Indigenous peoples in Australia.  
More specifically, contributing factors include racism within electoral institutions, systems, 
legislation, structures and policies. Without the Australian Government taking affirmative 
action to remove racism entrenched within its democratic institutions, Australia will maintain 
its longstanding low rates of Indigenous political participation.  
In response to this finding, this thesis synthesises the experiences of other equivalent 
jurisdictions, suggesting legal institutional reform that would offer a greater opportunity for 
Indigenous self-determination through an enhanced opportunity for political participation. 
This response addresses the goal of free and equal access to political participation for all 
citizens – including those of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander descent, and including the 
capacity for these peoples to express collective self-determination. 
The following parts suggest possible reforms focusing on the three elements of political 
participation: voter enrolment and participation; candidacy eligibility; and Indigenous body 
representation. 
I. VOTING  
 
At a preliminary stage to comprehensive reform, amendment of the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act 1918 is an easy and fast reform which would make immediate progress increasing 




goal to safeguard participation through the entrenchment of self-determination mechanisms, 
it does entail a lengthier and complex process.1384 
Reforming the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 to address identified direct and indirect 
barriers that limit Aboriginal access to enrolment and voting at Commonwealth elections 
might, therefore, be a preferable option in the first instance. Additionally, it would engage 
more disenfranchised Aboriginal voters to be ready to vote at a referendum for their 
constitutional recognition and, in turn, provide a greater chance of its success. 
As this thesis identifies in Chapter 2, citizens are required to verify their identity upon 
enrolment for Commonwealth elections. Typically this is done by way of a person producing 
their photo identification in the form of their driver’s license or passport number to an AEC 
officer in their local electorate.1385 If a person does not have photo identification or a passport 
number to produce, they must be accompanied by a person already enrolled to vote at the 
election who can declare and vouch for their identity.1386  
Given documented issues with registration of Aboriginal births, many Aboriginal people will 
not have access to the requisite identification and may not feel the incentive to bring someone 
to vouch for their identity. Typically, where Aboriginal births are registered their birth 
certificate is rarely obtained when they live in financial hardship. This is particularly the case 
for those living in remote communities that lack services and support.1387 This requirement 
can, therefore, create a barrier and lack of incentive to enrol and vote for Aboriginal citizens. 
In response, the AEC should draw upon its already established policy mandates of seeking to 
support and enhance Aboriginal political participation and work in partnership with state and 
territory registries of Births, Deaths and Marriages to financially assist disenfranchised 
Aboriginal citizens without a birth certificate to obtain one.1388  
This measure alone would assist those individuals to obtain necessary identification to 
identify themselves in a standardised way to secure their place at the polling booth. The 
additional benefit of a birth certificate is securing a driver’s license. Driving without a licence 
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is a key factor in incarceration rates in some areas, resulting in disqualification from voting. 
Ensuring equitable access to birth certificates opens the possibility of reducing this risk.  
Voter registration is also important for providing necessary data to the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics for state and territory population statistics. Those statistics are used to determine 
how many seats should be apportioned to state and territory electorates in the Commonwealth 
House of Representatives.1389 Jurisdictions with high populations of Indigenous citizens 
whose births are not registered and who are not on the electoral rolls will be inadequately 
represented in the Commonwealth House of Representatives. There are multiple layers in 
which Indigenous people are disenfranchised through this one seemingly simple factor.  
Finally, this measure also contributes to enhancing the incentive for Aboriginal citizens to run 
as a candidate in a Commonwealth election, given their eligibility to do so is determined by 
whether they are enrolled and eligible to vote at Commonwealth elections.1390  
Second, the AEC should increase and enhance its voter education programs and support 
measures for Aboriginal citizens. Compared to the non-Indigenous population, Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Australians have lower levels of literacy and numeracy. This can 
make filling out the ballot, and understanding party and candidate politics, difficult and 
confusing. Prior to the implementation of the 2016 Senate voting system, informal 
Indigenous citizens’ votes were high. It is only reasonable to increase support for Indigenous 
voters to engage in elections.  
This would include enhancing political education and support in communities with a high 
Indigenous population, particularly ones dispersed in remote locations. It should be supported 
through increased remote polling stations and Indigenous liaison officers to enhance outreach 
to those citizens, similar to Canada’s expansion of its community relations officers who are 
appointed to help with First Nation electors voting in Canadian elections. 
Third, political participation would be enhanced through reform of key disqualifying 
provisions that create a barrier to Aboriginal enfranchisement within the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918. Disqualification based on ‘unsound mind’ and ‘incarcerated for three 
years or more’, applied without appropriate regard to important differentiating experiences of 
Indigenous Australians, constitutes a structural barrier to political participation. For 
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Indigenous Australians, the consequence of one-size-fits-all disqualification is a failure to 
comprehend the contemporary effects of dispossession and ongoing limited access to full and 
equal citizenship and civil rights for Indigenous Australians.  
The ‘unsound mind’ provision should be repealed entirely, or in the alternative, should at 
least address the vagueness and ambiguity in its wording to provide clarity as to who decides 
the requisite disqualifying state of mind, what constitutes ‘unsound mind’, and the process of 
determination. This should be guided by international standards relating to1391 persons with a 
disability and the Australian Human Rights Commission.1392  
This thesis suggests adopting a similar approach to the narrow wording contained within New 
Zealand electoral legislation. For instance, s 80 (c) of the Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) only 
disqualifies persons who are detained in a hospital under the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 or are detained in a secure facility under the Intellectual 
Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003.1393 That electoral disqualifier 
really only applies to persons subject to a court order that declares their mental 
impairment1394 or compulsory treatment order. In turn, if inserted into the Australian 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, it would potentially provide more scope for more 
practical support to be expanded upon by the AEC that would seek to actually enhance 
citizen voting participation at Commonwealth elections rather than blanket banning people 
for a range of different mental illnesses at differing degrees of seriousness and from differing 
cultural backgrounds, some of which might suffer from continued racial bias within the 
health care system like Indigenous Australians.1395 
The incarceration disqualification should be repealed entirely. As observed in the Canadian 
context, Canada does not apply this disqualification in practice, having recognised that the 
provision goes against principles of justice and societal rehabilitation. With a high and 
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disproportionate Indigenous incarcerated population, and in light of the effects of 
colonisation in particular,1396 it is unfair and undemocratic.  
To adapt Australia’s voting system, it should incorporate, alongside the already suggested 
reform options, its own Indigenous Electoral Roll Option that would work similarly to New 
Zealand’s Maori Electoral Roll Option. This should be incorporated within the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 to give expression to political self-determination rights of 
Indigenous Australian citizens, to be exercised through their identification of themselves on 
their own differentiated electoral roll.  
The data from those registered on the Indigenous Electoral Roll Option can be used with 
Australian census data to determine whether more measures need to be taken by the 
Australian Government and AEC to increase and enhance Indigenous Australians’ political 
participation and representation in Commonwealth politics. More specifically, the data used 
would also determine, like the Maori Electoral Roll Option does, the number of Indigenous 
electorates should be established or increased for the next election to provide cultural 
electoral proportionality of representation of Indigenous Australians. Like Maori designated 
seats in Parliament, there should be a set minimal figure of established Indigenous electorates 
that cannot be decreased and can only continue to be maintained or increased based on census 
data and data obtained from the Indigenous Electoral Roll Option. 
Overall, these proposals for Commonwealth electoral law and policy reform in Australia for 
voter enrolment and participation would demonstrate a meaningful commitment by the 
Australian Government to principles of proportionality, equality, representative democracy 
and, most importantly, self-determination. 
II. CANDIDACY  
 
As with voting laws, electoral laws pose a barrier to Indigenous Australians standing for 
election and to promote political participation requires reform of the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918. While changes to voting eligibility will flow through to candidacy, 
measures implemented in New Zealand in particular show how candidacy can be guaranteed 
within the parliament – namely through designated seats in the Commonwealth Parliament 
for Indigenous candidates.   
                                                             




The absence of Indigenous representatives in the national parliament has been a significant 
issue politically for Indigenous Australians given the advocacy undertaken within the 
Commonwealth arena. Yet Indigenous cultural affairs remain largely represented by non-
Indigenous voices in Commonwealth decision-making processes. The disqualification of 
candidates who are not enrolled to vote at Commonwealth elections, together with the lack of 
guaranteed designated seats, have provided a minimal incentive for Indigenous citizens to run 
as candidates at Commonwealth elections, with consequences for political participation.  
Where policy concerning cultural affairs is developed by parliamentary representatives who 
are not of Indigenous descent, and who lack an Indigenous perspective through experience 
and authentic connection to Indigenous cultural issues, Indigenous Australians remain 
effectively unrepresented. Despite the Australian Constitution requiring members of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to represent the interests of their electors, there remains a 
significant number of disenfranchised Indigenous citizens within their electorates, whether 
registered or not. These citizens remain without a culturally appropriate means of their own 
political representation relative to the majority non-Indigenous population.1397  
Legislated guaranteed seats for Indigenous representation in Commonwealth Parliament 
would ensure their representation is safeguarded, and that in and of itself would support 
principles of self-determination and representative democracy for all, at the highest level of 
mainstream politics. 
Further, this strategy, like New Zealand’s designated seats for Maori, aligns with the 
proposed implementation of an Indigenous Electoral Roll Option which would be used with 
Indigenous census data to determine whether electorate boundaries need to be adjusted and 
designated seats increased. There should be, however, a minimal seat allocation in 
Commonwealth Parliament of Indigenous designated seats that cannot be taken away – only 
increased – again, similar to the framework of Maori designated seats in New Zealand. 
This reform proposal would not only enhance political proportionality within Australia’s 
Commonwealth structure but also provide a better chance for authentic Indigenous political 
representation in Commonwealth law-making processes. In addition, it would represent a 
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better likelihood for success of constitutional reform that recognises Indigenous rights and 
cultural identity. 
III. NATIONAL BODY REPRESENTATION 
 
Whilst Commonwealth electoral law and policy reform are necessary measures to enhance 
Aboriginal political participation in voting and representation at a federal level in Australian 
politics, those measures still require constitutional reform to safeguard such rights to 
recognition and protection of Indigenous cultural identity in Australia.   
 
The absence of meaningful representation and inclusion of Indigenous Australians in 
Commonwealth decision-making processes is due in no small part to the absence of 
constitutional recognition and protection of their rights and cultural identity. Consequently, 
constitutional recognition and entrenchment of such rights are fundamental to enhancing and 
protecting Indigenous rights to cultural identity, self-determination, self-governance and 
political participation.  
 
Without constitutional protection of such rights, previous national Indigenous representative 
bodies that have been established in Australia have been short-lived due to the parliament’s 
unconstrained ability to repeal their establishing legislation. There has also been minimal 
advocacy behind protecting the financial support each of those representatives has been 
allocated to meet their service delivery objectives.1398  
 
The importance of entrenched constitutional rights is revealed by the experiences of 
Indigenous peoples in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Canada and New Zealand, for 
example, have constitutional arrangements that afford a recognised partnership between their 
national government and Indigenous citizens. While not perfect, these institutional 
arrangements afford enhanced inclusion of Indigenous citizens’ voices in national decision-
making processes, and legislative frameworks implemented to guide those dialogues.  
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In addition to constitutional arrangements, both Canada and New Zealand have treaties 
between their national governments and Indigenous peoples that have supported the 
development of substantive rights to enhanced political participation. Canada has a 
constitutionally entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms that recognises First Nation 
rights and New Zealand has a Bill of Rights that, although not constitutionally entrenched, 
guides the relationship between Maori and the New Zealand Government alongside the 
Treaty of Waitangi.  
 
Those constitutional arrangements have guided the establishment and maintenance of 
Indigenous national representative bodies. Most importantly, though, the Indigenous 
representative bodies that have been established in Canada and New Zealand have had a 
meaningful impact on their Indigenous peoples’ affairs through their advocacy and protection 
of rights to self-determination and cultural identity. 
 
Australia has proposals for constitutional reform to entrench Indigenous rights – with a 
mandate of First Nations obtained through recognised discursive processes. Despite the 
government’s insistence on ever more inquiries, the Voice to Parliament and Makarrata 
Commission proposals meet the test of robust and equitable Indigenous political participation 
within the colonial legal framework. Based on the experience in Canada and New Zealand, 
however, and the history of Australian representative bodies, constitutional entrenchment is 
vital to avoid the risk of their being dismantled, or financially deprived without, at the very 
least, government accountability. Establishing these institutions provides the framework for a 
partnership between Indigenous Australians and the Australian Government that is formally 
recognised, respected and protected.  
 
To shore up the advancement of Indigenous political participation requires also establishment 
of the proposed Truth-Telling Commission through legislation. The Commission would add 
value and work alongside the Makarrata Commission and Voice to Parliament to enhance and 
protect the overall objectives sought to recognise Indigenous cultural identity, history and 





While the institutional co-design process is still underway following the appointment of an 
advisory panel,1399 it is instructive to consider the experience of similar bodies in Canada and 
New Zealand. The role and structure of the Waitangi Tribunal offer a useful framework for 
how the Makarrata Commission could be structured in terms of its proposed role to supervise 
treaty negotiations between Indigenous Australians and the Australian Government.  
The Waitangi Tribunal is empowered to investigate and hear Maori claims back to 1840 that 
concern the practical implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi 1840. It can also make 
determinations as to whether the New Zealand government has acted inconsistently with 
treaty principles and if it finds that the New Zealand government has, the Tribunal must then 
determine whether those actions are prejudice to Maori claimants and what actions should be 
taken to compensate for, remove or prevent the prejudice.1400  
The Tribunal can also refer claims to mediation and in certain circumstances, make binding 
recommendations for the return of land owned by the Crown where the Crown and the 
claimants have not been able to negotiate a settlement.1401  
The Tribunal has a chairperson and up to 20 members who must be appointed by the 
Governor-General. Maori Land Court judges and members who hold legal qualification can 
also serve as inquiry presiding officers. As part of its broader structure, the Tribunal also has 
a ‘Governance Group’ which is convened by the chairperson and is responsible for the 
strategic direction, and reviews the progress of, the Tribunal’s work programme. 1402 The 
Ministry of Justice of the Tribunal is responsible for providing operational support to the 
Tribunal through the Waitangi Tribunal Unit which delivers a range of services including 
being a registrar, undertaking event management, research, report writing, and administrative 
services.1403 
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Overall, the Tribunal is an ideal model for Australia to consider in its development and co-
design of the proposed Makarrata Commission as both seek to contribute to fair resolutions of 
Treaty claims and to uphold the partnership relationship between Indigenous people and the 
Crown.1404 Therefore, part of the Makarrata Commission’s supervisory role should include a 
mechanism of accountability on treaty claims, like the Waitangi Tribunal, that enables it to 
hear treaty disputes and ensure both parties adhere to their obligations prior to treaties being 
formed (as to process) and thereafter.1405  
In addition, the AFN in Canada is useful for consideration for Australia’s proposed Makarrata 
Commission because but it also deals with issues surrounding Canadian government 
adherence to First Nation treaty rights across Canada. Further, unlike New Zealand but more 
like Australia, First Nation identity in Canada is not one homogenous culture. First Nations of 
Canada are separate and distinct cultural identities in their own right. The AFN model, 
illustrates a means of accommodating consent and consultation within and between First 
Nation tribes of Canada, and their representation on the national executive. For instance, the 
AFN’s national executive structure comprises the National Chief who is elected by Chiefs 
every three years, 10 Regional Chiefs, and the Chairs of the Elders, Women’s and Youth 
councils.1406 The AFN also models a consultative process for both regional and national 
members and Chiefs to contribute to the dialogue surrounding First Nations rights in Canada.  
The AFN also offers a culturally internal democratic elective process that, if applied in 
Australia, would see Indigenous Australians periodically elect their own regional 
representatives to represent their regional interests within National Indigenous Makarrata 
forums on matters concerning the protection of cultural identity and rights to self-
determination. As such, both the national executive structure, internal electoral processes and 
consultative role that the AFN takes in Canada, should be considered in Australia for the 
design of the Makarrata Commission to enable all differing Indigenous Australian 
perspectives on treaty, to be consulted and included during those processes of treaty-making 
and dispute resolution.  
For the Voice to Parliament proposal, Australia should consider the design and structure of 
the New Zealand Maori Council. Whilst the Maori Council is established as a national 
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legislative body under the Maori Welfare Act 19621407 and is not constitutionally entrenched 
like what is sought after with the Voice to Parliament proposal, it is a national policy-making 
body inclusive of Maori voices and interests. The Maori Council is responsible for ensuring 
continuous consultation between the New Zealand Government and Maori Committees and 
makes representations to ministers and other stakeholders on behalf of Maori in law and 
policy-making processes. In turn, the Maori Council leads Maori policy development in New 
Zealand at both national and community-based levels.1408  
Another beneficial aspect of the function of the Maori Council that the co-design process of 
the Voice to Parliament should be considerate of, is that it also ensures it connects all District 
Maori Councils to the New Zealand Government and other key stakeholders on matters 
surrounding Maori affairs. The New Zealand Maori Council is comprised of an executive 
which has up to three delegates from each of the 16 District Maori Councils across New 
Zealand and the delegates hold a three-year tenure until the next election cycle.1409  
In addition, the consultation undertaken by the Council has been beneficial for and integral to 
connecting all District Maori Councils to the New Zealand Government on matters that 
concern Maori rights and affairs.1410 This is particularly useful for Australia to consider given 
how diverse Indigenous cultural identities, perspectives and experiences are and, the way in 
which most community representative voices from remote locations across Australia, are 
excluded and go unheard in such law and policy making processes.1411 
The design of the CAP in Canada is relevant also to the Voice design process. Political 
Accord agreements with the Canadian Government safeguard its rights and objectives as a 
representative body of non-status Indians. This type of agreement is useful as a governing 
framework for the design of the Voice to Parliament, to clarify how the Voice to Parliament’s 
recommendations are to be considered within the Commonwealth Parliament and, where 
relevant, applied.  
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In terms of constitutionally entrenching the Voice to Parliament, this aspect of the proposal is 
reliant on the Australian government’s decision to hold a referendum once the co-design 
process is completed. The intent behind constitutionally entrenching the Voice to Parliament 
is to protect it from being either legislatively or administratively extinguished, as this thesis 
has discussed in Chapter 5. Constitutional entrenchment would protect the Voice to 
Parliament from legislative override and significant funding cuts by the Australian 
government that would limit its capacity to function and exist.  
For the Voice to Parliament to be successful at a referendum, it is reliant on strong multi-
partisan parliamentary consensus for the timing of the referendum and the content and 
wording of the Voice to Parliament referendum proposal. The timing of the referendum 
should also be held at either the next federal election or the date of the 1967 referendum 
which was the last referendum Australia had that recognised Indigenous Australian rights. 
In all of these recommendations, at the heart lies the importance of reconciling a long 
disconnected post-colonial relation between Indigenous Australians as peoples, and the 
Australian Government. To overcome that, Australia’s national identity must be reformed as 
it manifests within political laws, policies, processes and institutions. This thesis calls for a 
renewed approach centred upon self-determination as a means of empowering Indigenous 
Australians to decide on matters that affect them. Such an approach aims to rectify past 
wrongs, and to take action, ensuring that Australia does so in accordance with principles of 
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